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CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 41 FALL 2004 NUMBER 1
THE NEW ADR: AGGREGATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
AND GREEN TREE FINANCIAL CORP. v. BAZZLE
IMRE S. SZALAI*
[Q]uod aliud est iudicium, aliud est arbitrium.... [Q]uaero abs te, quid
ita de hac pecunia, de his ipsis HS iccc de tuarum tabularum fide com-
promissum feceris, arbitrum sumpseris, quantum aequius et melius sit
dan ..... '
Trial before a judge is one thing, arbitration is another. I ask you why did
you make an agreement to abide by the award of an arbitrator concerning
the amount of money [you seek], 50,000 sesterces, and concerning the
credit of your books? Why did you choose an arbitrator to determine how
much would be fair and good to be given to you?
2
INTRODUCTION
In Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle,3 the Justices of the Su-
preme Court clashed with each other regarding class arbitration under
the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA").4 Historically, most reported ju-
* Visiting Fellow, California Western School of Law. The author would like to thank his
wife, Andrea, and daughter, Ella, for their loving support. The author also would like to
thank Barbara Cox for her insightful thoughts and comments regarding the article, Ruben
Garcia for his helpful discussions regarding class arbitration and the Federal Arbitration Act,
and Erik Matala for his outstanding research assistance.
1. Marcus Tullius Cicero, Pro Quinto Roscio Comodeo, in 6 CICERO 10, 12 (J.H. Freese
trans., 1984) [hereinafter CICERO].
2. Author's translation.
3. 539 U.S. 444 (2003) [hereinafter Bazzle].
4. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000); see Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 447, 454-55.
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dicial opinions regarding the FAA have involved arbitration adminis-
tered on a non-class basis. However, in the wake of Bazzle, lower
courts, the American Arbitration Association ("AAA"), and arbitrators
have ushered in an era of privately-created tribunals administering ar-
bitration on a class-wide basis. Lower courts are now paving the way
for class arbitration by compelling arbitration and holding that the ar-
bitrators, and not courts, should determine whether class arbitration is
permissible.5 In response to Bazzle, the AAA adopted class arbitration
rules patterned after Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.6
The AAA Class Rules provide that arbitrators may construe arbitra-
tion agreements to determine whether they provide for class arbitra-
tion. Arbitrators may also administer the entire class arbitration pro-
ceeding, determining class certification and awarding class-wide
relief.7 Arbitrators have already begun administering these AAA
Class Rules.8
The Supreme Court's Bazzle decision did not set forth binding
precedent, contrary to the interpretations of various courts, the AAA,
and arbitrators. The FAA has traditionally served as a valuable tool,
which acknowledges and enforces agreements to arbitrate on an indi-
vidual, non-class basis. Although some Justices have expressly stated
that class-wide arbitration in general is consistent with the FAA,9 the
5. See, e.g., Walker v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., No. Civ.A.3:03-CV-0684-N,
2004 WL 246406, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 15, 2004) (compelling arbitration and holding that
under Bazzle, the arbitrator must determine whether the agreement forbids or allows class ar-
bitration).
6. See AAA Supplementary Rules for Class Arbitration http://www.adr.org (last visited
Nov. 13, 2004) [hereinafter AAA Class Rules].
7. See AAA Class Rules, supra note 6, at Rules 3-7. Prior to Bazzle, a few courts, pri-
marily state courts in California and Pennsylvania, had sanctioned a type of hybrid class arbi-
tration procedure whereby a court certifies a class and then orders an arbitration to proceed on
a class-wide basis. See, e.g., Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club, 231 Cal. Rptr. 315 (Cal. Ct. App.
1986); Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860, 861 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)
("[W]e find that this class action, if properly certified, may continue through arbitration on a
class-wide basis. We therefore remand to the trial court for class certification proceedings.
After this ruling, the trial court must compel arbitration.").
8. The AAA's vice president for case management reportedly said after Bazzle, "We are
administering a number of class actions now, whereas before, we refused to take them." Post
Green Tree: AAA Will Produce Class Action Rules, 21 ALTERNATIVES To HIGH COST LITIG.
138, 138 (2003). The AAA now maintains a docket of class arbitrations being administered
under the AAA Class Rules on its website, http://www.adr.org (last visited on Nov. 13, 2004).
See, e.g., Clause Constr. Award, Goldstein v. Ibase Consulting of Fairfield County, LLC,
("After Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, the issue of whether a contract, silent about whether
a claimant may maintain a class or collection action, permits such an action, is clearly for an
arbitrator to decide."), at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=16235&JSPsrc=upload/
livesite/RulesProcedures/Topicsnterest/ldentitiesSheriesGoldstein.htm (last visited on
Nov. 15, 2004) (citation omitted).
9. See Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 459 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by O'Connor & Kennedy, JJ.,
2
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Supreme Court has not set forth a controlling analysis of how the
FAA's procedural mechanisms may operate in connection with class
arbitration. However, a general approach for applying the FAA's pro-
cedural mechanisms in connection with class arbitration can be
gleaned from other authority, and this article will explore a suggested
approach.
As the opening quote shows, Cicero's statements are as relevant
today with respect to this trend toward class arbitration as they were
more than 2,000 years ago in ancient Rome. For example, Cicero rec-
ognized that arbitration is a matter of agreement, 0 which is a founda-
tional principle underlying the FAA. This core principle raises some
concerns regarding class arbitration and the FAA. Respecting this
core principle in a non-class arbitration, where the validity of one
agreement to arbitrate may be at issue, is relatively uncomplicated in
comparison to possibly determining the validity of thousands of agree-
ments to arbitrate in a class-wide arbitration. Furthermore, Cicero
questioned someone's choice of arbitration as a method of resolving a
dispute."1 Judges, recognized as "public servants"12 who "represent
the interest of society as a whole,"' 3 have usually administered class
actions, which sometimes may involve claims of millions of dollars
and impact a nationwide class of individuals.' 4 As the trend toward
class arbitration as a form of collective alternative dispute resolution
gains momentum, it is important to examine Cicero's question in con-
nection with class arbitration and assess whether it is appropriate for a
private arbitrator to resolve such class claims that may have wide-
ranging impact.
It has been observed with respect to traditional judicial class ac-
tions that "there is no consensual tie between the represented and the
representative,"' 5 and because of a lack of consent, "interest represen-
dissenting) ("[T]he FAA does not prohibit parties from choosing to proceed on a class-wide
basis.").
10. See CICERO, supra note 1.
11. See CICERO, supra note 1.
12. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 202 (1979).
13. Id. at 203.
14. See, e.g., I ALBA CONTE & HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS
§ 3:5 (4th ed. 2002) ("Class actions under the amended Rule 23 have frequently involved
classes numbering in the hundreds, or thousands, or even millions.") (citations omitted); 2 id.
at § 4:40 (recognizing aggregate damages to a class may involve "hundreds or thousands or
millions of dollars"); 2 id. at § 6:24, (noting class actions may "affect hundreds of thousands,
or even millions, of persons similarly situated"); Kuenz v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 104
F.R.D. 474 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (certifying nationwide class); Avagliano v. Sumitomo Shoji Am.,
Inc., 103 F.R.D. 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (certifying nationwide class).
15. John Bronsteen & Owen Fiss, The Class Action Rule, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1419,
3
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tation," 6 whereby the "plaintiff represents the interests of the
class ... is the only justification for conceiving class actions as repre-
sentative lawsuits."'" It has been argued that these non-consensual
representations in traditional judicial class actions are "inherently sus-
pect and grate against even a minimum regard for allowing individuals
to be in charge of their own destiny."' 8 Nevertheless, our legal system
tolerates this method of representation in traditional judicial class ac-
tions primarily because "the class action is the only mechanism by
which our legal system can redress a large-scale public wrong."19
Class arbitration, which in theory should be entirely premised upon
consent, has the potential to alleviate some of these concerns and
serve as a representative mechanism whereby large-scale public
wrongs are redressed, and whereby class members are bound by the
arbitration, as a result of "consent, not coercion."'2 However, appro-
priate safeguards must be in place to ensure that the contracts of the
parties are honored and the arbitration remains consensual.
This trend toward class arbitration resolution has been occurring
against the interesting backdrop of a somewhat opposite trend in Con-
gress toward increased federal jurisdiction over judicial class actions
with potential nationwide ramifications. Congress has recently at-
tempted, but failed, to expand federal jurisdiction over certain class
actions.2' According to congressional reports regarding the proposed
legislation, increased federal oversight of class actions is justified in
part because of abuses that have occurred in connection with class ac-
tions in state courts.22 This recent Congressional push toward in-
creased federal oversight of class actions raises questions about the
adjudication of class claims in a privatized arbitral forum, relatively
insulated from judicial review.
This article, like ancient Gaul, is divided into three main parts.
The first section will analyze the Supreme Court's splintered Bazzle
decision, which fails to set forth binding precedent, and examine how
1419-20 (2003).
16. Id. at 1420.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1421.
19. Id.
20. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468,
479 (1989) ("Arbitration under the [Federal Arbitration] Act is a matter of consent, not coer-
cion.").
21. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 108-144 (2003); S. 2062, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 274, 108th
Cong. (2003).
22. See, e.g., S. REp. No. 108-23 (2003) (detailing abuses of class actions in state court
warranting increased federal jurisdiction).
[Vol. 41
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lower courts, the AAA, and arbitrators have been erroneously constru-
ing the Bazzle decision as authoritative. The second section will ex-
plore a suggested approach for handling class arbitration under the
FAA consistent with the core principle that arbitration is a matter of
agreement. This second section will also examine whether a court or
arbitrator should determine whether an arbitration agreement provides
for class arbitration. Finally, the third section will explore some con-
cerns about class arbitration as a means of aggregate dispute resolu-
tion, particularly in light of due process concerns and the narrow stan-
dard of review traditionally accorded to an arbitral decision. A system
of aggregate dispute resolution may be workable under the current
version of the FAA. However, if parties wish to resort to such a sys-
tem, a procedure should exist to ensure that the agreements of the par-
ties are respected, and amendments to the FAA should be considered
to help facilitate the system.
I. BAZZLE AND ITS AFTERMATH
A. The Background Leading Up to the Supreme
Court's Decision in Bazzle
The Bazzle litigation began when two sets of plaintiffs separately
filed actions in South Carolina state courts against Green Tree Finan-
cial Corporation ("Green Tree"), a commercial lender.23 The plain-
tiffs' underlying disputes involved Green Tree's alleged failure to
provide a certain form at the time of their loan transactions.24 The
form would have notified the plaintiffs that they had a right to name
their own lawyers and insurance agents in connection with the loan
transaction.25 The plaintiffs claimed the failure to provide the form
violated South Carolina law.26
One set of plaintiffs, Lynn and Burt Bazzle (the "Bazzles"), asked
the court to certify their claims as a class action, and defendant Green
Tree moved to stay the court proceedings and compel arbitration.27
The court certified a class and entered an order compelling arbitra-
tion.28 An arbitrator found Green Tree liable for not complying with a
23. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 351 (S.C. 2002) [hereinafter Green
Tree].
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South Carolina statute and eventually awarded the class $10,935,000
in statutory damages in addition to attorney's fees.29 The trial court
confirmed the award, and Green Tree appealed to the South Carolina
Court of Appeals, claiming, inter alia, that class arbitration was not
permissible.3"
With respect to the other set of plaintiffs, Daniel Lackey and
George and Florine Buggs (the "Lackeys"), defendant Green Tree
moved the trial court to compel arbitration, and the court at first de-
nied Green Tree's motion, finding the arbitration agreement unen-
forceable." A state appellate court reversed the denial of the motion
to compel arbitration, and an arbitrator was thereafter selected.32 The
arbitrator, the same person selected to administer the Bazzles' arbitra-
tion proceedings, certified a class and awarded $9,200,000 in damages
in addition to attorney's fees.33 The trial court confirmed the award,
and Green Tree appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals,
claiming, inter alia, that class arbitration was not permissible.34 The
South Carolina Supreme Court withdrew both cases from the appellate
court, assumed jurisdiction, and consolidated the proceedings.35
The South Carolina Supreme Court recognized that all the parties
agreed that the FAA applied to the contracts, but the parties disputed
how the FAA impacts class-wide arbitration.3 6 The court explained
that "[t]he United States Supreme Court has not addressed the FAA's
impact on class-wide arbitration. .. [t]hus, there is no binding prece-
dent that this Court is obligated follow."37
The South Carolina Supreme Court then explained that courts in
other jurisdictions had adopted two different approaches.38 One ap-
proach is that class-wide arbitration is prohibited when the arbitration
agreement is silent as to that issue." The South Carolina Supreme
Court described this approach as first enunciated by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Champ v. Siegel Trading
29. Id. at 353.
30. Id. at 353-54.
31. Id. at 353.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 354.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 355-56.
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Co. 4° According to the South Carolina Supreme Court, this Champ
approach relies on Section 4 of the FAA, which requires arbitration in
"accordance with the terms" 41 of the agreement, and if an arbitration
agreement is silent regarding class-wide arbitration, courts following
this approach "reason that authorizing class-wide arbitration would
not be in 'accordance with the terms' of the agreement. ' 42 The South
Carolina Supreme Court also recognized that courts following the
Champ approach often rely on case law prohibiting the consolidation
of arbitration proceedings when the arbitration agreements at issue are
silent regarding consolidation. These consolidation cases "place[d]
strict enforcement of the terms of the agreement above the policy fa-
voring expeditious resolution of claims. 43
The South Carolina Supreme Court in Bazzle v. Green Tree de-
scribed the opposing approach as first enunciated by the California
Supreme Court in Keating v. Superior Court.an This approach allows
class-wide arbitration to proceed on a case-by-case basis when the ar-
bitration agreement is silent.45 Under the Keating approach, a trial
court may in its discretion permit class-wide arbitration upon consid-
eration of certain factors including efficiency, equity, and prejudice to
the drafting party likely to result from class-wide arbitration.46
Turning next to South Carolina law, the South Carolina Supreme
Court stated that although it had "not addressed whether class-wide
arbitrations are permissible when the agreement is silent, this Court
has considered whether consolidation of arbitration is permissible. 47
In Episcopal Housing Corp. v. Federal Insurance Co.,48 the owner
of an apartment complex sued an architect and builder for design and
construction defects, and the contract between the owner and archi-
tect, as well as the contract between the owner and the builder, con-
tained an arbitration provision.49 The architect and builder petitioned
the lower court to stay the court proceedings pending arbitration, and
40. Id. at 356 (citing Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995)).
41. Id. at 356.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
45. Green Tree, 569 S.E.2d at 356.
46. Id. at 357.
47. Id. at 359.
48. 255 S.E.2d 451.
49. Id. at 451-52.
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the lower court issued an order granting their petitions.50 Thereafter,
the owner made a motion to consolidate into one proceeding the arbi-
tration demanded by the architect and by the builder, be consolidated
into one proceeding the arbitration demanded by the architect and by
the builder,5' and the lower court granted this motion. 2 The builder
appealed, contending that "it was error to compel it to submit to a con-
solidated proceeding absent contractual agreement or statutory author-
ity."' 53 However, the South Carolina Supreme Court disagreed and be-
lieved there was no error in permitting consolidation. 4
After setting forth the Champ approach, the Keating approach,
and the South Carolina precedent of Episcopal Housing permitting
consolidation of arbitration proceedings, the South Carolina Supreme
Court in Green Tree determined that "[a]s a preliminary matter, we
find Green Tree's arbitration clause was silent regarding class-wide
arbitration. ' 55  Next, the South Carolina Supreme Court rejected the
Champ approach and explained that it is debatable whether Section 4
of the FAA applies in state courts.5 6 The court announced that it "can
rely on independent state grounds to permit class-wide arbitration, in
the trial court's discretion, where the agreement is silent,' 57 "and un-
der general principles of contract interpretation .... Green Tree's
omission of any reference to class actions [is construed] against
them. '58 The South Carolina Supreme Court, relying on Episcopal
Housing, then held that "class-wide arbitration may be ordered when
the arbitration agreement is silent if it would serve efficiency and eq-
uity, and would not result in prejudice."59 The court, finding that the
Bazzles' and Lackeys' arbitration proceedings were properly adminis-
50. See Episcopal Housing Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 239 S.E.2d 647 (S.C. 1977) (In a sepa-
rate opinion, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed this order of the trial court in its en-
tirety, except for a portion of the order dealing with a defendant bonding company who had
not signed an arbitration agreement.).




55. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 359 (S.C. 2002). The clauses were
silent in the sense that they did not mention class arbitration. However, whether they are con-
sistent with class arbitration is debatable. As explained below in Parts I.B.2 and I.B.3, the
Justices of the United States Supreme Court were divided regarding this preliminary finding
of the South Carolina Supreme Court, both with respect to the finding itself as well as the is-
sue of who is the appropriate decision-maker for making such a finding. Id.
56. Id. at 359-60.
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tered as class arbitrations, upheld the arbitrator's awards in these pro-
ceedings.'
On October 23, 2002, Green Tree filed a petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari in the United States Supreme Court, presenting the question of
"[w]hether the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., prohibits
class-action procedures from being superimposed onto an arbitration
agreement that does not provide for class-action arbitration. ' ' 61 The
Supreme Court granted Green Tree's petition on January 10, 2003.62
B. The Fragmented Bazzle Opinion
1. Summary of the Justices' Positions
On June 23, 2003, the Justices of the Supreme Court issued the
fragmented Bazzle decision.63 In Bazzle, the Supreme Court examined
whether a state court's decision ordering class arbitration, in the con-
text of arbitration agreements that were arguably silent about class ar-
bitration, was consistent with the FAA.' In order to assess the prece-
dential effect of Bazzle, it is important to examine the splintered
opinions. After setting forth the positions of the Justices, this article
will explain that Bazzle sets forth no binding precedent and lower
courts, the AAA, and arbitrators are erroneously construing Bazzle as
authoritative.
Justice Breyer authored a plurality opinion, joined by Justices
Scalia, Souter, and Ginsburg.65 Justice Stevens issued a separate opin-
ion concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part.' Chief Justice
Rehnquist, joined by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, authored a dis-
senting opinion, and Justice Thomas wrote a separate dissenting opin-
ion.67
Justice Breyer's plurality opinion summarized the South Carolina
Supreme Court's holding as follows: "(1) that the arbitration clauses
are silent as to whether arbitration might take the form of class arbitra-
60. Id. at 361-62.
61. See Green Tree's Pet. for Writ of Cert., No. 02-634, 2002 WL 32101094, at *i (Oct.
23, 2002).
62. Green Tree, 569 S.E.2d at 349, cert. granted Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 537
U.S. 1098 (2003).
63. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447 (2003).
64. Id. at 447.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 454.
67. Id. at 455, 460.
9
Szalai: The New ADR: Aggregate Dispute Resolution and Green Tree Financia
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2004
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
tion, and (2) that, in that circumstance, South Carolina law interprets
the contracts as permitting class arbitration."68 The plurality reasoned
that there was a preliminary question of whether the contracts at issue
were in fact silent regarding class arbitration or forbade class arbitra-
tion, and the plurality believed it was improper to accept the South
Carolina Supreme Court's determination whether the agreements for-
bade class arbitration because such determination was to be made by
an arbitrator, not a court.69 Thus, the plurality decided to vacate the
South Carolina Supreme Court's judgment and remand the case so
that the question may be resolved in arbitration.70
Justice Stevens similarly described the holding of the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court: "The Supreme Court of South Carolina has held
as a matter of law that class-action arbitrations are permissible if not
prohibited by the applicable arbitration agreement, and that the
agreement between these parties is silent on the issue."7 Justice Ste-
vens believed "[t]here is nothing in the Federal Arbitration Act that
precludes either of these determinations by the Supreme Court of
South Carolina[,] '7 2 and he determined that the state court judgment
should simply be affirmed.73 However, recognizing that adherence to
his preferred disposition would result in no controlling judgment, Jus-
tice Stevens concurred in the result reached by Justice Breyer's plural-
ity opinion, vacating the state court's judgment.74
Chief Justice Rehnquist in his dissent reasoned that the holding of
the South Carolina Supreme Court, specifically, that "arbitration under
the contract could proceed as a class action even though the contract
does not by its terms permit class-action arbitration," 75 is in direct con-
travention of "the terms of the contract and is therefore pre-empted by
the FAA.' 76
Justice Thomas authored a separate dissenting opinion because, as
he has explained, in other Supreme Court opinions, he believed the
FAA simply does not apply in state court proceedings.77
68. Id. at 447.
69. Id. at 449-53.
70. Id. at 453.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 454-55.
73. Id. at 453.
74. Id. at 453-54.
75. Id. at 455.
76. ld.
77. Id. at 460 (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285-97
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The Justices disagreed whether the particular agreements permit-
ted class arbitration. There was also disagreement regarding who was
the appropriate decision-maker to determine whether the agreements
permitted class arbitration, and these disagreements will be explored
in the next subsection. The Bazzle decision has been improperly con-
strued as establishing that arbitrators, not courts, are the appropriate
decision-makers, but as explained in more detail in Section I.C., Baz-
zle did not establish any binding precedent. It is important to empha-
size that there was sharp disagreement regarding the issue of the cor-
rect decision-maker, and Justice Stevens did not believe this issue
regarding the correct decision-maker was properly before the Court.
2. Whether the Arbitration Agreements Permitted Class Arbitration
The Justices expressed different views as to whether the contracts
at issue permitted class arbitration. The plurality in Bazzle believed
the language in the arbitration agreements was ambiguous regarding
class arbitration, and Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion ar-
gued that class arbitration contravened the express language of the
particular arbitration agreements.78 However, the Supreme Court did
not ultimately resolve this dispute regarding the contracts at issue.
In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist focused on lan-
guage in the agreements regarding the selection of an arbitrator and
how such language was inconsistent with class-wide arbitration.79
This language provided that disputes relating to the contract "shall be
resolved by binding arbitration by one arbitrator selected by us with
consent of you."' 80 His dissenting opinion recognized that each con-
tract expressly defined "us" as Green Tree and "you" as the respon-
dent or respondents explicitly identified in the particular contract at
issue.8 In other words, individual contracts covered the approxi-
mately 3,700 class members whose rights were determined by the ar-
bitrator in the Lackeys' and Bazzles' class arbitrations. There was a
Contract Number 1 signed by Buyer Number 1, in which the term
"you" was specifically defined as Buyer Number 1 only. In Contract
Number 2 signed by Buyer Number 2, the term "you" was specifically
defined as Buyer Number 2 only, and so on with respect to each con-
tract. Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion construed the "us"
78. Id. at 459.
79. Id. at 455-59.
80. Id. at 456.
81. Id. at 457-58.
11
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and "you" language in each of these contracts as "mak[ing] quite clear
that petitioner [Green Tree] must select, and each buyer must agree to,
a particular arbitrator for disputes between petitioner [Green Tree] and
that specific buyer."" z
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, imposing class arbitration
"contravene[d] the just-quoted provision about the selection of the ar-
bitrator."83 Green Tree "had the contractual right to choose an arbitra-
tor for each dispute with the other 3,734 individual class members,"
and such a right was denied when class arbitration procedures were
imposed on Green Tree.' Chief Justice Rehnquist recognized that it
was "reasonable" for Green Tree to exercise this contractual right in
choosing a different arbitrator for each dispute in order "to avoid con-
centrating all of the risk of substantial damages awards in the hands of
a single arbitrator. 85
Justice Breyer, however, did not believe "that the contracts' lan-
guage is as clear as the Chief Justice believes"86 and the answer to the
question of whether the contracts forbid class arbitration was "not
completely obvious. '87 In analyzing the language regarding the selec-
tion of an arbitrator, Justice Breyer explained in his plurality opinion
that the class arbitrator was in fact "selected by" Green Tree "with
consent of'. .. the named plaintiffs[,] ' 8 8 and thus the contractual re-
quirement regarding consent to the selection of an arbitrator was ar-
guably fulfilled.89 Justice Breyer explained that the contracts stated
"(I) selected by us [Green Tree]," and the contracts did not state "(II)
selected by us [Green Tree] to arbitrate this dispute and no other (even
identical) dispute with another customer." 9 In the plurality's view,
"[t]he question whether (I) in fact implicitly means (II) is the question
at issue," and the language in the contracts was ambiguous. 9'
82. Id. at 458-59 (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 459.
84. Id.
85. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion also recognized that each contract at
issue "specified that it governs all 'disputes... arising from... this contract or the relation-
ships which result from this contract."' Id. His dissenting opinion viewed this language as






91. Id. With respect to the other Justices, Justice Stevens did not specifically analyze the
language of the contracts. He recognized that the South Carolina Supreme Court had made a
determination that the agreement between these parties was silent regarding class arbitration,
and the FAA does not preempt such a determination by a state court. Justice Thomas also did
[Vol. 41
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3. Who is the Correct Decision-Maker as to Whether Class Arbitration
is Permitted or Forbidden Under the Terms of an Arbitration
Agreement?
The fragmented Bazzle opinion did not ultimately resolve the is-
sue of whether the arbitration agreements permitted class arbitration.
Rather, the plurality's opinion and Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent-
ing opinion focused on the division of authority between arbitrators
and courts and which entity was the appropriate decision-maker for
certain issues, such as whether the arbitration agreements permitted
class arbitration. Justice Stevens preferred to affirm the state court
decision, which did not address this issue of the correct decision-
maker, and Justice Stevens made it clear that this issue of the correct
decision-maker was not properly before the Court.92
a. Justice Breyer's Plurality Opinion: The Arbitrator is the Correct
Decision-Maker as to Whether Class Arbitration is Permitted or
Forbidden Under the Terms of an Arbitration Agreement
The plurality determined that the disputed issue of contract inter-
pretation, i.e., whether the contracts provided for class arbitration, was
to be resolved by an arbitrator, not a court. The plurality thus could
not "accept the South Carolina Supreme Court's resolution of this
contract-interpretation question[,]" 93 and the plurality decided to va-
cate the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court, which had
improperly usurped the authority of the arbitration and made the de-
termination that the arbitration agreements were silent regarding class
arbitration.'
Justice Breyer grounded his plurality opinion on two primary con-
siderations. The first (and probably foremost) consideration was the
contractual nature of arbitration. According to the express terms of
the parties' contracts, "the parties agreed to submit to the arbitrator
'[afll disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or relating to this
contract or the relationships which result from this contract."' 95 Be-
cause a dispute about what the terms of an arbitration contract means
not examine the language of the contracts. Only Justice Breyer's plurality opinion and Justice
Rehnquist's dissenting opinion explored the language of the contracts in any detail. Id. at
444-60.
92. Id. at 454-55.
93. Id. at451.
94. Id. at 451-52.
95. Id. at451.
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is a dispute "relating to this contract,"96 the plurality reasoned that the
parties had agreed that an arbitrator would resolve an issue of contract
interpretation such as whether the arbitration agreement forbids class
arbitration.97 Accordingly, under the very terms of the parties' agree-
ments in this case, an arbitrator was the proper decision-maker regard-
ing class arbitration. 98 The plurality concluded by emphasizing the
contractual grounds for its decision: "we remand the case so that the
arbitrator may decide the question of contract interpretation-thereby
enforcing the parties' arbitration agreements according to their
terms."99
The plurality also relied on prior holdings where the Court recog-
nized that certain limited "gateway matters"'1 were generally for a
court to determine.t01 The plurality explained that "these limited in-
stances [that are generally for a court to resolve] typically involve
matters of a kind that 'contracting parties would likely have expected
a court' to decide."' 0 2 Examples of such "gateway matters"10°3 include
"whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement at all,"'" such
as "whether an arbitration agreement survives a corporate merger,'105
or "whether a concededly binding arbitration clause applies to a cer-
tain type of controversy,"'06 such as "whether a labor-management
layoff controversy falls within the scope of an arbitration clause."' 7
However, the plurality determined that the issue in this case, "whether
the contracts forbid class arbitration,"108 does not fall within this nar-
row category of instances that are generally for courts to determine. 109
The plurality characterized the question in this case as involving "the
kind of arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to,"" 0 and such a
96. Id.
97. Id. The plurality opinion also recognized that if there is a doubt regarding whether an
arbitration clause covers a particular dispute, i.e., whether an issue is "arbitrable," courts
"should resolve that doubt 'in favor of arbitration."' Id. at 452.
98. Id. at 451-52.
99. Id. at 454 (emphasis added).
100. Id. at 452.
101. Id.
102. Id. (citing Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. (citations omitted).
106. Id.
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question implicates "contract interpretation and arbitration proce-
dures.""'  The plurality, acknowledging the institutional competence
of an arbitrator, reasoned that "[a]rbitrators are well situated to answer
that question"' involving "procedural gateway matters."' 3 Accord-
ingly, given these considerations regarding the division of authority
between a court and arbitrator and the broad contract language, the
plurality concluded "this matter of contract interpretation should be
for the arbitrator, not the courts, to decide."' 14
b. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Dissent: Courts, Not Arbitrators, Are the
Correct Decision-Maker
The plurality vacated the state court judgment in order for the ar-
bitrator to make a determination whether the agreement at issue per-
mits class arbitration. But Chief Justice Rehnquist believed that
courts, not arbitrators, should make this determination:
The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that arbitration under the con-
tract could proceed as a class action even though the contract does not by
its terms permit class-action arbitration. The plurality now vacates that
judgment and remands the case for the arbitrator to make this determina-
tion. I would reverse because this determination is one for the courts, not
for the arbitrator, and the holding of the Supreme Court of South Carolina
contravenes the terms of the contract and is therefore pre-empted by the
FAA. 
5
Although the opening paragraph of Chief Justice Rehnquist's dis-
sent indicated the court is to make the determination whether a con-
tract provides for class arbitration," 6 the reasoning in the rest of his
dissent focused on who should make the determination of a slightly
different, although arguably related, issue: who is the appropriate de-
cision-maker regarding how an arbitrator should be selected. He ex-
plained that courts are the appropriate decision-maker for this particu-
lar issue of how an arbitrator should be selected under a contract.'
Then, after analyzing the contract and making a judicial determination
regarding the proper arbitrator selection procedure under the contract
at issue, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned class arbitration would con-




115. Id. at 455 (emphasis added).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 456.
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travene the particular arbitrator selection procedure agreed to by the
parties. 118
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent explained that "the decision of
what to submit to the arbitrator is a matter of contractual agreement by
the parties, and the interpretation of that contract is for the court, not
for the arbitrator.' ' 9 "[A] party can be forced to arbitrate only those
issues it specifically has agreed to submit to arbitration,"'' 20 and thus if
there is ambiguity or silence in a contract concerning the appropriate
decision-maker to determine whether an issue is to be sent to arbitra-
tion, a court should make the determination.' 2' For example, suppose
two parties to an arbitration agreement disagree whether fraud claims
are to be arbitrated under the terms of the contract. If the agreement at
issue is silent or ambiguous regarding whether a court or arbitrator is
to determine whether a particular claim is to be arbitrated, the general
rule is that a court should resolve whether this particular claim is to be
arbitrated. Otherwise, if an arbitrator were given the power to make
such a determination, the result may be to "force unwilling parties to
arbitrate a matter they reasonably would have thought a judge, not an
arbitrator would decide."'' 22
After recognizing the rule that courts generally determine what is
submitted to an arbitrator, Chief Justice Rehnquist then explained that
the issue of arbitrator selection is comparable to the issue of what is to
be submitted to an arbitrator, which suggests that courts should also be
the decision-maker regarding issues of arbitrator selection. 23  Chief
Justice Rehnquist explained that "Ujlust as fundamental to the agree-
ment of the parties as what is submitted to the arbitrator is to whom it
118. Id. at 458-59.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 456.
121. Id. (citing First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995)).
122. Id. (citing First Options, 514 U.S. at 945). This rule regarding the appropriate deci-
sion-maker as to the scope of an arbitration clause exists against the backdrop of another gen-
eral rule of interpretation under the FAA. If there is doubt whether a particular claim is to be
arbitrated under an arbitration clause, such as whether a fraud claim is to be arbitrated, there is
a strong presumption under the FAA in favor of arbitration, and thus the doubt is resolved in
favor of sending the claim to arbitration. First Options clarifies that this presumption in favor
of arbitration does not apply to resolve a doubt as to who determines whether an issue is to be
arbitrated, and such a doubt is to be resolved in favor of having a court make the determina-
tion. Id. at 944-45 ("In this manner the law treats silence or ambiguity about the question
'who (primarily) should decide arbitrability' differently from the way it treats silence or am-
biguity about the question 'whether a particular merits-related dispute is arbitrable because it
is within the scope of a valid arbitration agreement'-for in respect to this latter question the
law reverses the presumption.") (citations omitted).
123. 539 U.S. at 456-57.
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is submitted ... I have no hesitation in saying thai the choice of arbi-
trator is as important a component of the agreement to arbitrate as is
the choice of what is to be submitted to him.""2 4
Having established the authority of courts to be the appropriate
decision-maker regarding arbitrator selection, Chief Justice Rehnquist
proceeded to interpret the contractual provisions regarding arbitrator
selection, and he concluded that the contracts provided Green Tree
with a right to chose an arbitrator for each dispute with the 3,734 indi-
vidual class members.1 25  Because Green Tree had the contractual
right to choose a different arbitrator to hear each one of these disputes,
Chief Justice Rehnquist in dissent concluded that class-wide arbitra-
tion contravened the agreement to arbitrate, and the state court's
judgment must be reversed because the state court failed to enforce
the agreement to arbitrate according to its terms. 1 26
C. Bazzle Does Not Set Forth Binding Precedent and Lower Courts,
the AAA, and Arbitrators Have Been Erroneously Treating
Bazzle as Authoritative
Several lower courts, without much analysis, have simply cited
Bazzle as establishing binding precedent that an arbitrator, and not a
court, must determine whether an arbitration clause provides for class
arbitration. For example, a California appellate court concluded that
in Bazzle "the Supreme Court determined-that the issue of whether an
arbitration clause allowed class arbitration was a matter for the arbitra-
tor, not the court, to decide."' 27 The AAA has also come to the same
conclusion regarding the "holding" of Bazzle: "In its June 23, 2003
decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, the United States
Supreme Court held that where an arbitration agreement was silent re-
garding the availability of class-wide relief, an arbitrator, and not a
court, must decide whether class relief is permitted."'' 28
124. Id. at 455; see also id. at 457 ("I think that the parties' agreement as to how the arbi-
trator should be selected is much more akin to the agreement as to what shall be arbitrated, a
question for the courts under First Options... .
125. Id. at 457-58.
126. Id. at 459-60.
127. Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 562, 565-66 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (dis-
cussing Bazzle); see also Franciscan Med. Group v. Premera Blue Cross, No. 29010-3-11,
2003 WL 22794545, at *9 (Wash. App. Nov. 25, 2003) ("The United States Supreme Court
has held that whether an agreement to arbitrate allowed class arbitration is itself a dispute sub-
ject to arbitration.").
128. American Arbitration Association Policy on Class Arbitration, http://www.
adr.org/index2. 1.jsp?JSPssid=1 5753&JSPaid=43408 (last visited Nov. 13, 2004).
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These court opinions, as well as the AAA's statement, did not
really address that Bazzle was a fragmented plurality decision, and this
failure to address the fragmented nature of Bazzle is significant be-
cause such decisions may be of questionable precedential value. This
section of the article, Section I.C., will explain how a fragmented Su-
preme Court decision should be analyzed and why Bazzle is not au-
thoritative regarding the correct decision-maker to determine whether
an arbitration clause provides for class arbitration. Section II of this
article will then explore a suggested approach for handling class arbi-
tration under the FAA and will examine whether arbitrators or courts
are the correct decision-maker.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had the
opportunity to address Bazzle in Pedcor Management Co. Inc. Welfare
Benefit Plan v. Nations Personnel of Texas, Inc.,"19 and the Fifth Cir-
cuit, recognizing that Bazzle was a plurality opinion, discussed a spe-
cial analysis used to determine the precedential effect of splintered
Supreme Court decisions. 30 The Fifth Circuit, however, incorrectly
applied this special analysis and thus came to the wrong conclusion
regarding the holding of Bazzle. Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit's
opinion sheds some light on understanding splintered Supreme Court
decisions like Bazzle.
1. The Fifth Circuit's Flawed Pedcor Decision
In Pedcor, the underlying dispute involved alleged breaches of re-
insurance contracts. 3 ' North American Indemnity, NV (NAI), an in-
surance company that had entered into reinsurance contracts with sev-
eral employer self-funded ERISA plans, allegedly breached these
contracts by defaulting on the payment of claims.' NAI's reinsur-
ance contracts with the plans contained an arbitration provision requir-
ing that disputes between the parties be submitted to arbitration, and
like the arbitration provisions in Bazzle, the arbitration provisions did
not explicitly address class arbitration.'33 NAI originally sued the
third party administrator of the plans, alleging negligent underwriting
of the plans.'34 Subsequently, several individual plans sought to inter-
129. 343 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2003).
130. Id. at 358.
131. Id.
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vene as plaintiffs against NA. The lower court granted their motions
for leave to intervene and NAI filed a motion to stay pending arbitra-
tion of the intervenors' complaints.'35 The intervening plaintiffs as-
serted claims, including breach of contract and fraud, arising out of
NAI's alleged failure to pay benefits, and the intervening plaintiffs
moved for certification of a class of employee welfare benefit plans
that had contracted with NA. 136
The lower court then held a hearing to discuss the possibility of
certifying a class for arbitration proceedings against NAI. 13 7 Pedcor,
an ERISA plan that was an unnamed member of the putative class,
participated in the hearing as amicus curiae and filed suggestions ad-
vising against class certification.138 At the hearing, the court indicated
that "[a]s soon as a class is certified and the time periods have expired
I will then compel arbitration."13 9 In anticipation of arbitration, the
lower court then certified a class "to consist of all employer plans that
bought reinsurance through North American Indemnity, N.V., after
January 1, [2000], whose claims have not been paid."'" Pedcor then
requested permission to appeal the certification order pursuant to Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(f), and the Fifth Circuit granted Pedcor's petition to ap-
peal in August 2002.111
After the parties had completed their initial briefing before the
Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court issued Bazzle, and the Fifth Circuit in
Pedcor addressed the precedential effect of Bazzle in detail.
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis of the precedential effect of
Bazzle by explaining "[i]t is well established that when we are con-
fronted with a plurality opinion, we look to 'that position taken by
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds."" 42 This approach, sometimes referred to as the Marks rule,
guides lower courts in deriving a holding from fragmented Supreme
Court decisions,'43 and the Fifth Circuit searched through the plurality
135. Id.; Appellants Request for Oral Argument, at *8-9, Pedcor (No. 02-20878).
136. Id. at *5.
137. Pedcor, 343 F.3d at 357.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 357 n.2.
140. Id. at 357.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 358 (quoting Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 64 F.3d 184, 189 (5th
Cir. 1995), quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
143. Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens applied this rule in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 154, 169 n.15 (1976), in which these Justices explained that when there is no clear ma-
jority of the Court, "the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those
19
Szalai: The New ADR: Aggregate Dispute Resolution and Green Tree Financia
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2004
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
and Justice Stevens' limited concurrence for a position "on the nar-
rowest grounds.""
The Fifth Circuit summarized Justice Stevens' opinion as dissent-
ing "to the extent that he would have permitted the state court decision
allowing class arbitration to stand."'45 He reasoned that the decision
was correct as a matter of law, i.e., nothing in the court's application
of state law to allow class arbitration violated the FAA, and he em-
phasized that the petitioner challenged only the merits of that decision,
not whether it was made by the right decision-maker."" The Fifth
Circuit then recognized that the basis for Justice Stevens' preferred
disposition of the case, "that the state court judgment was correct as a
matter of law-fails to constitute the most narrow grounds on which
the case was decided[,]' 147 and thus could not form binding precedent
under the Marks rule. The Fifth Circuit believed that "Justice Stevens
did express his agreement, however, with the principle laid down by
the plurality that arbitrators should be the first ones to interpret the
parties' agreement."'' 48 As a result, the plurality's governing rationale
in conjunction with Justice Stevens' support of that rationale substan-
tially guides our consideration of this dispute."' 149 After its analysis of
Bazzle under the Marks rule, the Fifth Circuit in Pedcor treated Bazzle
as holding, with "clarity," that "arbitrators, not courts, decide whether
an agreement provides for class arbitration."' 150
As a result of a flawed application of Marks, the Fifth Circuit in
Pedcor erred in concluding that the holding of the fragmented Bazzle
decision is that "arbitrators, not courts, decide whether an agreement
provides for class arbitration."'' As explained below in Section I.C.3,
the Fifth Circuit's error arises from a misreading of Justice Stevens'
opinion in Bazzle in which he dissented in part and concurred in the
Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds." Subsequently, a major-
ity of the Court in Marks, 430 U.S. at 193, relied on this rule in interpreting a fragmented de-
cision, and lower courts have followed this rule when construing the holdings of fragmented
Supreme Court decisions.
144. Pedcore Mgmt., 343 F.3d at 358 (citing Campbell, 64 F.3d at 189 (5th Cir. 1995)





149. Id. at 358-59.
150. Id. at 359, 363; see also id. at 359 (stating that Bazzle clearly holds that "arbitrators
are supposed to decide whether an arbitration agreement forbids or allows class arbitration").
151. Id. at 363.
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judgment. 5 2 Justice Stevens did not believe this issue of the correct
decision-maker was properly before the Court.'53 Because Bazzle did
not set forth binding precedent, lower courts should grapple with this
issue of the correct decision-maker and rely on pre-Bazzle authority
when addressing arbitration clauses and class arbitration under the
FAA. Section II will set forth a suggested approach for courts to deal
with class arbitration under the FAA.
2. The Marks Rule
The Marks rule helps lower courts interpret fragmented Supreme
Court decisions. In Marks, "[criminal defendants] were charged with
several counts of transporting obscene materials in interstate com-
merce in violation of [federal law] ... ."1" The conduct at issue cov-
ered a time period through February 1973, and before the trial of these
defendants occurred, the Court issued Miller v. California,155 which
"announced new standards"' 56 regarding First Amendment protection
and obscenity. 15 7 The defendants argued in the district court that they
were entitled to jury instructions under the standards set forth in
Memoirs v. Massachusetts.5 8 The defendants believed that Memoirs
stated the law in effect prior to Miller, and to apply Miller retroac-
tively and punish conduct that they believed was permissible under
Memoirs violated the due process clause.' 59 The trial court rejected
the defendants' arguments and used the Miller standards in the jury
instructions, and the court of appeals affirmed. "6
The court of appeals did not believe that Memoirs was the govern-
ing law of the land because the standards announced Memoirs did not
receive the assent of more than three Justices. 16 1 Thus, the court of
152. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 454-55 (2003).
153. Id. at 455.
154. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 189 (1977).
155. Id. at 190 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
156. Id. (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 29).
157. Id.
158. Id. (citing Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966)).
159. Id. at 190-91.
160. Id. at 191.
161. Id. at 192. In Memoirs, Justice Brennan "announced the judgment of the Court and
delivered an opinion in which... C[hief] J[ustice] [Warren] and... Justice F[ortas]
join[ed]." 383 U.S. at 414. Justices Black and Stewart concurred in the result for the reasons
stated in their respective dissenting opinions in two prior cases. Id. at 421. Justice Douglas
authored a separate concurring opinion, id at 424, and Justices Clark, Harlan, and White each
authored dissenting opinions, id at 441-62.
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appeals looked to Roth v. United States," a majority decision that
pre-dated Memoirs, in order to determine whether Miller had ex-
panded criminal liability. 63 If Miller were compared to Roth instead
of Memoirs, Miller did not significantly change the law governing ob-
scenity.I64 However, if Memoirs was governing law, Miller would
have significantly changed the law and expanded criminal liability,
and retroactive application of the Miller standards to the defendants
would be problematic.
In Marks, the Court focused on whether the fragmented Memoirs
decision set forth governing law. To construe the precedential effect
of a case like Memoirs where there is no majority, the Marks Court es-
tablished the following rule: "When a fragmented Court decides a case
and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five
Justices, 'the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position
taken by those members who concurred in the judgments on the nar-
rowest grounds ... "'I"
Applying this interpretative rule to the fragmented Memoirs deci-
sion, the Marks Courts concluded that "[t]he view of the Memoirs plu-
rality [authored by Justice Brennan] . . constituted the holding of the
Court and provided the governing standards."'" The Marks Court de-
termined that, in Memoirs, Justices Black and Douglas "concurred on
broader grounds [than the plurality] in reversing the judgment be-
low,' 167 and similarly, Justice Stewart's concurrence was on broader
grounds.168 As a result, the Memoirs plurality represented the govern-
ing law, and retroactively applying the new Miller standards, which
expanded criminal liability in light of the governing law set forth in
the Memoirs plurality, violated due process. 169
Every federal court of appeals has scrutinized fractured Supreme
Court opinions under the Marks rule to determine whether such opin-
ions constitute governing law. For example, the Eleventh Circuit, ap-
plying Marks, has explained that "[w]hen faced with a fragmented
[Supreme] Court, we may distill the various opinions down to their
162. Miller, 430 U.S. at 192. See generally Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
163. Id. at 192-93.
164. Id. at 193.
165. Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976) (opinion of Stewart,
Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
166. Id. at 194 (emphasis added).
167. Id. at 193.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 196.
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narrowest grounds of concurrence to derive any binding precedent. 70
Likewise, the Sixth Circuit has rummaged through a splintered Su-
preme Court decision to find "the narrowest ground of agreement,"
which would form the binding precedent of the case under Marks.'7'
Courts have recognized that, under the Marks rule, a splintered
opinion may sometimes fail to establish any binding precedent. For
example, in United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.,'72 the Second
Circuit attempted to discern a holding from Eastern Enterprises v.
Apfel,' 173 which was issued by "a deeply divided Supreme Court."'74
The Second Circuit recognized that five members of the Eastern Court
joined in the judgment to declare the retroactive liability scheme of
the Coal Act unconstitutional."'75 However, there was no agreement
on a rationale among these five Justices. 17 6 The Second Circuit rea-
soned that four Justices (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor, Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas) concluded that the statute
was "unconstitutional based upon a takings clause analysis[,]"' 77 and
Justice Kennedy, concurring separately in the result, provided the fifth
vote and "found the statute unconstitutional based on a violation of
substantive due process[,]"' 78 as opposed to a violation of the takings
clause as set forth in Justice O'Connor's opinion."' Then, citing the
Marks rule as the framework for interpreting splintered opinions, the
Second Circuit explained that the Marks rule "only works in instances
where "one opinion can meaningfully be regarded as 'narrower' than
another-only when one opinion is a logical subset of other, broader
170. Redner v. Dean, 29 F.3d 1495, 1499 (1 1th Cir. 1994).
171. Reese v. City of Columbus, 71 F.3d 619, 625 (6th Cir. 1995); see also Fernandes v.
Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 580 (1st Cir. 1999) (concluding that "inferior courts
should give effect to the narrowest ground upon which a majority of the Justices supporting
the judgment would agree."); Village of Bolingbrook v. Citizens Utils. Co. of Illinois, 864
F.2d 481, 483 (7th Cir. 1988) (applying Marks and concluding that "[o]ur obligation as an
inferior court is to apply.., the least common denominator [from the fragmented Supreme
Court decision], the approach contained in Justice Blackmun's opinion."); Morris v. Am.
Nat'l Can Corp., 988 F.2d 50, 51 (8th Cir. 1993) ("Our reliance on Justice O'Connor's opin-
ion was premised on the fact that her opinion represented the narrowest grounds for the
Court's decision."); Ctr. For Fair Pub. Policy v. Maricopa County, 336 F.3d 1153, 1161 (9th
Cir. 2003) (applying Marks rule); Tijerina v. Offender Mgmt. Review Comm., Nos. 03-4054,
03-4134, 2004 WL 161540, at *3 (10th Cir. Jan. 28, 2004).
172. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179 (2d. Cir. 2003).
173. E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
174. Alcan, 315 F.3d at 188-89 (citingApfel, 524 U.S. at 537).
175. Id. at 189.
176. Id.
177. Id. (citing Apfel, 524 U.S. at 499, 537).
178. Id. (citing Apfel, 524 U.S. at 539).
179. Id.
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opinions,".., that is to say, only when that narrow opinion is the
common denominator representing the position approved by at least
five justices."' 18 In such circumstances where there is no "common
denominator," the Second Circuit explained that "there is then no law
of the land because no one standard commands the support of a major-
ity of the Supreme Court.' ' 8'
After explaining that some divided Supreme Court opinions pro-
duce no binding precedent under Marks, the Second Circuit resumed
its analysis of the fractured Eastern Enterprises decision and recog-
nized that "[b]ecause the substantive due process reasoning presented
in Justice Kennedy's concurrence is not a logical subset of the plural-
ity's takings analysis, no "common denominator" can be said to exist
among the Court's opinions."'82 The Second Circuit then explained
that "[tlhe only binding aspect of such a splintered decision is its spe-
cific result,"'' 83 and therefore, "the authority of Eastern Enterprises is
confined to its holding that the Coal Act is unconstitutional as applied
to Eastern Enterprises.""8
Similarly, in Franklin County Convention Facilities Authority v.
American Premier Underwriters, Inc.,185 the Sixth Circuit concluded
that "Eastern Enterprises has no precedential effect on this case be-
cause no single rationale was agreed upon by the Court."'86 In Com-
monwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 87 the court came to the same
conclusion regarding Eastern Enterprises.'88 After setting forth the
Marks rule, the Edison court explained that in splintered "cases where
approaches fundamentally differ, no particular standard is binding on
an inferior court.' ' 89 Then, turning to the divided Eastern Enterprises
case, the Edison court held that:
180. Id. (citing King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc)).




185. 240 F.3d 534 (6th Cir. 2001).
186. Am. Premier, 240 F.3d at 552 (citing Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 213-14
(1910) ("[Ihe principles of law involved not having been agreed upon by a majority of the
court sitting prevents the case from becoming an authority for the determination of other
cases, either in [the Supreme Court] or in inferior courts.")).
187. 46 Fed. Cl. 29 (2000).
188. Edison, 46 Fed. Cl. at 39 (footnote omitted).
189. Id. (citing Rappa v. New Castel County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1058 (3d Cir. 1994); Texas v.
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 (1983) (criticizing lower courts for following a plurality view that
did not command a majority and stating that such a plurality view is not "binding precedent");
Hertz, 218 U.S. at 213-14.
[Vol. 41
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[T]hese principles [established in Marks] mean that no part of the plural-
ity's reasoning [in Eastern Enterprises] constitutes binding precedent. The
plurality opinion and Justice Kennedy's concurrence agree in result and
focus on similar facts, but share no common denominator in terms of legal
rationale. As such, the only part of the plurality opinion that is binding is
the secific result-the Coal Act is unconstitutional as applied to East-
ern.
Similarly, the court in Combined Properties/Greenbriar Ltd.
Partnership v. Morrow 9' reasoned that "Justice Kennedy's concur-
rence in the judgment was based on an entirely different rationale
from the plurality's decision. Therefore, no single theory of law was
adopted by a majority of the Court, and Eastern Enterprises is not en-
titled to any precedential weight."' 92
3. The Precedential Effect of Bazzle Under the Marks Rule
The Fifth Circuit in Pedcor erred in treating Bazzle as holding,
with "clarity," that "arbitrators, not courts, decide whether an agree-
ment provides for class arbitration[.J' 9 3 In applying Marks, the Fifth
Circuit recognized that Justice Stevens preferred to affirm the state
court judgment, and thus the basis for his preferred disposition "fails
to constitute the most narrow grounds on which the case was de-
cided."' The Fifth Circuit concluded that "Justice Stevens did ex-
press his agreement, however, with the- principle laid down by the plu-
rality that arbitrators should be the first ones to interpret the parties'
agreement."' 95  Consequently, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that under
Marks and as a result of Justice Stevens' "ex-
press[ed]... agreement"'96 with the plurality, Bazzle established,
with "clarity,"' 197 the holding that "arbitrators are supposed to decide
whether an arbitration agreement forbids or allows class arbitra-
tion[.]' ' 98
However, contrary to the Fifth Circuit's wishful thinking, Justice
Stevens did not expressly agree with the principle set forth in the plu-
190. Edison, 46 Fed. Cl. at 39 (footnote omitted).
191. 58 F. Supp. 2d675 (E.D. Va. 1999).
192. Id. at 681.
193. Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Tex., Inc., 343 F.3d 355,
359, 363 (5th Cir. 2003).
194. Id. at 358.
195. Id. at 358-59 (emphasis added).
196. Id. at 358.
197. Id. at 359.
198. Id. at 358.
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rality that arbitrators should decide whether an arbitration agreement
permits class arbitration. His opinion deliberately avoids expressing
agreement on this issue. In the portion of his opinion in which he set
forth his dissent, Justice Stevens concluded that the state court's deci-
sion to permit a class arbitration was "correct as a matter of law,"199
and he also concluded that whether or not the state court was the ap-
propriate decision-maker regarding this issue was not challenged by
the petitioner and not properly before the Court."° Justice Stevens
explained that the petitioner challenged only the merits of the court's
decision "without claiming that it was made by the wrong decision-
maker[.]" 2 1
Instead of expressly agreeing with the plurality regarding the issue
of the correct decision-maker, Justice Stevens was very cautious in
simply stating: "Arguably the interpretation of the parties' agreement
should have been made in the first instance by the arbitrator, rather
than the court." '202
Justice Stevens' statement can by no means be construed as ex-
pressing consent with the plurality on the specific issue of who is the
appropriate decision-maker. He stressed that the issue should not be
reached because it was not properly before the Court, and the Bazzle
plurality sua sponte and erroneously chose to address this issue. 203 By
prefacing his statement with the word "arguably," it appears Justice
Stevens was cautioning that the issue is debatable and subject to ar-
gument. The Fifth Circuit misconstrued Bazzle by disregarding the
word "arguably" and ignoring that Justice Stevens considered the is-
sue improper to resolve, and the Fifth Circuit erred in concluding that
Justice Stevens expressly "agreed" with the plurality on this specific
issue regarding the appropriate decision-maker. Also, in addition to
plainly prefacing his statement with the term "arguably" and stating
that the issue was not properly before the Court, Justice Stevens used
other language to indicate that he was not agreeing or disagreeing with
the specific issue laid down by the plurality. In explaining that the
state court was correct in its decision and thus there was no need to
vacate the lower court and remand the case as the plurality wished,
Justice Stevens was careful to describe the state court's acting as the
199. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 455 (2003). The four-Justice plurality
refused to rule on the state court's decision regarding contract interpretation and instead be-
lieved that an arbitrator was the appropriate decision-maker. Id. at 453.
200. Id. at 455 (Stevens, J. concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
201. Id.
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decision-maker as merely a "possible error. ' '204 Justice Stevens was
deliberately cautious in not committing himself to one side or the
other on this debatable issue of who was the appropriate decision-
maker regarding class arbitration. The Fifth Circuit in Pedcor was in-
correct in ignoring the plain language of Justice Stevens' separate
opinion and concluding that Justice Stevens "did express his agree-
ment" with the plurality on this specific issue of who was the correct
decision-maker. °5
In sum, with respect to this threshold issue of the correct decision-
maker for determining whether a contract permits class arbitration,
there are four Justices forming the plurality who believed that an arbi-
trator was the correct decision-maker. 2" Three Justices were in dis-
sent and believed a court was the correct decision-maker, 07 while two
Justices simply did not reach the merits of this issue.2"' Bazzle did not
establish any binding precedent regarding this particular issue.
The Second Circuit's application of the Marks rule in Alcan is in-
structive in interpreting the precedential effect of Bazzle under Marks.
The Second Circuit explained that the Marks rule:
only works in instances where one opinion can meaningfully be regarded
as narrower than another-only when one opinion is a logical subset of
other, broader opinions, . . . that is to say, only when that narrow opinion
is the common denominator representing the position approved by at least
five justices. 209
In Alcan, the Second Circuit determined that the substantive due
process rationale set forth in one justice's concurring opinion in East-
ern Enterprises was "not a "logical subset"210 of the plurality's takings
analysis, [and] no 'common denominator' 211 could be said to exist
among the... concurring Justices." 2 Accordingly, there was no bind-
ing precedent set forth in Eastern Enterprises.2t 3 Similarly, in Bazzle,
204. Id. (emphasis added).
205. Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Tex., Inc., 343 F.3d 355,
358-59 (5th Cir. 2003) (emphasis added).
206. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 447 (Scalia, Souter, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.).
207. Id. at 455-60 (Rehnquist, C.J.,O'Connor &Kennedy, JJ., dissenting).
208. Id. at 454-55, 460 (Thomas, J., dissenting on grounds that the FAA was inapplicable
in state court, and thus he had no reason to address this issue. Stevens, J., did not reach this
issue believing that the plurality had improperly raised it sua sponte.
209. United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 189 (2d Cir. 2003) (citations






Szalai: The New ADR: Aggregate Dispute Resolution and Green Tree Financia
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2004
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
one cannot conclude that Justice Stevens's opinion is a "logical sub-
set" '214 of the four-Justice plurality's analysis concluding that an arbi-
trator should determine whether a contract permits class arbitration.
As explained above, and contrary to the Fifth Circuit's conclusion in
Pedcor, Justice Stevens did not expressly agree with the plurality on
the specific issue that an arbitrator was the correct decision-maker. 215
He was cautious to avoid expressing agreement with the plurality on
this particular issue, and his preferred disposition of affirming the
lower court's judgment was in direct contrast to the plurality's dispo-
sition. Thus, under Marks, one cannot conclude that Bazzle estab-
lishes a holding that arbitrators must determine whether class arbitra-
tion is permissible.
Although Justice Stevens ultimately did concur in the result, he
did not do so on grounds that could be considered a "logical subset" of
the plurality's opinion, a "common denominator," or a "position ap-
proved by at least five justices." ' 6 Justice Stevens recognized "[wiere
I to adhere to my preferred disposition of the case, however, there
would be no controlling judgment of the Court. In order to avoid that
outcome, and because Justice Breyer's opinion expresses a view of the
case close to my own, I concur in the judgment. 217
In explaining why he was concurring in the result, Justice Stevens
cited Justice Rutledge's opinion in Screws v. United States,218 in which
Justice Rutledge expressed his preferred disposition of the case and
why he ultimately switched his vote to concur in the result of the plu-
rality to avoid the undesirable outcome of having no controlling
judgment:
My convictions are as I have stated them. Were it possible for me to ad-
here to them in my vote, and for the Court at the same time to dispose of
the cause, I would act accordingly. The Court, however, is divided in
opinion. If each member accords his vote to his belief, the case cannot
have disposition. Stalemate should not prevail for any reason, however
compelling, in a criminal cause or, if avoidable, in any other. My views
concerning appropriate disposition are more nearly in accord with those
stated by Mr. Justice Douglas, in which three other members of the Court
concur, than they are with the views of my dissenting brethren who favor
outright reversal. Accordingly, in order that disposition may be made of
this case, my vote has been cast to reverse the decision of the Court of
Appeals and remand the cause to the District Court for further proceedings
214. Id.
215. Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Tex., Inc., 343 F.3d 355
(5th Cir. 2003).
216. Id.
217. Green Tree Fin. Corp., v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 at 455 (2003).
218. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
[Vol. 41
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in accordance with the disposition required by the opinion of Mr. Justice
Douglas.
21 9
Like Justice Rutledge in Screws, Justice Stevens, who preferred to af-
firm the lower court's decision and allow the class arbitration award to
stand, believed that his views were more "close" to the views of the
plurality than the views expressed by Chief Justice Rehnquist in dis-
sent, who preferred outright reversal of the lower court's decision and
viewed the class arbitration that had occurred as impermissible. Like
Justice Rutledge in Screws, Justice Stevens switched his vote from his
preferred disposition to avoid the undesirable outcome of having no
controlling judgment for the parties.22° Appropriately, it has been ob-
served that Justice Rutledge's vote-switching and limited concurrence
in the result in Screws to avoid the lack of a controlling outcome for
the parties prevented the four-Justice plurality opinion in Screws from
becoming binding precedent.2
Justice Stevens' limited concurrence in the plurality's result in
Bazzle-in the vein of Justice Rutledge's limited concurrence in
Screws-should have also prevented the Bazzle decision from becom-
ing binding authority. The purpose of Justice Stevens's limited con-
currence was to avoid the undesirable outcome of not having a con-
trolling disposition of the case for the parties, and Justice Stevens was
cautious to avoid expressing explicit agreement with the plurality on
the specific issue of the correct decision-maker, an issue which he
considered improper to reach.222
In Olmstead v. L. C. ex rel. Zimring,2 3 as in Bazzle, Justice Ste-
vens also preferred to affirm the lower court's judgment.2 4 However,
recognizing there were insufficient votes for his preferred disposition,
he switched his vote in Olmstead and expressly joined not only in the
judgment but also in the rationale set forth in parts of an opinion au-
219. Screws, 325 U.S. at 134 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
220. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 455.
221. See Frederick M. Lawrence, Civil Rights and Criminal Wrongs: The Mens Rea of
Federal Civil Rights Crimes, 67 TUL. L. REv. 2113, 2182 (1993) ("Although the plurality
opinion [in Screws] has been assumed by some lower courts to represent the 'rule' in Screws,
it did not command a majority of the votes of the Court and thus announced only the judg-
ment of the Court.") (emphasis added and citations omitted); see also United States v. Reese,
2 F.3d 870, 880 n.16 (9th Cir. 1993) (indicating that the four-Justice plurality opinion in
Screws did not become binding until the Supreme Court subsequently revisited the issue and
the majority adopted the plurality's rationale) (citations omitted).
222. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 455.
223. 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (Stevens, J., concurring).
224. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 607.
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thored by another Justice.225 The absence of an explicit joinder with
the plurality in Olmstead suggests an intent not to join the plurality's
rationale in Bazzle.2 26
In Eastern Enterprises, the divided Supreme Court opinion in Al-
can, Franklin, Edison, and Morrow was interpreted as setting forth no
binding precedent. The plurality opinion and concurring opinion
agreed in result, but the plurality's takings analysis and concurrence's
due process analysis "share[d] no common denominator in terms of
[a] legal rationale""22 and therefore produced no binding precedent.
Similarly, no common denominator exists in Bazzle, and Justice Ste-
vens was careful in Bazzle to avoid expressing agreement with the
plurality on the issue of the correct decision-maker, an issue that he
believed was improper to reach and the very issue that numerous
courts are improperly treating as conclusively determined in Bazzle.
228
As explained by courts construing splintered Supreme Court decisions
like Bazzle, where there is no opinion that is a "common denominator"
or a "logical subset" of others, such decisions have "no precedential
effect."'229
Justice Stevens and the four-Justice plurality described the Su-
preme Court of South Carolina's holding as consisting of two parts:
"(1) that the [particular] arbitration clauses [at issue were] ... silent as
225. Id. at 607-08 (emphasis added).
226. Compare id. at 608 ("I join the Court's judgment and Parts I, IL and IlI-A of its opin-
ion. Cf... Screws v. United States") (citation omitted), with Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 455
("I concur in the judgment. See Screws v. United States") (citation omitted).
227. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 29, 39 (2000).
228. Cf Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2660 (2004) ( "It should go without saying
that in joining with the plurality to produce a judgment, I do not adopt the plurality's resolu-
tion of constitutional issues that I would not reach.") (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg, J.).
229. See Franklin County Convention Facilities Auth. v. Am. Premier Underwriters, Inc.,
240 F.3d 534, 552 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Edison, 46 Fed. Cl. at 39 (noting in such splin-
tered decisions, "no particular standard is binding on an inferior court"); Combined
Prop./Greenbriar Ltd. P'ship v. Morrow, 58 F. Supp. 2d 675, 681 (E.D. Va. 1999) (splintered
decision "not entitled to any precedential weight"); cf. Savage v. Premiere Packaging, Inc.,
No. 230591, 2003 WL 1761561, at *1 n.l (Mich. Ct. App. Apr. 1, 2003) ("[Tlhe decision is
without precedential value because a majority of judges concurred in the result only and did
not concur in the rationale underlying the decision."); Gerald Kogan & Robert Craig Waters,
The Operation and Jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court, 18 NOVA L. REV. 1151, 1175
(1994) (A separate opinion concurring in the result may constitute the final vote necessary to
resolve the case, "but the effect in such a case is that there is no 'opinion' of the Court and
thus no precedent beyond the specific facts of the controversy at hand.") (citations omitted);
see also The Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Leading Cases: Ill. Federal Statutes And Regula-
tions: C. Federal Arbitration Act, 117 HARv. L. REV. 410, 414-15 (2003) (succinctly describ-
ing Bazzle in its annual summaries of Supreme Court opinions as having "resolved nothing");
Igor Kirman, Note, Standing Apart To Be a Part: The Precedential Value of Supreme Court
Concurring Opinions, 95 CoUJM. L. REV. 2083, 2084 (1995) ("The concurrence in judgment
is really a dissent from the rationale of the majority opinion.").
30
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to whether arbitration might take the form of class arbitration, '230 and
(2) as a matter of state law, South Carolina permits class arbitration if
the arbitration clauses are silent regarding class arbitration or do not
prohibit class arbitration.2 31 With respect to the first part of the hold-
ing, there is an issue regarding whether a court or an arbitrator is to
make the determination, and as explained above, there was no binding
precedent established in Bazzle regarding this issue.
If Bazzle did not establish binding precedent regarding this issue
of the correct decision-maker, did Bazzle establish any other holding?
The second part of the South Carolina Supreme Court's holding raises
an issue of whether the FAA preempts a particular state law of South
Carolina. Justice Stevens succinctly addressed this second part of the
holding, as well as the first part, by concluding that "[t]here is nothing
in the Federal Arbitration Act that precludes either of th[ose two] de-
terminations by the Supreme Court of South Carolina[,] ' '232 and thus,
the state court decision should simply be affirmed.233
What, if anything, did the four-Justice plurality indicate regarding
the second part of the holding, which implicates federal preemption
over state law under the FAA? It appears that the four-Justice plural-
ity focused on the issue of whether a court or an arbitrator should
make the determination that forms the first part of.the holding, but the
plurality did not expressly address whether the second part of the
holding was consistent with and not preempted by the FAA. The plu-
rality explained that if the state court's determination with respect to
the first part of the holding was incorrect, i.e., the contracts at issue
were not silent regarding class arbitration and actually forbade class
arbitration, then the state court's "holding is flawed on its own
terms[.] ' '234 The plurality believed that an arbitrator should first inter-
pret the contract; the arbitrator's interpretation of the contract could
possibly render the holding of the state court flawed if the contract
were not in fact silent regarding class arbitration.235 Only if an arbitra-
tor eventually interprets the contract as silent regarding class arbitra-
tion, would it then become appropriate to address whether silence can
be construed as permitting class arbitration.236
230. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 447.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 454-55.
233. Id. at 455.
234. Id. at 450.
235. Id. at 451-52.
236. Cf PacifiCare v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003) (decided two months before Bazzle and
holding that it would be "premature" and "unusually abstract" for the Court to determine
31
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As recognized above, South Carolina state law provided that an
arbitration agreement silent about class arbitration actually permits
class arbitration,237 and this state law raises an issue of FAA preemp-
tion. Because the plurality did not go beyond the preliminary question
of whether the contracts at issue were indeed silent, believing that the
arbitrator should answer this preliminary question, the plurality did
not seem to reach the specific issue of preemption. Justice Stevens
reached this preemption issue, however, and indicated that the FAA
did not preclude the state court from applying this particular state law
involving silent agreements.238 Chief Justice Rehnquist believed that
whether a particular interpretation of the phrase "punitive damages" in an arbitration clause
rendered the arbitration clause unenforceable before knowing how an arbitrator would ulti-
mately construe the phrase).
237. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 447 ("South Carolina law interprets the contracts as permitting
class arbitration."); id. at 454 ("The Supreme Court of South Carolina has held as a matter of
state law that class-action arbitrations are permissible if not prohibited by the applicable arbi-
tration agreement ... ").
238. Id. at 454-55. As indicated by the dissenting opinion of Justice Thomas in Bazzle, it
should also be recognized that whether the FAA even applies in state court is open to doubt.
See id. at 460. Compare, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) ("In creat-
ing a substantive rule applicable in state as well as federal courts, Congress intended to fore-
close state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration agreements."), with
id. at 35 (Congress' intent in passing the FAA "was to create uniform law binding only in the
federal courts."), and id. at 31 ("Section,2, like the rest of the FAA, should have no applica-
tion whatsoever in state courts.") (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Rehnquist, J.). See also
Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 n.6
(1989) ("[W]e have held that the FAA's 'substantive' provisions--§§ I and 2-are applicable
in state as well as federal court ....") (citations omitted); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 285 (1995) ("In my view, the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not
apply in state courts.") (Thomas, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J.); I IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL.,
FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT, § 10.1 (Supp. 1999) ("When enacted in 1925, the FAA was a procedural
statute applicable only in federal courts."). Some state courts have held that Section 2 is bind-
ing on state courts. See Rosen v. SCIL, LLC, 799 N.E.2d 488, 493 (nl1. App. Ct. 2003) ("It is
clear the FAA applies in both state and federal courts.") (citation omitted); see also Adler v.
Rimes, 545 So. 2d 421, 422 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) ("The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) is
binding on the courts of this state."). Whether Sections 3 and 4 of the FAA, which set forth
the FAA's enforcement procedures, are applicable in state courts is also questionable. See,
e.g., Volt, 489 U.S. at 477 n.6 (stating that "we have never held that §§ 3 and 4, which by their
terms appear to apply only to proceedings in federal court, are nonetheless applicable in state
court") (citations omitted). Compare Rosenthal v. Great W. Fin. Sec. Corp., 926 P.2d 1061,
1068 (Cal. 1996) ("Section 4 of the [FAA] does not explicitly govern the procedures to be
used in state courts."), with Adler, 545 So. 2d at 422 (holding that the FAA is binding on state
courts and applying Section 4). However, if Section 2 is properly applicable in state courts, it
seems that arbitration agreements would be enforceable in state courts regardless of whether
Sections 3 and 4 apply. See Jean R. Sternlight, Forum Shopping for Arbitration Decisions:
Federal Courts' Use of Antisuit Injunctions Against State Courts, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 91, 111
& n.96 (1998) ("Since 1983 the Supreme Court has, on multiple occasions, made it clear that
the FAA requires state courts, as well as federal courts, to enforce parties' arbitration agree-
ments. Technically, those holdings only explicitly address section 2 of the Act, but it none-
theless seems clear that state courts have the same obligation as federal courts to enforce the
32
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the holding of the Supreme Court of South Carolina-"that arbitration
under the contract could proceed as a class action even though the
contract does not by its terms permit class-action arbitration ' 239 "con-
travenes the terms of the contract and is therefore pre-empted by the
FAA."2' A discussion of the FAA's preemption over state laws in
general and the FAA's preemption over the South Carolina state law
construing silence as permitting class arbitration is beyond the scope
of this article. 24 1 Although Chief Justice Rehnquist believed that class
arbitration was improper in this particular case, he did acknowledge
that generally "the FAA does not prohibit parties from choosing to
proceed on a class-wide basis[,] '24 2 and this general principle seems
implicit in the rationale of Justice Stevens, who believed that the
South Carolina Supreme Court's holding was not precluded by the
FAA.243
The analysis in Section II of this article will discuss how the en-
forcement mechanisms of the FAA would generally operate in con-
nection with class arbitration when the parties "choos[e] to proceed on
a class-wide basis[,]" 44 assuming no preemption problems arise.
4. The Garcia GVR Adds More Confusion to the Bazzle Holding
About four months after the Court issued Bazzle, the Court used a
mysterious procedure that may create even more confusion regarding
the precedential effect of Bazzle. On October 6, 2003, the Court is-
sued a summary order in Hughes Electronics Corp., Inc. v. Garcia,245
the complete text of which appears below:
On petition for writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeal of California, Sec-
ond Appellate District. Petition for writ of certiorari granted. Judgment
vacated, and case remanded to the Court of Appeal of California, Second
statute by granting a motion to compel .... [Elven if sections 3 and 4 are not held to apply in
state court, it is now clear that section 2, and its emanations, impose on state courts duties that
are indistinguishable from those imposed by sections 3 and 4 of the FAA,") (citations omit-
ted).
239. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 455 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
240. Id.
241. See generally MACNEIL, supra note 238, § 10 for a discussion regarding the FAA's
preemption over state laws.
242. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 459.
243. Id. at 455-56.
244. Id.
245. 540 U.S. 801 (2003).
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Appellate District, for further consideration in light of Green Tree Finan-
cial Corporation v. Bazzle.
2 46
When the Supreme Court grants a petition for certiorari, vacates
the lower court order, and remands for further consideration, the
summary order is usually referred to as a "GVR," which has been de-
scribed as "'a dark corner of Supreme Court practice.' 2 47 Recent arti-
cles have implored the Supreme Court for a clarification of this GVR
procedure,248 and the Garcia GVR may appear confusing in light of
the splintered Bazzle decision.
The Chemerinsky article explains that the Supreme Court has cau-
tioned that a GVR order is "not a disposition of the merits."'249 Rather,
a GVR order is simply an indication from the Supreme Court that in-
tervening precedent is "'sufficiently analogous and, perhaps, decisive,
to compel reexamination of the case"' by the lower court.2 10  How-
ever, a "lower court remains free to reach whatever result it feels ap-
propriate[,] ' '25' and a GVR order "does not create an implication that
the lower court should change its prior determination. 2 2  A GVR or-
der "enabl[es] [a lower court] to consider potentially relevant deci-
sions and arguments that were not previously before it."'253  The
Chemerinsky article also cited a leading Supreme Court treatise to
shed some light on the GVR practice:
It seems fairly clear that the Court does not treat the summary reconsidera-
tion order as the functional equivalent of the summary reversal order and
the lower court is being told simply to reconsider the entire case in light of
the intervening precedent -which may or may not compel a different re-
sult.25
4
246. Garcia, 540 U.S. at 801.
247. Theodore B. Olson & John K. Bush, Two Recent High Court Cases List GVR Crite-
ria, Court Clarifies When Recent Developments Justify Orders That Grant, Vacate, and Re-
mand, NAT'L L.J., July 29, 1996, at B 10 (citation omitted).
248. Erwin Chemerinsky & Ned Miltenberg, The Need To Clarify the Meaning of U.S. Su-
preme Court Remands: The Lessons of Punitive Damages Cases, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 513, 515
(2004) ("This article is a plea for the Supreme Court to clarify the meaning of a GVR or-
der."); see also Shaun P. Martin, Gaming the GVR, 36 ARIz. ST. L.J. 551 (2004).
249. Chemerinsky & Miltenberg, supra note 248, at 517.
250. Id. (quoting Henry v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776, 777 (1964)); Martin, supra
note 248, at 564 (citation omitted).
251. Chemerinsky & Miltenberg, supra note 248.
252. Martin, supra note 248, at 564-65 (citations omitted).
253. Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 193, 197 (1996).
254. Chemerinsky & Miltenberg, supra note 248, at 517 (quoting ROBERT L. STERN, ET
AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 314, 319 (8th ed. 2002)).
[Vol. 41
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In sum, the Supreme Court has cautioned that a GVR order such
as the one issued in Garcia is not a decision on the merits, and the
Garcia GVR simply instructs the lower court to reconsider its decision
in light of Bazzle.255
A GVR referring a lower court to a plenary decision would give
the lower court a chance to re-examine a case using the lens of the
new intervening precedent, which was not available at the time of the
lower court's first examination of the issues. Such a GVR would ap-
pear to be justified because:
a GVR order conserves the scarce resources of... [the Supreme] Court
that might otherwise be expended on plenary consideration, assists the
court below by flagging a particularissue [sic] that it does not appear to
have fully considered, assists ... [the Supreme] Court by procuring the
benefit of the lower court's insight before... [the Supreme Court] rule[s]
on the merits, and alleviates the "[p]otential for unequal treatment" that is
inherent in... [the Supreme Court's] inability to grant plenary review of
all pending cases raising similar issues[.]256
But, how should the appellate court in Garcia interpret the GVR it re-
ceived that instructed it to reconsider its decision in light of the splin-
tered Bazzle decision, which failed to set forth binding precedent?
In Garcia, the plaintiff filed a demand for class arbitration before
the American Arbitration Association, identifying claims against
DirecTV, a digital home satellite television services provider.257 Sub-
sequently, the plaintiff filed a class action in court against DirecTV.5 8
The trial court in Garcia "found that it, not the arbitrator, would have
to determine the class action issues, and that the merits of the underly-
ing dispute would then be decided by the arbitrator. 15 9 Accordingly,
the trial court granted DirecTV's motion to compel arbitration, "but
only after determination of the class action certification issues 'by the
court."' 2  DirecTV then appealed the trial court's order, contending
255. See, e.g., Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 666 n.6 (2001) ("We also reject Tyler's at-
tempt to find support in our disposition in Adams v. Evatt," a GVR order, because the order
did not constitute a "'final determination on the merits."') (citation omitted).
256. Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 167 (1996) (citations omitted). But see Chemerin-
sky & Miltenberg, supra note 248, at 517-18 (criticizing the Supreme Court's use of the
"short and cryptic" GVR order which may appear "inherently ambiguous" to lower courts).




260. Id. (explaining that "[p]rocedurally, the court granted the motion to compel arbitra-
tion but stayed enforcement of that order 'pending the court's ruling on a class certification
motion."').
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that class arbitration is not permitted under the FAA and that Blue
Cross of California v. Superior Court,26' a prior California appellate
case that had authorized class arbitration in appropriate circumstances
when the arbitration agreement was silent on the issue, was either
wrong or distinguishable.262
DirecTV's appeal occurred prior to the Supreme Court's decision
in Bazzle, and it does not appear that DirecTV's appeal focused on the
threshold issue of whether a court or an arbitrator was the correct de-
cision-maker regarding class arbitration. Instead, DirecTV's appeal
focused on whether class arbitration was permissible. 263 The appellate
court, which rendered its decision prior to Bazzle, concluded that Blue
Cross was indistinguishable from the case before it, and thus, the ap-
pellate court relying on Blue Cross affirmed the lower court's order.26
What were the Justices thinking in GVR'ing the Garcia case to be
reconsidered in light of the splintered Bazzle decision? A lower court
receiving such an order may, at first glance, assume that the Bazzle
decision must contain binding precedent if the Supreme Court has or-
dered reconsideration in light of it. However, as discussed above,
Bazzle did not establish binding precedent.265
The Garcia GVR seems odd because the lower court's reconsid-
eration was to be undertaken in light of a splintered opinion setting
forth no binding law. In issuing the GVR, the Court could not have
been flagging a new law in Bazzle for the lower appellate court to
consider in reexamining the case because no new law was established
in Bazzle. Rather, it is possible that the GVR order was simply flag-
ging or inviting the appellate court to take a crack at the bat in exam-
ining de novo the threshold, but undecided, issue of who was the cor-
rect decision-maker for the appellate court, a threshold issue that was
not raised on appeal by the parties in Garcia and that the Supreme
Court in Bazzle failed to resolve.
Although this particular use of the GVR procedure may seem un-
usual,2" the issuance of the Garcia GVR can be construed as consis-
261. 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998).
262. Garcia, 2002 WL 31769224, at *2.
263. See Appellant's Opening Brief at *2, Garcia v. DirecTV, Inc., No. B158570, 2002
WL 32147423 (describing the issue presented on appeal as "[w]hether the trial court's order
staying arbitration and ordering the parties to conduct class certification proceedings is erro-
neous as a ... when the parties' arbitration agreement expressly provides that arbitration is to
be conducted pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, which does not permit class arbitrations
absent the parties' agreement.").
264. Garcia, 2002 WL 31769224, at *4.
265. See discussion infra Part I.C.3.
266. See Martin, supra note 248, at 559-60 (recognizing that the Supreme Court has or-
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tent with some standards the Supreme Court had previously identified
in connection with the issuance of GVRs. Some members of the Su-
preme Court267 apparently believed that the Garcia GVR order would
"enabl[e] [the lower court] to consider potentially rele-
vant ... arguments [e.g., arguments regarding the threshold issue of
the correct decision-maker,] that were not previously before it."268
Also, issuing the Garcia GVR would help conserve the Supreme
Court's resources and assist the Supreme Court in future cases by ob-
taining the lower court's insight on issues left unresolved by Bazzle.269
If lower courts begin reaching their own conclusions regarding issues
like the appropriate decision-maker (instead of incorrectly concluding
that Bazzle settled the issue once and for all), then the next time the is-
sue appears before the Supreme Court, the Court may benefit from
lower courts' reasoning regarding this issue, and perhaps one position
will garner five votes to become the law of the land. In sum, Bazzle
dered a GVR "in response to intervening Supreme Court precedent, federal statutes, state su-
preme court decisions, state statutes, agency regulations, proposed changes in state agency
policies, changes in position by the Solicitor General or a state attorney or solicitor general,
changed factual circumstances, new local federal appellate procedures, ongoing district court
proceedings, and the introduction of new contentions on appeal.").
267. The number of votes for a GVR order to be issued is not entirely clear and appears to
be part of the mystery surrounding GVRs. It seems that either a Justice or a former law clerk
had previously divulged in a confidential interview that the "Rule of Six" applies when sum-
marily disposing of a certiorari petition, such as through a summary reversal, and some have
suggested that, because a GVR resembles a summary reversal, the issuance of a GVR also
requires six votes. See id. at 567 n.96 (citations omitted). However, because some GVRs
have issued over the dissent of four Justices, there is some doubt regarding the Rule of Six.
Id. (collecting cases); see also J. Mitchell Armbruster, Note, Deciding Not To Decide: The
Supreme Court's Expanding Use of the "GVR" Power Continued in Thomas v. American
Home Products, Inc. and Department of the Interior v. South Dakota, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1387,
1399-1400 (1998). In Bazzle, the vote was 4-1-3-1, and it is- not readily apparent how the Jus-
tices voted in connection with the Garcia GVR. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S.
444, 444 (2003).
268. Stutson v. United States, 516 U.S. 193, 197 (1996). It is also possible that one or
more of the Justices voting in favor of the Garcia GVR wanted the lower court to address one
or more other issues raised in the splintered Bazzle opinion like preemption or the permissibil-
ity of class arbitration in general.
269. Lawrence v. Chater, 516 U.S. 163, 167 (1996).
[A] GVR order conserves the scarce resources of [the Supreme Court] that
might otherwise be expended on plenary consideration, assists the court below
by flagging a particular issue that it does not appear to have fully considered,
assists [the Supreme] Court by procuring the benefit of the lower court's in-
sight before [the Supreme Court] rule[s] on the merits, and alleviates the
'[p]otential for unequal treatment' that is inherent in [the Supreme Court's] in-
ability to grant plenary review of all pending cases raising similar issues.
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has established no precedent, and the Garcia GVR seems to be a sub-
tle invitation to lower courts that has been left unanswered.
Without binding precedent from the Supreme Court in Bazzle, it
seems reasonable that the appellate court in Garcia upon receiving the
GVR should have undertaken a fresh examination of the undecided is-
sues raised in Bazzle and implicated in Garcia, such as who is the cor-
rect decision-maker regarding whether the contracts provide for class
arbitration. After receiving the GVR, the appellate court in Garcia
should have come to its own independent conclusions, relying on
cases other than Bazzle.270 However, after the issuance of the Garcia
GVR, the appellate court in Garcia, like several other courts, miscon-
strued the precedential effect of Bazzle and forcefully concluded that
"[t]he Supreme Court has spoken, and the foundational issue-
whether a particular arbitration agreement prohibits class arbitra-
tions-must (in FAA cases) henceforth be decided by the arbitrators,
not the courts. '271 Based on this fictional Bazzle holding, the appellate
court in Garcia reversed the trial court.272
5. Flawed Interpretations of Bazzle
Courts, the American Arbitration Association, and arbitrators are
treating Bazzle as setting forth the flawed holding that arbitrators, and
not courts, should determine whether an arbitration agreement pro-
vides for class arbitration:
* "[T]he Supreme Court determined that the issue of
whether an arbitration clause allowed class arbitration was
a matter for the arbitrator, not the court, to decide.
273
* "The United States Supreme Court has held that whether
an agreement to arbitrate allowed class arbitration is itself
a dispute subject to arbitration.2 74
270. The Chemerinsky article criticizes the Supreme Court's practice of issuing GVR or-
ders and implores the Supreme Court to clarify the meaning of GVR orders by, inter alia, set-
ting forth in each GVR order certain language about the meaning of such order. Chemerinsky
& Miltenberg, supra note 248, at 517-18, 525-26 (criticizing the use of the "short and cryptic"
GVR order which may appear "inherently ambiguous" to lower courts and suggesting that the
Supreme Court should clarify the meaning of GVR orders). The Garcia GVR would have
perhaps been the ideal candidate for including clarifying language in the order.
271. Garcia v. DirecTV, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 191 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
272. Id. at 191, 196.
273. Omar v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 562, 566 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004).
274. Franciscan Med. Group v. Premera Blue Cross, No. 29010-3-11, 2003 WL 22794545,
at *9 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 2, 2003).
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" "[T]he Supreme Court held that it was for an arbitrator to
decide whether the contracts at issue prohibited class arbi-
tration. 275
" The Supreme Court held, with "clarity .... that arbitrators
are supposed to decide whether an arbitration agreement
forbids or allows class arbitration. 276
* "[T]he availability of class-wide arbitration is an issue that
must be decided by the arbitrator in the first instance. "277
* "A recent Supreme Court case specifically states that the
arbitrator, not the court, should determine whether class
arbitration is permitted by an ambiguous contract ....
[Accordingly], this Court does not have the authority to
decide whether the contract permits class arbitrations. '"7
* The "United States Supreme Court... conclud[ed] that an
arbitrator, not a court, should decide the question of con-
tract interpretation involved in the issue whether 'class ar-
bitration' could take place. 2 9
" "Green Tree established that in FAA cases, whether a par-
ticular arbitration agreement prohibits class arbitrations is
an issue to be decided by the arbitrators and not the
courts.
28 0
* "The FAA... permit[s] arbitrators to decide whether class
actions may be arbitrated under a particular contractual
provision .... Because we are remanding for arbitration,
we leave this issue for the arbitrator to decide. 281
275. Reyes v. Equifax Credit Info. Servs., No. 03 C 1377, 2003 WL 22922190, at *2 (N.D.
111. Dec. 10, 2003).
276. Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Texas, Inc., 343 F.3d
335, 359 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Walker v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., No. Civ.A.3:03-
CV-0684-N, 2004 WL 246406, at *8 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 15, 2004) (stating that the Fifth Circuit
in Pedcor recognized that "the clear import of Green Tree is that 'arbitrators are supposed to
decide whether an arbitration agreement forbids or allows class arbitration."').
277. In re Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practices Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 1126-
27 (D. Kan. 2003); see also id. at 1127 (describing Pedcor as "analyzing Bazzle and conclud-
ing that the arbitrator must first decide whether class arbitration is available or forbidden
where the arbitration agreement does not clearly forbid class arbitration.").
278. Johnson v. Long John Silver's Rests., Inc., No. 3:01-1526, 2004 WL 1302268, at *9
(M.D. Tenn. July 7, 2004).
279. Birmingham News Co. v. Horn, Nos. 1020552-57, 2004 WL 1293993, at *25 (Ala.
Jun 11, 2004).
280. Deluna v. La Salsa Holding Co., No. B164161, 2004 WL 1112788, at *7 (Cal. Ct.
App. May 19, 2004).
281. Orkin Exterm. Co. v. Petsch, 872 So. 2d 259, 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (citations
omitted).
39
Szalai: The New ADR: Aggregate Dispute Resolution and Green Tree Financia
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2004
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
" The Supreme Court held that "question of whether con-
tract prohibited or permitted arbitration of class action was
for arbitrator to decide.- 282
" "[T]he question of whether these claims may be submitted
to arbitration as a class action is for the arbitrator to de-
cide.- 283
" "After Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, the issue of
whether a contract, silent about whether a claimant may
maintain a class or collection action, permits such an ac-
tion, is clearly for an arbitrator to decide. ''" 2 4
* "In its June 23, 2003 decision in Green Tree Financial
Corp. v. Bazzle, the United States Supreme Court held that
where an arbitration agreement was silent regarding the
availability of class-wide relief, an arbitrator, and not a
court, must decide whether class relief is permitted. '285
However, Bazzle does not establish the law of the land. It is in-
correct to treat the divided Bazzle decision as a plenary decision estab-
lishing a binding holding that arbitrators, and not courts, should de-
termine whether an arbitration agreement provides for class
arbitration.286 The splintered Bazzle decision creates no binding prece-
dent for lower courts under the Marks rule, and it seems that the Su-
preme Court through the Garcia GVR may have issued a subtle invi-
tation for lower courts to address independently the issues raised in
Bazzle.287 With the exception of the Fifth Circuit in Pedcor, the re-
282. Lakeland Anesthesia, Inc. v. United Healthcare of Louisiana, Inc., 871 So. 2d 380,
389 n.15 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
283. Flynn v. Labor Ready, Inc., 775 N.Y.S.2d 357, 359 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (citing
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003) and Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare Benefit
Plan v. Nations Pers. of Texas, Inc., 343 F.3d 335 (5th Cir. 2003).
284. Clause Construction Award, Goldstein v. Ibase Consulting of Fairfield County, LLC,
11 160 02760 03, at http://www.adr.org/upload/LIVESITE/RulesProcedures/Top-
icsInterest/GoldteinAward.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2004).
285. American Arbitration Association Policy on Class Arbitration, at http://www.adr.
org/index2. 1.jsp?JSPssid= 16235&JSPsrc=upload/livesite/RulesProcedures/TopicsInterest/
AAA%20Class%20Action%20policy.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2004).
286. Courts are already compounding their error by using the fictional Bazzle holding to
overturn FAA case law regarding other issues. For example, the Fifth Circuit in Pedcor ex-
plained that "Green Tree has effectively overruled our holding in Del E. Webb Constr. v.
Richardson Hosp. Auth., 823 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1987)." Pedcor, 343 F.3d at 363. In Del E.
Webb, the Fifth Circuit held that a court, not an arbitrator, must determine whether consolida-
tion of arbitrations is permitted. 823 F.2d 145, 151 (5th Cir. 1987). The Pedcor court, apply-
ing the "holding" of Bazzle, concluded that "[t]o the extent that the issue of consolidation in
arbitration is analogous to class arbitration, Green Tree's holding that arbitrators, not courts,
decide whether an agreement provides for class arbitration would appear to overrule Del E.
Webb's holding to the contrary." 343 F.3d at 363.
287. Even assuming arguendo that the plurality opinion in Bazzle established binding
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ported decisions that have erroneously treated Bazzle as establishing a
holding have thus far provided little or no analysis regarding the ap-
propriate interpretation of a splintered Supreme Court opinion. In the
future, courts should apply the Marks analysis and conclude that Baz-
zle established no binding precedent.
II. SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR HANDLING CLASS ARBITRATION
UNDER THE FAA
Courts construing splintered Supreme Court decisions like Bazzle,
where there is no opinion that is a "common denominator" or a "logi-
cal subset" of others, have concluded that such decisions have "no
precedential effect," '288 except for the specific result in the particular
case before the Supreme Court.289 However, left without a binding
precedent from the splintered Bazzle decision, courts are still bound
by precedent established before Bazzle.
precedent, most lower courts' descriptions of the purported "holding" are overly simplified.
Under the plurality's rationale, a court, and not an arbitrator, may still under certain circum-
stances make the determination whether a contract permits class arbitration, and therefore it
would be erroneous for a court following Bazzle's plurality to conclude that an arbitrator must
always make the determination regarding class arbitration. The arbitration provisions in Baz-
zle were broad clauses covering "[aill disputes, claims, or controversies arising from or relat-
ing to this contract or the relationships which result from this contract." Bazzle, 539 U.S. at
445. The plurality reasoned in part that because a dispute about what the terms of an arbitra-
tion contract means is a dispute "relating to this contract," id., the parties had previously
agreed that an arbitrator would resolve an issue of contract interpretation such as whether the
arbitration agreement forbids class arbitration. Id at 448. However, what would happen if an
arbitration clause was not as broad in scope as the clause at issue in Bazzle? In Camferdam v.
Ernst & Young Int'l, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 10100(BSJ), 2004 WL 1124649 (S.D.N.Y. May 19,
2004), the arbitration clause at issue was narrower than the clauses in Bazzle and provided for
arbitration of "[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to tax and tax related ser-
vices." Id. at *2. The court, comparing the clause at issue to the ones in Bazzle, reasoned that
instead of "embodying an agreement to arbitrate any claim arising out of the parties' agree-
ment, the clause limits arbitration to disputes relating to the tax services Defendants were to
provide to Plaintiffs." Id. The court held that it, and not an arbitrator, had to resolve a dis-
puted issue of contract interpretation. Id. The court, citing Bazzle, explained that "[h]ad the
parties intended to submit these types of contract interpretation issues to an arbitrator, they
should have included a broader arbitration clause." Id.
288. Franklin County Convention Facilities Auth. v. Am. Premier Underwriters, Inc., 240
F.3d 534, 552 (6th Cir. 2001).
289. Id. at 552; United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 189 (2d Cir. 2003)
("The only binding aspect of such a splintered decision is its specific result," and therefore,
"the authority of Eastern Enterprises is confined to its holding that the Coal Act is unconstitu-
tional as applied to Eastern Enterprises."); see also Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United
States, 46 Fed. Cl. 29, 39 (2000) (stating that in such splintered decisions, "no particular stan-
dard is binding on an inferior court"); Combined Props./Greenbriar Ltd. v. Morrow, 58 F.
Supp. 2d 675, 681 (E.D. Va. 1999) (splintered decision "not entitled to any precedential
weight").
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When faced with a fragmented Supreme Court decision of "no
precedential effect,"" 0 courts have routinely relied upon authority
other than the divided Supreme Court decision to resolve their cases.
In Morrow, for example, the court concluded that because "no single
theory of law was adopted by a majority of the Court,... Eastern En-
terprises is not entitled to any precedential weight. As a result, the
Fourth Circuit's decision in United States v. Monsanto, [which pre-
dated Eastern Enterprises] ... has not been disturbed and remains
controlling." ' If a splintered opinion sets forth no binding authority,
courts should independently examine whether other decisions exist
that may control or guide them in resolving the dispute before it.292
290. Id. at 552.
291. Morrow, 58 F. Supp. 2d at 681; see United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160 (4th
Cir. 1988); see also Franklin, 240 F.3d at 552-53 (recognizing that "[p]rior to Eastern Enter-
prises, myriad courts had sustained the constitutionality of the retrospective application of
CERCLA to pre-enactment conduct" and relying on rulings from Supreme Court decisions
other than the splintered Eastern Enterprises case in order to resolve the case before it); Al-
can, 315 F.3d at 189 (recognizing that "courts considering the issue prior to the Eastern En-
terprises decision consistently agreed that the retroactive liability scheme of CERCLA is con-
stitutional" and resolving the dispute before it in accord with such authority); Edison, 46 Fed.
Cl. at 39 (recognizing that "numerous courts [applying Marks] have ... observ[ed] that East-
ern essentially leaves takings law unaffected"); cf Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 192-
93 (1977) (recognizing that the appellate court would have been correct in its analysis if the
Supreme Court's splintered decision had no precedential effect and instead "the last compara-
ble plenary decision of this Court" remained the law of the land).
292. A few courts, most noticeably the Third Circuit, have taken a different approach
when confronting a splintered Supreme Court case that fails to establish a binding precedent
under the Marks rule, and this approach entails examining whether the party at issue is in a
"substantially identical" position as the party before the Supreme Court with respect to both
the plurality and concurring opinions. See, e.g., Berwind Corp. v. Comm'r of Social Security,
307 F.3d 222, 234-42 (3d Cir. 2002). However, this "substantially identical" approach is in-
applicable to Bazzle.
Under this "substantially identical" approach, courts still have conceded that a splin-
tered Supreme Court decision may produce no binding holding for lower courts. Id. at 234.
Under this "substantially identical" approach, if the party at issue is in a "substantially identi-
cal" position as the party before the Supreme Court with respect to both the plurality and con-
curring opinions, the lower court reasons that the Supreme Court would reach the same result
in the new case, and thus the lower court is justified in reaching the same conclusion as it pre-
dicts the Supreme Court would reach. For example, assume that the plurality in a divided Su-
preme Court opinion held that a particular statute was unconstitutional as applied to Person X
based on rationale 1, and a concurring opinion concluded the statute was unconstitutional as
applied to Person X based on rationale 2. Assume further that under the Marks rule, this case
produced no binding precedent. A new individual, Person Y, now approaches a lower court,
claiming that the same statute at issue in the divided Supreme Court opinion is unconstitu-
tional as applied to it. Under the "substantially identical" approach, if Person Y would be
"substantially identical" to Person X with respect to both the plurality and concurring opin-
ions, even though the splintered Supreme Court decision established no binding precedent, it
is perhaps rational to predict that the Supreme Court would reach the same result in this new
case as it did in the older case (i.e., a plurality would rule for Person Y based on rationale 1,
and the concurring justices would reach the same result with respect to Person Y based on
rationale 2), and the lower court would justify reaching the same conclusion on the basis that
42
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Henceforth, instead of incorrectly concluding that the Supreme Court
in Bazzle established that arbitrators are to resolve whether contracts
permit class arbitration and instead of overturning other FAA case law
based on the flawed premise that Bazzle is somehow controlling,
courts should rely on other authority to develop their own reasoned
opinions regarding class arbitration issues and simply treat Bazzle "as
a point of reference for further discussion." '293
Authority exists to serve as guideposts for courts in addressing
class arbitration issues. A suggested framework based on core arbitra-
tion law principles will be set forth in this second section of the arti-
cle. Whatever approach is ultimately adopted in handling class arbi-
tration issues, courts as well as arbitrators must be extremely vigilant
in respecting the foundational principle that arbitration is, first and
foremost, a matter of agreement. Section II.A. examines how the ex-
istence of an arbitration agreement is a crucial issue when courts com-
pel arbitration, and this section also explores the procedure under the
FAA used by courts in connection with non-class arbitration to deter-
mine whether a valid arbitration agreement exists. Section II.B. then
discusses that compelling an entire class to arbitrate may be problem-
atic under the procedure established under the FAA. Section II.C. ex-
amines the role of opt-outs in connection with class proceedings, and
Section II.D. then explains how procedures used in connection with
non-class arbitration may be used in connection with class arbitration.
the Supreme Court would likely issue yet another divided opinion and reach the same result if
it had to address this new case.
This approach may appear justified in situations where the facts critical to the plural-
ity and concurring opinions' rationales were also identical in the case before the lower court,
and in such situations, it may be reasonable to predict that the Supreme Court may reach the
same outcome in this new case. However, this "substantially identical" approach, which is
premised on the predictability of the Supreme Court's result, would collapse if applied in the
Bazzle situation. If someone with facts similar to Bazzle were before the Supreme Court
again, it is not certain that the same result would occur. For example, if this new case prop-
erly raised the issue of the appropriate decision-maker, an issue Justice Stevens declined to
rule on, it is not certain how Justice Stevens would rule on this matter. Moreover, if the new
case arose in federal court, Justice Thomas may also choose to address the issue. This "sub-
stantially identical" approach used primarily in the Third Circuit would not be appropriate for
use in connection with the splintered Bazzle decision. Rather, courts should rely on other au-
thority and come to their own conclusions regarding class arbitrations. See, e.g., Morrow, 58
F. Supp. 2d at 681 ("Eastern Enterprises is not entitled to any precedential weight. As a re-
sult, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Monsanto, [which pre-dated Eastern Enterprises] ... has
not been disturbed and remains controlling.").
293. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 (1983) (stating that "[w]hile the lower courts
generally have applied the Coolidge plurality's discussion of 'plain view,' it has never been
expressly adopted by a majority of this Court," and recognizing that such a plurality view fails
to establish "binding precedent" and should be treated as a "point of reference for further dis-
cussion of the issue") (plurality opinion).
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Section ILE. then examines whether a court or arbitrator should de-
termine whether an arbitration agreement provides for class arbitra-
tion.
A. The Core Principle That Arbitration is a Matter of Agreement and
the Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements under the FAA
Prior to the enactment of the FAA in 1925, a deep-rooted judicial
hostility to the enforcement of arbitration agreements had existed at
English common law and had been adopted by American courts. Con-
gress decided to reverse the hostility by passing the FAA."9 The
FAA, which today is divided into three chapters,29 "establish[es] and
regulat[es] the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate. 296
A cardinal principle forming the foundation of federal arbitration
law is that arbitration is a matter of agreement between the parties,297
294. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 n.14
(1985) (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-21 & n.6 (1985)). In
Dean Witter, the Supreme Court elaborated upon Congress' purpose in enacting the FAA:
The need for the law arises from an anachronism of our American law. Some cen-
turies ago, because of the jealousy of the English courts for their own jurisdiction,
they refused to enforce specific agreements to arbitrate upon the ground that the
courts were thereby ousted from their jurisdiction. This jealousy survived for so
long a period that the principle became firmly embedded in the English common
law and was adopted with it by the American courts. The courts have felt that the
precedent was too strongly fixed to be overturned without legislative enactment,
although they have frequently criticized the rule and recognized its illogical nature
and the injustice which results from it.
Dean Witter, 470 U.S. at 220 n.6 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 96-68, at 1-2 (1924)).
295. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 is primarily concerned with domestic arbitration. Chapter 2,
9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208, and Chapter 3, 9 U.S.C. §§ 301-307, deal with international arbitration.
This article will focus on domestic arbitration under Chapter 1. For a discussion regarding
Chapters 2 and 3, see generally John P. Bowman, The Panama Convention And Its Implemen-
tation Under The Federal Arbitration Act, 1 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 1 (2000) (explaining that
Chapter 2 of the FAA implements the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and En-
forcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, and Chapter 3 of the FAA implements the Inter-
American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration).
296. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625 (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 & 25 n.32 (1983)).
297. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995) ("[A]rbitration is sim-
ply a matter of contract between the parties; it is a way to resolve those disputes-but only
those disputes--that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration."); McCarthy v. Azure,
22 F.3d 351, 354 (1st Cir. 1994) ("We start with bedrock: 'arbitration is a matter of contract
and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed to
submit."') (citations omitted); Thomson-CSF, S.A. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773,
779 (2d Cir. 1995) ("Arbitration is strictly a matter of contract.") (citation omitted); Delgrosso
v. Spang & Co., 769 F.2d 928, 933 (3d Cir. 1985) ("It is an elementary principle that arbitra-
tion is a matter of contract ....") (citation and internal quotations omitted); HCMF Corp. v.
District 28, 117 F.3d 1413 (Table), 1997 WL 382026, at *1 (4th Cir. July 9, 1997) ("Arbitra-
tion is a matter of private contract.") (citation omitted); Smith Barney Shearson, Inc. v.
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and this principle is reflected in several sections of Chapter 1 of the
FAA. 298 Other well-established principles of arbitration flow directly
from the central idea that arbitration is a matter of agreement. First,
an arbitrator's authority derives from the agreement of the parties.
"[A]ny power that the arbitrator has to resolve the dispute must find
its source in a real agreement between the parties. He has no inde-
pendent source of jurisdiction apart from the consent of the parties. ' 299
Boone, 47 F.3d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 1995) ("In AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications
Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643 (1986), the Supreme Court reaffirmed the basic principle out-
lined in its earlier decisions that 'arbitration is a matter of contract ....'); Aspero v. Shear-
son Am. Exp., Inc., 768 F.2d 106, 107 (6th Cir. 1985) ("[Alny duty to arbitrate is founded on
a contractual obligation."); Geneva Sec., Inc. v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 1998)
("The Supreme Court's Steelworkers Trilogy makes clear a 'first principle' of federal arbitra-
tion law: '[A]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbi-
tration any dispute which he has not agreed to submit."') (quoting United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)); Lebanon Chem. Corp. v. United
Farmers Plant Food, Inc., 179 F.3d 1095, 1099 (8th Cir. 1999) ("Arbitration is a creature of
contract."); Francesco's B., Inc. v. Hotel and Rest. Emp. and Bartenders Union, Local 28, 659
F.2d 1383, 1387 (9th Cir. 1981) ("The duty to arbitrate depends solely on the contractual
agreement of the parties to settle their disputes in that manner."); Zink v. Merrill Lynch Pierce
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 13 F.3d 330, 332 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Arbitration is a matter of con-
tract."); Brown v. IT Consumer Fin. Corp., 211 F.3d 1217, 1221 (11 th Cir. 2000) ("It is well
established that arbitration is a creature of contract ....'9) (citation and internal quotations
omitted); Blake Const. Co. v. Laborers' Intern. Union of North Am., AFL-CIO, 511 F.2d 324,
327 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("[A] duty to arbitrate rests on contract[.]"); see also H.R. REP. No. 68-
96, at 1 (1924) ("Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract, and the effect of this
bill is simply to make the contracting party live up to his agreement.").
298. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Exalon Indus., Inc., 138 F.3d 426, 429 (1st Cir. 1998)
("The need for an agreement... manifests itself throughout the various provisions of [the
FAA].").
299. I.S. Joseph Co. v. Mich. Sugar Co., 803 F.2d 396, 399 (8th Cir. 1986); see also Cza-
rina, L.L.C. v. W.F. Poe Syndicate, 358 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2004) ("arbitration is a
creature of contract, and thus the powers of an arbitrator extend only as far as the parties have
agreed they will extend"); Int'l Med. Group, Inc. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, Inc., 312 F.3d
833, 842 (7th Cir. 2002) ("arbitrators derive their authority to resolve disputes from the prior
agreement of the parties to submit their grievances to arbitration") (citation omitted); R.J.
O'Brien & Assocs., Inc. v. Pipkin, 64 F.3d 257, 263 (7th Cir. 1995) ("The arbitrators' powers
are derived from the parties' agreement.") (citation omitted); George Day Constr. Co. v.
United Bd. of Carpenters, Local 354, 722 F.2d 1471, 1474 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[A]n arbitrator's
jurisdiction is rooted in the agreement of the parties."); Davis v. Chevy Chase Fin. Ltd., 667
F.2d 160, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("In sum, the genesis of arbitral authority is the contract, and
arbitrators are permitted to decide only those issues that lie within the contractual mandate.");
Totem Marine Tug & Barge, Inc. v. North Am. Towing, Inc., 607 F.2d 649, 651 (5th Cir.
1979) ("Arbitration is contractual and arbitrators derive their authority from the scope of the
contractual agreement."); Swift Indus., Inc. v. Botany Indus., Inc., 466 F.2d 1125, 1131 (3d
Cir. 1972) ("It is, of course, fundamental that the authority of the arbitrator springs from the
agreement to arbitrate."); Lundgren v. Freeman, 307 F.2d 104, 109-10 (9th Cir. 1962) ("The
scope of the arbitrators' power rests ultimately on the agreement of the parties.") (citations
omitted); Smith Wilson Co. v. Trading & Dev. Establ't, 744 F. Supp. 14, 16 (D.D.C. 1990)
("[Airbitrators derive their authority to resolve disputes only because the parties have agreed
in advance to submit such grievances to arbitration") (quoting AT&T Techs. Inc., v. Commu-
nications Workers of America 475 U.S. 643, 648-649 (1986)); Bowater North Am. Corp. v.
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The entire arbitral process, including the role of the private third par-
ties who serve as arbitrators, is legitimized by the agreement of the
parties to submit to arbitration, and the end result of the arbitral proc-
ess, an arbitrator's decision resolving the dispute between the parties,
is tantamount to an agreement between the parties.3" If an arbitrator
were permitted to exercise decision-making authority beyond the au-
thority conferred by the agreement of the parties, such exercise of au-
thority would likely chill the willingness to enter into arbitration
agreements. The entire arbitral scheme acknowledged by the FAA
finds its roots firmly embedded in the contractual obligation of the
parties. 30
1
A second well-established principle flowing from the central tenet
that arbitration is simply a matter of contract is that, before a court
may compel parties to submit to arbitration, the court should first de-
termine the threshold issue of whether a valid agreement to arbitrate
exists between the parties. "The rationale for such an inquiry [regard-
ing the existence of an arbitration agreement] comes from the fact that
'arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to
submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to sub-
mit."' 302 It has long been recognized that because arbitration is a mat-
ter of contract, "no arbitration may be compelled in the absence of an
agreement to arbitrate. '3 3 By sanctioning arbitral proceedings with-
Murray Mach., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 821, 822-23 (D. Tenn. 1984) ("As a matter of black letter
law arbitration is a matter of contract, and the contours of the arbitrator's authority in a given
case are determined by reference to the arbitral agreement."); cf. United Steelworkers of Am.
v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581 (1960). "A proper conception of the
arbitrator's function is basic. He is not a public tribunal imposed upon the parties by superior
authority which the parties are obliged to accept. He has no general charter to administer jus-
tice for a community which transcends the parties. He is rather part of a system of self-
government created by and confined to the parties." Id. (citation omitted).
300. E. Assoc'd. Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., Dist. 17, 531 U.S. 57, 62
(2000) ("[W]e must treat the arbitrator's award as if it represented an agreement between [the
parties] .... For present purposes, the award is not distinguishable from the contractual
agreement.") (citation omitted).
301. Avedon Eng'g, Inc. v. Seatex, 126 F.3d 1279, 1286 (10th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he FAA
was not enacted to force parties to arbitrate in the absence of an agreement.").
302. Wagner v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 83 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting
Tracer Research Corp. v. Nat'l Envtl. Servs. Co., 42 F.3d 1292, 1294 (9th Cir. 1994) cert. dis-
missed, 515 U.S. 1187 (1995) (citing United Steel Workers of Am. v, Warrior and Gulf Navi-
gation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960))).
303. Sandvik AB v. Advent Int'l Corp., 220 F.3d 99, 107-08 (3d Cir. 2000); see also Nat'l
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Maine Corp., 850 F.2d 756, 761 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("[1]f
there was never an agreement to arbitrate, there is no authority to require a party to submit to
arbitration."); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 547 (1964) ("The duty to
arbitrate being of contractual origin, a compulsory submission to arbitration cannot precede
judicial determination that the.. . agreement does in fact create such a duty.").
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out a rigorous determination that the parties had actually agreed to ar-
bitrate, courts would be undermining the arbitration process and po-
tentially forcing an unconsenting party to undergo a somewhat
Kafkaesque arbitral proceeding.
"Sections 2, 3 and 4 of [the FAA] are the key statutory provisions
governing the substantive and procedural law associated with arbitra-
tion cases and the enforceability of arbitration agreements .... 304
Section 2, 305 recognized by the Supreme Court as "the primary sub-
stantive provision"3t 6 and the "centerpiece" of the FAA,30 7 declares
that "a written agreement to arbitrate 'in any maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce. . . shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."'30 8  Section 2
represents a "congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy fa-
voring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive
or procedural policies to the contrary."3 °" The Supreme Court has de-
scribed the statutory scheme of the FAA as:
provid[ing] two parallel devices for enforcing an arbitration agreement: a
stay of litigation in any case raising a dispute referable to arbitration, 9
U.S.C. § 3, and an affirmative order to engage in arbitration, § 4. Both of
304. Glass v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 114 F.3d 446, 451 (4th Cir. 1997).
305. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
306. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
307. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985).
308. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 24 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2004)).
309. Id. at 22. Out of the sixteen sections in Chapter 1, the primary sections directly im-
plicated by a party's request to compel arbitration are Sections 2, 3, and 4. With respect to
the other Sections, Section 1 sets forth definitions of the terms "maritime transaction" and
"commerce," and through the definitions, exempts from the coverage of the act contracts of
transportation workers. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (exempting "contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate com-
merce"); see also Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001) ("Section 1
exempts from the FAA only contracts of employment of transportation workers."). Section 5
deals with court appointment of arbitrators, 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2004), and Section 6 provides that
an application to the court under Title 9 is to be treated procedurally as a motion, 9 U.S.C. § 6
(2004). Section 7 concerns compelling the attendance of witnesses before arbitrators. 9
U.S.C. § 7 (2004). Section 8 deals with admiralty claims. 9 U.S.C. § 8 (2004). Section 9
deals with confirmation of arbitration awards, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2004) and Sections 10, 11, 12,
and 13 deal with vacating, modifying, and correcting arbitration awards, 9 U.S.C. §§ 10-12
(2004). Section 14 provides that Title 9 does not "apply to contracts made prior to January 1,
1926." 9 U.S.C. § 14 (2004). Section 15 provides that the Act of State doctrine is inapplica-
ble to the enforcement of "arbitral agreements, confirmation of arbitral awards, and execution
upon judgments based on orders confirming such awards," 9 U.S.C. § 15 (2004), and Section
16 involves appeals of orders regarding arbitration, 9 U.S.C. § 16 (2004).
47
Szalai: The New ADR: Aggregate Dispute Resolution and Green Tree Financia
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2004
48 CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41
these sections call for an expeditius and summary hearing, with only re-
stricted inquiry into factual 
issues.
These mechanisms help ensure that the core principle of arbitration
law, that arbitration is a matter of contract, is dutifully respected. As
observed by the Supreme Court:
"[t]he preeminent concern of Congress in passing the [Federal Arbitration]
Act was to enforce private agreements into which parties had entered," a
concern which "requires that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbi-
trate." Accordingly, the first task of a court asked to compel arbitration of
a dispute is to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dis-
pute.
Likewise, every federal circuit court of appeals has steadfastly
guarded the core principle that arbitration is a matter of contract and
has validated the entire arbitral process by requiring courts to under-
take a critical threshold examination of whether a valid agreement to
arbitrate exists between the parties before issuing an order compelling
arbitration.31 2
310. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 22; see also Glass v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 114 F.3d
446, 452 (4th Cir., 1997) ("[The FAA's] enforcement provisions, sections 3 and 4, execute
the purpose of section 2.").
311. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625-26
(1985) (alteration in original) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221
(1985)).
312. See, e.g., InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 142 (1st Cir. 2003) ("'[A]rbitration is
a matter of contract' and a court must find "that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists" before
compelling parties to arbitrate.) (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers of
Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (citing United Steel Workers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navig.
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960))); Mehler v. Terminix Int'l Co., 205 F.3d 44, 49 (2d Cir. 2000)
(before compelling parties to arbitration, the court must "determine[] the threshold issue of
whether an arbitration agreement exists"); Pritzker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 7 F.3d 1110, 1114 (3d Cir. 1993) ("'[A]s a matter of contract, no party can be forced to
arbitrate unless that party has entered an agreement to do so.' Thus, before it compels arbitra-
tion, a court should determine 'that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists between the par-
ties ... ') (quoting PaineWebber, Inc. v. Hartmann, 921 F.2d 507, 511 (3d Cir. 1990));
Hightower v. GMRI, Inc., 272 F.3d 239, 242 (4th Cir. 2001) ("In order for a court to compel
arbitration, the court must first find that an arbitration agreement exists between the parties.");
Banc One Acceptance Corp. v. Hill, No. 03-60356, 2004 WL 831240, *2 (5th Cir. Apr. 19,
2004) ("The first step of the process [in deciding whether parties should be compelled to arbi-
trate a dispute] entails determining 'whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate between
the parties ... ') (citing Webb v. Investacorp, Inc., 89 F.3d 252, 258 (5f Cir. 1996)); Fazio
v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 340 F.3d 386, 393 (6th Cir. 2003) ("Before a court can send a case to
arbitration, it must first determine that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists."); N. 11l. Gas Co.
v. Airco Indus. Gases, 676 F.2d 270, 275 (7th Cir. 1982) ("A party cannot be required to arbi-
trate a dispute which he has not agreed to arbitrate" and in a proceeding to compel arbitration
"the sole issue is the existence of an agreement to arbitrate the dispute."); Houlihan v. Offer-
man & Co., 31 F.3d 692, 694-95 (8th Cir. 1994) ("[Ulnder the Federal Arbitration Act, the
district court must engage in a limited inquiry to determine whether a valid agreement to arbi-
trate exists between the parties ...."); Lifescan, Inc. v. Premier Diabetic Servs., Inc., 363
48
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Section 4, which sets forth the particular enforcement procedure
to obtain such an order, helps safeguard the core principle that arbitra-
tion is a matter of contract.313 Section 4 provides that a court shall not
F.3d 1010, 1012 (9th Cir. 2004) ("[Tlhe district court's role [in compelling arbitration] is lim-
ited to determining whether a valid arbitration agreement exists .... "); Avedon Eng'g, Inc. v.
Seatex, 126 F.3d 1279, 1283 (10th Cir. 1997) ("Before granting a stay of litigation pending
arbitration, a district court must determine that an agreement to arbitrate exists."); Benoay v.
Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 805 F.2d 1437, 1440 (1 1th Cir. 1986) ("A court may not order
arbitration unless and 'until it is satisfied that a valid arbitration agreement exists."') (citing
Miller v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 850, 853 (11 th Cir. 1986)); Bethlehem
Steel Corp. v. Grace Line, Inc., 416 F.2d 1096, 1106 (D.C. Cir. 1969) ('Arbitration is ... a
matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration any dispute which he
has not agreed so to submit,"' and thus "a party's obligation to arbitrate. .. 'is a matter to be
determined by the Court ... ') (internal footnotes omitted) (first quoting United Steelwork-
ers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960), then Atkison v. Sinclair
Ref. Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241 (1962)); Microchip Tech. Inc. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 367 F.3d
1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (it is "the responsibility of the judiciary to resolve the gateway
dispute of whether an agreement to arbitrate exists .... ). However, it should be noted that
parties may agree to submit an arbitrability issue directly to an arbitrator. See First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 943 (1995).
313. While Section 3 provides for an order staying litigation, 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2004), Section
4 provides for an order compelling the parties to litigate, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2004). Courts have
granted requests to compel arbitration pursuant to Section 4 in two main scenarios: (1) when a
defendant in a pending suit moves to compel arbitration of plaintiff's claims, see, for exam-
ple, Gouger v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 823 F. Supp. 282, 288 (E.D. Pa. 1993); and (2) when a
petitioner commences an independent proceeding in court seeking to compel the respondent
to arbitrate see, for example, CitiFinancial, Inc. v. Lipkin, 143 F. Supp. 2d 657, 663 (N.D.
Miss. 2000). Courts have sometimes indicated that a defendant moving to compel arbitration
should do so under Section 3 rather than Section 4. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Fin. Corp.
v. Penn. Power & Light Co., 849 F.2d 761, 763 n.] (2d Cir. 1988) (noting that although the
appellant sometimes referred to its motion to compel arbitration as brought under Sections 3
and 4, Section 4 deals with an independent proceeding brought to compel arbitration and Sec-
tion 3 covers a party seeking a stay in the context of an ongoing lawsuit). But see Garten v.
Kurth, 265 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 2001) (reversing district court's denial of defendants' mo-
tion to compel arbitration of plaintiff's claims); Gregory v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
188 F.3d 501 (Table), 1999 WL 674765, at *8 n.8 (4th Cir. Aug. 31, 1999) ("The district
court held that the Eleventh Circuit's reliance on 9 U.S.C. § 4 was misplaced since § 4 only
applies when there is a suit seeking to compel arbitration and not when the defendant in a suit
in district court seeks to dismiss or stay pending arbitration. We reject this position .... ");
First Liberty Inv. Group v. Nicholsberg, 145 F.3d 647, 648 (3d Cir. 1998) (reversing the dis-
trict court's denial of defendant's motion to compel arbitration after concluding that agree-
ment to arbitrate existed and that the dispute fell within the scope of the arbitration agree-
ment).
It appears that it has become fairly commonplace for defendants to request, and for
courts to grant, an order compelling arbitration under Section 4 and an order staying litigation
under Section 3 in an already-pending action. See, e.g., Madol v. Dan Nelson Auto. Group,
372 F.3d 997, 998 (8th Cir. 2004) (reversing the lower court and finding that the defendant's
motion to compel arbitration and stay litigation pursuant to Sections 3 and 4 should have been
granted); May v. Higbee Co., 372 F.3d 757, 758 (5th Cir. 2004) (reversing the district court's
denial of defendant's motion to compel arbitration and stay litigation pursuant to Sections 3
and 4). Seeking relief pursuant to both sections seems justified. For example, the Supreme
Court has recognized that relief under Section 3 may be inadequate in some situations. See,
e.g., Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 27.
In many cases, no doubt, a § 3 stay is quite adequate to protect the right to arbitra-
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order arbitration until it is "satisfied that the making of the agreement
for arbitration. . . is not in issue .... '314 However, "[i]f the making of
tion. But in a case such as this, where the party opposing arbitration is the one
from whom payment or performance is sought, a stay of litigation alone is not
enough. It leaves the recalcitrant party free to sit and do nothing-neither to liti-
gate nor to arbitrate.
Id. Relief under Section 3 also may be inadequate for a party who desires to minimize the
uncertainties regarding potential liability due to the threat of claims. Regardless of the under-
lying motivation, it now appears routine for courts to grant a defendant's motion pursuant to
both Sections 3 and 4 seeking both a stay of pending litigation as well as an affirmative order
compelling arbitration.
In evaluating such motions brought under both Sections 3 and 4, courts often apply
one basic analysis, without really distinguishing between the two sections. See, e.g., Minter
v. Freeway Food, Inc., No. 103CV00882, 2004 WL 735047, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 02, 2004)
("Generally, four issues must be considered when determining whether to stay proceedings
and compel arbitration: (1) the existence of a dispute between the parties; (2) a written
agreement that includes an arbitration provision which purports to cover the dispute; (3) the
relationship of the transaction, which is evidenced by the agreement, to interstate or foreign
commerce; and (4) the failure, neglect, or refusal of the defendant to arbitrate the dispute.");
Trogden v. Pinkerton's Inc., No. 4:02-CV-90494, 2003 WL 21516580, at *3, *5-6 (S.D. Iowa
May 8, 2003) (In addressing the defendant's motion to compel and stay proceedings, the
court's role is to "'determine whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate and whether the
specific dispute at issue falls within the substantive scope of that agreement,"' and to grant
defendant's motion after concluding "there is no genuine issue of material fact concerning the
agreement of the parties to arbitrate ... ") (quoting Larry's United Super, Inc. v. Werries,
253 F.3d 1083, 1085 (8th Cir. 2001)); Phox v. Atriums Mgmt. Co., 230 F. Supp. 2d 1279,
1282, 1283 (D. Kan. 2002) (recognizing that "[the movant] must present evidence which is
sufficient to demonstrate an enforceable agreement to arbitrate" and denying movant's motion
to compel arbitration and stay litigation because the movant "has not met its burden to show a
meeting of the minds on the purported agreement to arbitrate"); Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104
F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1336 (D. Kan. 2000) ("[The movant] must present evidence sufficient to
demonstrate the existence of an enforceable agreement to arbitrate."); Morales v. Rent-A-
Center, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 2d 175, 184-85 (D. Conn. 2003) (finding "the evidence presented
by [non-movant] insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact concerning the exis-
tence or scope of the agreement" and granting motion to compel arbitration and stay litiga-
tion).
This article assumes that a request for an order to compel arbitration, whether through
an independent action or by a defendant moving to compel arbitration, is encompassed by
Section 4, as courts have routinely treated such requests. Moreover, even if a defendant's re-
quest to compel arbitration is more appropriately covered by Section 3, the core principle that
arbitration is matter of agreement is reflected in both Sections. It is beyond dispute that arbi-
tration cannot be compelled pursuant to Section 4, and a stay of litigation cannot be ordered to
permit arbitration to proceed under Section 3, unless a valid agreement to arbitrate exists.
Compare 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2004) ("upon being satisfied that the issue involved in such suit or
proceeding is referable to arbitration under such an agreement") with 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2004)
("upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration... is not in issue").
As explained above and as recognized by the Supreme Court, relief under Section 3 may be
inadequate for certain individuals, Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 27, and thus to the extent that
Section 4 is inapplicable to defendants' motions to compel arbitration and the only other re-
course would be relief under Section 3 (which is contrary to the routine practice of many
courts), Congress should amend the enforcement procedures of the FAA.
314. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2004) Section 4 reads in full:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate
under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district
50
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the arbitration agreement ... be in issue, the court shall proceed sum-
marily to the trial thereof.3'1 5 In evaluating motions to compel arbitra-
tion pursuant to Section 4 and ensuring an arbitration agreement ex-
ists, courts have applied a standard similar to that applicable for a
motion for summary judgment. For example, in Oppenheimer & Co.
v. Neidhardt,316 the Second Circuit explained that:
[T]o put [the making of the arbitration agreement] in issue, it is not suffi-
cient for the party opposing arbitration to utter general denials of the facts
on which the right to arbitration depends. If the party seeking arbitration
has substantiated the entitlement by a showing of evidentiary facts, the
party opposing may not rest on a denial but must submit evidentiary facts
showing that there is a dispute of fact to be tried.
317
court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a
civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the contro-
versy between the parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in
the manner provided for in such agreement. Five days' notice in writing of such
application shall be served upon the party in default. Service thereof shall be made
in the manner provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court shall
hear the parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for ar-
bitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an
order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of
the agreement. The hearing and proceedings, under such agreement, shall be
within the district in which the petition for an order directing such arbitration is
filed. If the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal
to perform the same be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial
thereof. If no jury trial be demanded by the party alleged to be in default, or if the
matter in dispute is within admiralty jurisdiction, the court shall hear and deter-
mine such issue. Where such an issue is raised, the party alleged to be in default
may, except in cases of admiralty, on or before the return day of the notice of ap-
plication, demand a jury trial of such issue, and upon such demand the court shall
make an order referring the issue or issues to a jury in the manner provided by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or may specially call a jury for that purpose. If
the jury finds that no agreement in writing for arbitration was made or that there is
no default in proceeding thereunder, the proceeding shall be dismissed. If the jury
finds that an agreement for arbitration was made in writing and that there is a de-
fault in proceeding thereunder, the court shall make an order sunmarily directing
the parties to proceed with the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof.
9 U.S.C. § 4.
315. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (As explained in more detail below, the trial regarding the making of the
agreement may be a bench trial, or if proper notice is given, a jury trial.) 9 U.S.C. § 4.
316. 56 F.3d 352 (2d Cir. 1995).
317. Oppenheimer, 56 F.3d at 358 (citations omitted). Courts addressing a Section 3 mo-
tion for a stay have also used a similar summary judgment procedure to fulfill the core princi-
ple of arbitration law and determine whether the parties are bound by a valid arbitration
agreement. See, e.g., Choice v. Option One Mortg. Corp., No. Civ. A. 02-6626, 2003 WL
22097455, at *3 (E.D. Pa. May 13, 2003) ("When confronted with a motion to stay proceed-
ings pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 3, the appropriate standard of review for the district court is that
employed in evaluating motions for summary judgment under FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCE-
DURE 56(c)."); See Manning v. Energy Conversion Devices, Inc., 833 F.2d 1096, 1103 (2d
Cir. 1987) (where the application for an order compelling arbitration was supported by evi-
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The party seeking an order for arbitration in Oppenheimer had
produced sufficient evidence that it was entitled to arbitration, but the
"[non-moving party's] evidence failed to meet the thrust of the [mov-
ing party's] evidence. It failed to raise a genuine issue of fact for
trial. ' 318  Thus, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's order
granting the motion to compel arbitration pursuant to Section 4 be-
cause the making of the arbitration agreement was not in issue, and a
trial on such issue was therefore unnecessary. 31 9
When a party moves to compel arbitration under Section 4, "this
[summary judgment type standard] requires the [movant] to present
evidence sufficient to demonstrate an enforceable agreement to arbi-
trate. ' 320  Typically, when filing a motion to compel arbitration, the
movant attempts to discharge its burden by submitting the purported
agreement to arbitrate by means of an affidavit authenticating the
dence of entitlement, "[a] party resisting arbitration on the ground that no agreement to arbi-
trate exists must submit sufficient evidentiary facts in support of this claim in order to precipi-
tate the trial contemplated by 9 U.S.C. § 4."). See also Interocean Shipping Co. v. Nat'l
Shipping & Trading Corp., 462 F.2d 673, 676 (2d Cir. 1972); cf FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e); see
also supra note 313 (It has become rather common for parties to file motions pursuant to both
Sections 3 and 4, and courts' analyses in determining whether the dispute is arbitrable do not
really distinguish between the two sections.).
318. Oppenheimer, 56 F.3d at 358.
319. Id.; see also In re Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practices Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d
1107, 1116 (D. Kan. 2003) ("The Courts of Appeals have uniformly held that '[iun the context
of motions to compel arbitration brought under the Federal Arbitration Act ('FAA'), 9 U.S.C.
§ 4 (2000), courts apply a standard similar to that applicable to a motion for summary judg-
ment.'"); Great Earth Cos. v. Simons, 288 F.3d 878, 889 (6th Cir. 2002)
If the district court is satisfied that the agreement to arbitrate is not 'in issue,'
it must compel arbitration. If the validity of the agreement to arbitrate is 'in
issue,' the court must proceed to a trial to resolve the question. In order to
show that the validity of the agreement is 'in issue,' the party opposing arbi-
tration must show a genuine issue of material fact as to the validity of the
agreement to arbitrate. The required showing mirrors that required to with-
stand summary judgment in a civil suit.
Id. (citations omitted); Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Distajo, 107 F.3d 126, 129-30 (2d Cir. 1997)
Although a party may demand a jury trial when issues respecting arbitrability
are 'in issue,' 9 U.S.C. § 4, we have cautioned that '[a] party resisting arbitra-
tion.. . bears the burden of showing that he is entitled to a jury trial.' As
when opposing a motion for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, the
party requesting a jury trial must 'submit evidentiary facts showing that there
is a dispute of fact to be tried.'
Id. (quoting first Doctor'sAssociates, Inc. v. Stuart 85 F.3d 975, 983 (2d Cir. 1996), (quoting
Dillard v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 961 F.2d 1148, 1154 (5th Cir. 1992)
and Oppenheimer, 56 F.3d at 358); Brown v. Dorsey & Whitney, LLP, 267 F. Supp. 2d 61, 67
(D.D.C. 2003) (the summary judgment standard applies in evaluating a motion to compel ar-
bitration).
320. In re Universal Serv., 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1117.
[Vol. 41
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agreement,3 2' in which the affiant may also set forth the circumstances
surrounding and establishing the making of the agreement. However,
if the movant fails to demonstrate the existence of an arbitration
agreement, the court denies the motion to compel arbitration, thereby
enforcing the core principle that arbitration is a matter of agreement.322
Once the movant has presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate
an enforceable arbitration agreement:
the burden shifts to [the non-movant] to demonstrate a genuine issue of
material fact as to the making of the agreement to arbitrate. To accom-
plish this, the facts 'must be identified by reference to an affidavit, a depo-
sition transcript, or a specific exhibit incorporated therein.' If the [non-
movant] demonstrates a genuine issue of material fact, then a trial on this
issue is required.
323
If the non-movant fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact, no
trial is required, and the court may determine that an agreement exists
based on the submitted papers.3 24 However, if there is a genuine dis-
pute such that the making of the arbitration agreement is "in issue,"
321. See, e.g., Mixon v. Park Place Motors, No. 3-02-CV-0800-L, 2002 WL 32438777, at
*2 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2002) ("[The movant] has properly authenticated the arbitration
agreement through the Affidavit of Lee Ann Benge, Vice President of Human Resources for
Park Place Motors.").
322. See, e.g., Smith v. Devlin Partners, LLC., No. Civ.A.03-2380-KHV, 2004 WL
1490401, at *3 (D. Kan. July 2, 2004) ("[The movant] has not authenticated the documents
which it contends create the arbitration agreement," and, "[blecause [the movant] has not
submitted evidence sufficient to establish an enforceable agreement to arbitrate, the Court
overrules its motion to compel arbitration."); Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co. v. GE Reinsurance
Corp., No. Civ. A. 02-171, 2002 WL 922148, at *3-5 (E.D. Pa. May 6, 2002) (striking por-
tions of movant's affidavit because of inadmissible statements and denying movant's request
that matter be sent to arbitration).
323. In re Universal Serv., 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1117 (citing Adams v. Am. Guarantee &
Liab. Ins. Co., 233 F.3d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Thomas v. Witchita Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 968 F.2d 1022, 1024 (10th Cir. 1992))); see also Manning v. Energy Conversion
Devices, Inc., 833 F.2d 1096, 1103 (2d Cir. 1987) ("A party resisting arbitration on the
ground that no agreement to arbitrate exists must submit sufficient evidentiary facts in support
of this claim in order to precipitate the trial contemplated by 9 U.S.C. § 4."); Almacenes Fer-
nandez, S. A. v. Michael Golodetz, 148 F.2d 625, 628 (2d Cir. 1945).
Had a genuine issue been raised as to [the making of the arbitration agree-
ment] the appellant could have demanded a jury trial as of right under § 4 of
the Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 .... To make a genuine issue entitling the
plaintiff to a trial by jury, an unequivocal denial that the agreement had been
made was needed, and some evidence should have been produced to substan-
tiate the denial.
Id.
324. See, e.g., Gibbs v. PFS Invs., Inc., 209 F. Supp. 2d 620, 625, 627 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(concluding "that no triable issue exists with regard to the validity of the parties' agreement"
and compelling arbitration without a trial).
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"the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof."'325 The trial
regarding the making of the agreement may be a bench trial or a jury
trial under Section 4, depending on whether the non-moving party
makes a timely demand for a jury. 326
Also, in the context of motions to compel arbitration, courts may
sometimes permit parties to engage in limited discovery regarding the
critical issue of the making of the arbitration agreement. For example,
in Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips,32 7 the court permitted "limited
discovery in the form of interrogatories, requests to produce and five
depositions. 3 28  The court reasoned that "in order for [the non-
movant] to respond properly to the [motion to compel arbitration], she
was entitled to limited discovery relative to the circumstances sur-
rounding the making of the alleged arbitration agreement." '329 Another
325. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2004); see also Bank of Am., N.A. v. Diamond State Ins. Co., No. 01-
9075, 2002 WL 1378683, at *2 (2d Cir. June 26, 2002) ("[W]e hold that sufficient evidence
has been produced substantiating an unequivocal denial that the agreement was made and
thereby warranting a trial."); Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co., 957 F.2d 851, 854-55
(11 th Cir. 1992) (Because a substantiated denial of the non-movant indicates a genuine dis-
pute regarding the making of an arbitration agreement, "it is clear that [the non-movant] is
entitled to a trial on the issue of whether or not she is bound by the customer agreements.");
A/S Custodia v. Lessin Int'l, Inc., 503 F.2d 318, 320 (2d Cir. 1974) (ordering trial regarding
making of arbitration agreement because of disputed issues of fact on this issue); Institut Pas-
teur v. Chiron Corp., 315 F. Supp. 2d 33, 39-40 (D.D.C. 2004) (denying motion to compel
arbitration "because it is not clear beyond genuine dispute that there was a meeting of the
minds... on an agreement to arbitrate" and, pursuant to Section 4, ordering trial regarding
the existence of the agreement to arbitrate because of the "conclusion that the existence of an
arbitration agreement is at issue"); Prevost v. Bums Int'l Sec. Servs. Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d
439, 442 (S.D. Tex. 2000) ("[Non-movant's] sworn affidavit, in combination with the two
arguably distinct signature types seen by the Court, is sufficient to carry [non-movant's] bur-
den and create an issue for factual determination [regarding the making of an arbitration
agreement] under 9 U.S.C. § 4," and thus a trial is warranted.).
326. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2004)
If no jury trial be demanded by the party alleged to be in default,.. . the court
shall hear and determine such issue. Where such an issue is raised, the party
alleged to be in default may .... on or before the return day of the notice of
application, demand a jury trial of such issue, and upon such demand the court
shall make an order referring the issue or issues to a jury in the manner pro-
vided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or may specially call a jury for
that purpose.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Blatt v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express Inc., No. 84 Civ. 7715-
CSH, 1985 WL 2029, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 16, 1985) ("[The non-movant] has not made a
timely demand for jury trial under section 4 of the Act, which required such a demand on or
before the return day of [movant's] notice of application to compel arbitration ... Accord-
ingly the issue will be resolved by summary trial to the Court .. "); Dassero v. Edwards,
190 F. Supp. 2d 544, 557 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) ("In the case at bar, plaintiffs have made a timely
demand for a jury trial [under Section 4].") (emphasis added).
327. 39 F. Supp. 2d 582 (D.S.C. 1998).
328. Hooters, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 591.
329. Id.
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court has characterized such discovery as "useful" to resolve the cru-
cial threshold issue of whether an arbitration agreement exists.330
After it is certain that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists between
the parties, a court usually proceeds to determine whether the dispute
at issue falls within the scope of that agreement before compelling ar-
bitration. Courts have summarized the general procedure as follows:
Before a party may be compelled to arbitrate under the Federal Arbitration
Act, the district court must engage in a limited inquiry to determine
whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties and
whether the specific dispute falls within the scope of that agreement. A
federal court must stay court proceedings and compel arbitration once it
determines that the dispute falls within the scope of a valid arbitration
agreement.
331
330. Blatt, 1985 WL 2029, at *2.
I will schedule a bench trial on this issue [regarding the making of the pur-
ported arbitration agreement] after the parties have completed pre-trial discov-
ery, which in my experience is useful in preparing such issues for resolution.
Depositions should be taken of both plaintiffs, and of representatives of de-
fendants with knowledge of the facts, in order to ascertain the circumstances
under which the agreement attached to the motion papers came into being ....
During the course of discovery, Mrs. Blatt will also be required, if so re-
quested by defendants, to provide known samples of her handwriting, and to
execute handwriting exemplars.
Id.; see also H.L. Libby Corp. v. Skelly & Loy, Inc., 910 F. Supp. 195, 200 & n.2 (M.D. Pa.
1995) ("Because the parties have not adequately addressed the issue of whether their contract
included the agreement to arbitrate contained in the Standard Terms and Conditions, we will
permit a limited period for discovery and the filing of briefs," and such "[d]iscovery shall be
limited to the issue of whether the agreement to arbitrate was part of the parties' contract.");
Berger v. Cantor Fitzgerald Sec., 942 F. Supp. 963, 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that discov-
ery is needed "as it should help to clarify several disputed issues of fact that may or may not
give rise to special circumstances rendering the U-4 arbitration agreement unenforceable."):
The parties shall be permitted to conduct limited discovery.., concerning the
making of the agreement to arbitrate between plaintiff and defendant. All such
discovery shall be completed by February 1, 2000. "Completed" means that all
discovery, objections, motions to compel and all other motions and replies relating
to discovery in this action must be filed and/or noticed in time for the party object-
ing or responding to have opportunity under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to make response. "All discovery" includes all disclosures and discovery except
the disclosures required by [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 26(a)(3).
Kincaid v. Commercial Credit Corp., No. CIV. A. 2:98-0842, 1999 WL 33510175, at *6 (S.D.
W. Va. Nov. 16, 1999); Donato v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 663 F. Supp.
669, 677 (N.D. Il. 1987) ("[P]arties are directed to prepare an expedited discovery schedule"
regarding the existence of the purported arbitration agreement.).
331. Houlihan v. Offerman & Co., 31 F.3d 692, 694-95 (8th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted);
see also Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 340 F.3d 386, 392 (6th Cir. 2003) (before compelling
arbitration, a court must, inter alia, "determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate" and
"determine the scope of that agreement") (citation omitted); Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v.
Lang, 321 F.3d 533, 537 (5th Cir. 2003):
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In sum, the entire procedure that has developed in evaluating mo-
tions to compel arbitration is designed to ensure that arbitration is a
matter of agreement.332
The FAA provides that written agreements to arbitrate "shall be
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." '333 The Supreme
Court has held in light of Section 2 that "generally applicable contract
defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied
to invalidate arbitration agreements[,]" 3" and has cautioned that
"courts should remain attuned to well-supported claims that the
agreement to arbitrate resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming
economic power that would provide grounds 'for the revocation of
any contract."'335 Other courts have similarly explained that "gener-
ally applicable state-law contract defenses like fraud, forgery, duress,
mistake, lack of consideration or mutual obligation, or unconscion-
ability, may invalidate arbitration agreements. 336
In honoring the core principle that arbitration is a matter of con-
tract, courts have refused to compel arbitration in a variety of situa-
The first question to be addressed in adjudicating a motion to compel arbitration
under the FAA is "whether the parties agreed to arbitrate the dispute in question.
This determination involves two considerations: (1) whether there is a valid
agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and (2) whether the dispute in question
falls within the scope of that arbitration agreement."
Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Lang, 321 F.3d 533, 537 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Webb v. In-
vestacorp, Inc., 89 F.3d 252, 258 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted)).
When parties have entered into a valid and enforceable agreement to arbitrate their
disputes and the dispute at issue falls within the scope of that agreement, the FAA
requires federal courts to stay judicial proceedings, see 9 U.S.C. § 3, and compel
arbitration in accordance with the agreement's terms, see 9 U.S.C. § 4
Murray v. United Food & Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 289 F.3d 297, 301 (4th Cir.
2002)
332. E.E.O.C. v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002) ("Arbitration under the
[FAA] is a matter of consent, not coercion," and "the FAA is at bottom a policy guaranteeing
the enforcement of private contractual arrangements.") (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. W. Seas Shipping
Co., 743 F.2d 635, 637 (9th Cir. 1984) ("[Section 4] comports with the statute's underlying
premise that arbitration is a creature of contract") (quoting the district court's opinion); Com-
prehensive Accounting Corp. v. Ruddell, 760 F.2d 138, 140 (7th Cir. 1985) ("[Tihe premise
of [Section 4] is the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, and the section sets out a proce-
dure for determining whether there was such an agreement in the particular case.").
333. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2004).
334. Doctors' Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
335. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 627
(1985).
336. Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493, 498 (6th Cir. 2004).
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tions. For example, in Prevot v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,3 37 the court
refused to compel two of the employees to arbitrate in accordance
with the terms of arbitration agreements they signed. 338 The affidavits
submitted by some of the employees indicated that they could not read
English at the time of signing the agreements, and they testified they
were pressured into signing the agreements. 39  The court found that
under these particular circumstances, the contracts of these employees
were procedurally unconscionable and unenforceable, and thus, the
court could not compel them to arbitrate. 340 Also, in Brennan v. Bally
Total Fitness,34 1 the district court denied the defendant's motion to
compel arbitration where the defendant gave the plaintiff insufficient
time to review the agreement and used other high-pressure tactics. 342
In Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc.,3 clients of a stockbroker sued the
brokerage houses that had employed the stockbroker who had alleg-
edly engaged in fraud, and the brokerage houses moved to compel ar-
bitration. 3" The Sixth Circuit explained that "[u]nder the [FAA], a
district court must make a number of threshold determinations before
compelling arbitration ... [including] whether the parties agreed to
arbitrate, '345 and the court also recognized that a claim of fraud in the
inducement of the arbitration clause could invalidate the clause. 346 In
addressing whether valid arbitration agreements existed, the Sixth
Circuit explained that "[b]ecause some parties raise issues specific to
337. 133 F. Supp. 2d 937, 941 (S.D. Tex. 2001).
338. Prevot, 133 F. Supp. 2d at 941.
339. Id. at 940.
340. Id. at 941; see also Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Lang, 321 F.3d 533, 536, 540 (5th
Cir. 2003) (salesperson's purported misrepresentation to an illiterate consumer that arbitration
agreements were merely loan documents could amount to fraud in the inducement of the arbi-
tration agreement and holding that the district court should adjudicate this issue); Kingston v.
Ameritrade, Inc., 12 P.3d 929, 933-34 (Mont. 2000) (concluding plaintiff husband and wife's
claim that they never received a copy of the specific terms and conditions regarding arbitra-
tion created a genuine dispute as to whether an arbitration agreement existed and remanding
for the district court to determine whether a valid agreement existed); Spahr v. Secco, 330
F.3d 1266, 1273-1275 (10th Cir. 2003) (affirming the lower court's denial of a motion to
compel arbitration due to the plaintiff s diminished mental capacity).
341. 198 F. Supp. 2d 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2002);
342. Brennan, 198 F. Supp. 2d at 383-84; see also Am. Gen. Fin., Inc. v. Branch, 793
So.2d 738, 751-52 (Ala. 2000) (per curiam) (finding one consumer's arbitration agreement
unconscionable due to particular circumstances at the time of its making, but refusing to hold
another consumer's arbitration agreement unconscionable under her different set of circum-
stances).
343. 340 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2003).
344. Fazio, 340 F.3d at 391.
345. Id. at 392.
346. id. at 393, 397.
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their arbitration agreements and because the record below is undevel-
oped in this regard, we are unable to conclude whether the arbitration
agreements here are valid." 37 The court concluded there were "fact-
intensive issues" to be resolved, such as whether the particular agree-
ments were obtained by forgery, and there were also issues of whether
"a trust was bound by the signature of its trustee on separate accounts
containing arbitration agreements and signed in an individual capac-
ity." '348 The Sixth Circuit, therefore, remanded the case in order to al-
low the district court to resolve these individualized, fact-intensive is-
sues and determine the threshold question of whether each of the
arbitration agreements was valid.3 49
In Casteel v. Clear Channel Broadcasting, Inc.,35° four individuals
sued their former employer for discrimination, and the defendant em-
ployer moved to stay the litigation and compel arbitration."' The
terms of the arbitration agreements, which allegedly bound each of the
four employees, were identical.3"2 However, the circumstances sur-
rounding the purported making of each agreement differed, and after
the court had analyzed the evidence regarding each plaintiffs alleged
making of the agreement, the court determined that none of the four
plaintiffs were bound to arbitrate.353 With respect to one plaintiff, the
defendant had failed to produce sufficient evidence of an agreement.5
Although there was testimony that a copy of an employment guide
containing the arbitration clause was placed on her desk or in her
workplace mailbox, it was not proven that the first plaintiff actually
received or understood the guide's contents, and there was no proof
that this employee had signed an acknowledgment of receipt of the
guide.355 With respect to two other plaintiffs, the court found that, al-
though they had signed an acknowledgment of receipt, they were not
bound by their signature due to unconscionability.356 These two plain-
tiffs were forced to sign the acknowledgement when their supervisor
presented each with a form and demanded that it be signed while he
347. Id. at 397.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 397-98.
350. 254 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (W.D. Ark. 2003).
351. Id. at 1083.
352. Id. at 1085 n.2.
353. Id. at 1089-90.
354. Id. at 1089.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 1089-90.
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stood over them.3 57 While these three plaintiffs purportedly entered
into an arbitration agreement while they were already employed, the
fourth plaintiff was a new hire who had signed an employment appli-
cation that stated she agreed to be bound by an arbitration agreement
if she became an employee, but the application did not provide details
regarding the arbitration agreement.358 Although after she became
employed she did sign two separate acknowledgments of receipt of the
employee guide containing the arbitration clause, she signed these ac-
knowledgments because she was told to sign immediately and return
the form as soon as possible, and a manager was "standing at her desk
impatiently waiting" for her signature.359 The court explained that
"[u]nder these facts, we cannot find that mutuality of agreement has
been demonstrated or that a binding contract to arbitrate was formed
with regard to [the fourth plaintiff]." 36 Accordingly, because the de-
fendant had failed to demonstrate that any of the plaintiffs were bound
by a valid arbitration agreement, the court denied the defendant's mo-
tion to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration.361
To summarize, in making sure that a valid arbitration agreement
exists before issuing an order compelling arbitration, courts evaluate
motions to compel arbitration under a standard similar to that applica-
ble for a motion for summary judgment in making sure that a valid ar-
bitration agreement exists before issuing an order compelling arbitra-
tion.362 9 U.S.C. section 4 provides that "[flive days' notice in writing
of such application [to compel arbitration] shall be served upon the
party in default,"3 63 and service must occur in the manner provided by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 64 The moving party must pre-
sent sufficient evidence of a valid agreement to arbitrate, and the party
allegedly in default must be given an opportunity to present contrary
357. Id.
358. Id. at 1090.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id.; see also Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 554 (4th
Cir. 2001) (citing Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000)). ("[I]t is
undisputed that fee splitting [provisions] can render an arbitration agreement unenforceable
where the arbitration fees and costs are so prohibitive as to effectively deny the [individual]
access to the arbitral forum."). In Bradford, the Fourth Circuit explained that in determining
the enforceability of an arbitration agreement in connection with a claim that the fee splitting
provisions therein render the agreement unenforceable, courts should engage in a "case-by-
case analysis that focuses, among other things, upon the claimant's ability to pay the arbitra-
tion fees and costs." Id. at 556.
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evidence and also, within a certain time fixed by the statute, an oppor-
tunity to request a jury trial in case there is a genuine dispute regard-
ing the making of the agreement.3 65 If a genuine issue exists as to the
making of the agreement and the party allegedly in default has timely
requested a jury trial, a jury trial is held, and if there was no timely re-
quest, a bench trial must occur regarding the critical issue of the mak-
ing of the agreement.366 Furthermore, discovery may be permitted for
the parties to collect more evidence regarding the making of the
agreement, and courts have engaged in a fact-intensive, individualized
inquiry to ascertain whether a valid arbitration agreement exists.3 67
Under this detailed procedure, courts in the course of enforcing arbi-
tration agreements under the FAA stand as sentinels who protect the
core principle that arbitration is a matter of agreement.
B. Is the FAA's Enforcement Procedure Consistent with Compelling
an Entire Class to Arbitrate?
Suppose that one person or entity called Blue Tree entered into
individual contracts with thousands of its customers providing for
class arbitration, and one of these customers files a class action law-
suit in federal court against Blue Tree along with a motion to certify a
class consisting of all these other individual customers. Blue Tree
then moves to compel arbitration, and the court grants both motions,
certifying a class and compelling arbitration. This hypothetical situa-
tion resembles what occurred in the Pedcor and the Bazzles' proceed-
ings. In Pedcor, the lower court certified a class for purposes of arbi-
tration and was about to issue an order compelling arbitration,3 68 and
although not entirely clear, it appears that the lower court in Pedcor




368. Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Texas, Inc., 343 F.3d
335, 357 & n.2 (5th Cir. 2003).
369. The Fifth Circuit in Pedcor had granted Pedcor's petition for permission to appeal the
class certification order pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f). However, the Fifth Circuit did not
discuss the trial court's certification order in detail or analyze the appellant's arguments re-
garding the purported infirmities of the certification order. Based on the "authority" of Baz-
zle, the Fifth Circuit held that the arbitrator should determine whether class arbitration is per-
mitted, and thus the Fifth Circuit washed its hands of dealing with the allegedly flawed
certification order. Pedcor, 343 F.3d at 363 ("As we hold today that, pursuant to Green Tree,
arbitrators should decide whether class arbitration is available or forbidden, we do not address
the parties' other arguments on appeal .... ). Based on the available briefs on appeal, the
appellant characterized the certification order as ambiguous regarding which subdivision of
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trial court "issued two separate orders memorializing its rulings on
December 5, 1997: (1) an order granting class certification; and (2) an
order compelling arbitration .... In a supplemental order issued
January 7, 1998, the trial court ordered that the class action in arbitra-
tion proceed on an opt-out basis. 37°
Collectively compelling an entire class of thousands of Blue Tree
customers to arbitrate their claims on a class-wide basis seems prob-
lematic under the FAA and may run counter to the core principle that
arbitration is a matter of contract. The legitimacy of the arbitrator's
ultimate decision with respect to each individual class member de-
pends on the existence of thousands of valid, individual agreements to
arbitrate. Assuming that it is permissible to compel an entire class to
arbitrate, before a court may issue such an order compelling thousands
of customers to arbitration pursuant to the FAA, Section 4 requires
that the court follow a specific procedure designed to help ensure that
each of the thousands of agreements to arbitrate actually exists. For
example, Section 4 provides that these thousands of customers shall
receive "[f]ive days' notice in writing"37' regarding the application for
an order to compel arbitration, and the service of such notice on the
thousands of class members shall be made in the manner provided by
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.37 2 Under the summary judg-
ment-like procedure for evaluating motions to compel arbitration, dis-
covery may be appropriate regarding the making of an agreement, and
each of these thousands of customers would be entitled to put forward
evidentiary facts showing there is a genuine dispute regarding the
making of the agreement. Should a genuine dispute arise regarding
the making of an agreement, Section 4 also provides that "the court
shall proceed summarily to the trial"37 3 regarding the making of that
particular agreement, and the trial regarding the making of a particular
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) the trial court was certifying a class under, although it appeared that the
trial court was certifying a non-opt-out class "pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1) and/or
(b)(2)." See Brief of Appellant Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare Benefit Plan at *11 & n.10, Ped-
cor, 2002 WL 32508025 (5th Cir. 2002) (No. 02-20878) (quoting transcript of certification
hearing). Some of the language in the order tracked the language of Rule 23(b)(2), and a
transcript indicates that the trial court stated at the certification hearing that "the normal justi-
fications for the option to exclude yourself from a class do not seem to apply here," which is
consistent with a Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) class. Id. at *11-*12 & n.10.
370. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 352 (S.C. 2002).
371. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
372. Id.; Coughlin v. Shimizu Am. Corp., 991 F. Supp. 1226, 1230 (D. Or. 1998) (defen-
dant moved to compel arbitration complied with Section 4 by providing the required five
days' notice).
373. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
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customer's agreement may be a jury trial if the customer makes a
timely demand for a jury "before the return day of the notice of appli-
cation. 114
The specific procedure in Section 4 envisions the enforcement of
a single agreement between two parties.375 In Fazio and Casteel,
which only involved a handful of plaintiffs, the courts had to engage
in a contract-by-contract analysis, or more specifically, a fact-
intensive analysis of the circumstances surrounding the making of
each agreement before compelling arbitration.376 Under Section 4, it
seems that notice would have to be given to the entire class regarding
Blue Tree's motion to compel arbitration before the court could issue
an order compelling each of the class members to arbitrate, and each
member would need to have an opportunity to contest the making of
his or her agreement, to present facts showing that a genuine dispute
exists as to the making of the agreement, and to request and have a
jury trial regarding the making of the agreement.377
Theoretically, such enforcement proceedings of the entire class of
Blue Tree customers could disintegrate into several individual, fact-
intensive mini-trials by juries regarding the makings of individual
agreements. However, the concern may be overstated. It is possible,
but not entirely clear, that the number of individualized jury trials
would not be significant. Suppose a national hardware store called
House Depot offered customers a House Depot credit card, and the
credit card failed to comply with a regulatory statute. Suppose further
that a plaintiff wanted to sue House Depot and the issuing bank in a
class action for violation of this statute. The House Depot cardholder
agreements would likely contain similar arbitration agreements, but
perhaps the circumstances surrounding the making of each agreement
varied. Some customers may have obtained the card through a tele-
marketer. Others may have obtained the card through a mail-in appli-
cation form, and some customers may have obtained the card by fill-
ing out an application at the store with a store clerk verbally
instructing them how to fill out the form. It is not certain how many
374. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
375. 9 U.S.C. § 4 ("[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect or refusal of another
[party] to arbitrate under a written agreement") (emphasis added).
376. Fazio v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 340 F.3d 386, 397 (6th Cir. 2003); Casteel v. Clear
Channel Broadcasting, Inc., 254 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1088-90 (W.D. Ark. 2003).
377. It is not clear whether this procedure was followed in Pedcor or in the Bazzles' pro-
ceedings. If the courts compelled arbitration without providing for the consideration of the
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customers would contend there is no valid agreement. Although sev-
eral people may claim they are not bound by arbitration agreements,
not every argument will have merit. Some arguments may be rather
weak and may be ultimately rejected. However, even if some claims
are weak or meritless, a court would nevertheless first have to con-
sider, resolve, and ultimately reject the weak claims. Stronger claims
may involve forgery, fraud in the inducement of the arbitration clause
itself, and perhaps procedural unconscionability. Perhaps only a
handful of individuals would be successful in demonstrating no valid
arbitration agreements exist. Also, it is possible that individual class
members who receive notice and an opportunity to contest the making
of an arbitration agreement may not even care or appreciate the nature
of the underlying claims enough to contest the making of an arbitra-
tion agreement. Thus, the concern about the enforcement proceedings
disintegrating into multiple mini-trials may be overstated.378
C. An Agreement to Arbitrate, On an Opt-Out Basis?
Even though the mechanics of enforcing an entire class to arbi-
trate may be workable and protect the core principle that arbitration is
a matter of contract, there are still other problems regarding class arbi-
tration, particularly on an opt-out basis. Turning back to the hypo-
thetical example regarding Blue Tree, suppose again that Blue Tree
entered into individual contracts with thousands of its customers pro-
viding for class arbitration, and one of these customers files a class ac-
tion lawsuit in federal court against Blue Tree along with a motion to
certify a class consisting of all these other individual customers. Sup-
pose that Blue Tree files a motion to compel arbitration, and the court
certifies a class. In addition, the court follows an appropriate proce-
dure to ensure that every class member has a valid arbitration agree-
ment, and the court compels class arbitration on an opt-out basis in
accordance with their individual agreements. This situation resembles
what occurred in the Bazzles' proceedings when "the trial court or-
dered that the class action in arbitration proceed on an opt-out ba-
sis,"379 although it is not clear whether the court followed a specific
procedure to ensure that every class member had a valid arbitration
378. Also, there is an additional problem regarding compelling an entire class to arbitrate,
and perhaps an order compelling arbitration should be limited to the parties in breach of an
arbitration agreement, which will be addressed below in Part n. D.
379. Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 569 S.E.2d 349, 352 (S.C. 2002).
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agreement. In the Bazzles' proceedings, twelve individuals decided to
exercise the opt-out option.380
This situation regarding class arbitration on an opt-out basis raises
interesting questions regarding the meaning of an arbitration agree-
ment under the FAA. Is an arbitration agreement providing for opt-
out class arbitration really an enforceable arbitration agreement cov-
ered by the FAA?
With respect to traditional class actions in federal court, a class
action must satisfy the four requirements of numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and adequacy set forth Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a), as well as the
requirements of at least one of the three subsections of Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(b).381 ' These three subsections of 23(b) set forth the three basic
types of classes, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide a
right to opt-out in connection with the third type of class, a class pur-
suant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). 382 Rule 23(b)(3) "authorizes a class
action when the justification for doing so is the presence of common
questions of law or fact and a determination that the class action is su-
perior to other available methods for resolving the dispute fairly and
efficiently." '383 Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) set forth classes based upon
the "effect" or "type" of relief sought.3" A class may be brought pur-
suant to Rule 23(b)(1) if prosecution of individual actions by or
against individual class members may prejudice the defendant or class
members.385 Such classes include a "limited fund" class where "a
fixed asset or piece of property exists in which all class members have
a preexisting interest, and an apportionment or determination of the
interests of one class member cannot be made without affecting the
proportionate interests of other class members similarly situated. 3 86
Class actions pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) primarily seek injunctive or
corresponding declaratory relief, and it has been recognized that "Rule
380. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, App. D at 68a, Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle,
2002 WL 32101094 (No. 02-634).
381. See 2 CONTE &NEWBERG, supra note 14, § 4:1.
382. 7B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1787
(2d ed. 1986 & 2004 Supp.) (explaining that under the Federal Rules, "the privilege of being
excluded from the judgment only exists in actions brought under Rule 23(b)(3)," but some
courts have acknowledged opt-out rights in connection with (b)(1) or (b)(2) classes); see also
Eubanks v. Billington, 110 F.3d 87, 94 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ("We join those circuits holding that
the language of Rule 23 is sufficiently flexible to afford district courts discretion to grant opt-
out rights in (b)(l) and (b)(2) class actions,").
383. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 382, § 1777.
384. Id.
385. See 2 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 14, § 4:3.
386. Id. § 4:9.
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23(b)(2) class actions were designed specifically for civil rights cases
seeking broad declaratory or injunctive relief for a numerous and often
unascertainable or amorphous class of persons, though this type is not
the exclusive type of suit that qualifies under this category.- 387
In contrast, a class certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3) requires in-
dividual notice of the certification to all class members who can be
identified through reasonable effort, and class members are entitled to
a right to exclude themselves from the class and the binding effect of
the future judgment for the class.388 It has been observed that a justifi-
cation for the difference in treatment of (b)(3) as opposed to (b)(1) and
(b)(2) classes is that "[e]ffective representation is especially important
in Rule 23(b)(3) actions because the class members are only loosely
associated by common questions of law or fact, rather than by any
pre-existing or continuing legal relationship," 389 and classes certified
pursuant to (b)(1) and (b)(2) are generally "more cohesive. ' ' 39  It has
been further observed that:
In representative actions brought under [Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2)], the
class generally will be more cohesive-for example, in many instances
each member will be affected as a practical matter by a judgment obtained
by another member if individual actions were instituted. Similarly, it is
less likely that there will be special defenses or issues relating to individ-
ual members of a Rule 23(b)(1) or Rule 23(b)(2) class, than in the case of
a Rule 23(b)(3) class. This means that there is less reason to be concerned
about each member of the class having an opportunity to be present.
Thus, in suits under subdivisions (b)(1) or (b)(2), once the court deter-
mines that the members are adequately represented as required by Rule
23(a)(4), it is reasonably certain that the named representatives will pro-
tect the absent members and give them the functional equivalent of a day
in court. In keeping with this philosophy, class members in Rule 23(b)(1)
and Rule 23(b)(2) actions are not provided an opportunity by the rule to
exclude themselves from the action as is true in Rule 23(b)(3) actions. 391
The opt-out procedure helps protect individual autonomy by:
preserv[ing] the right of a potential class member who feels that his inter-
ests are in conflict with, or antagonistic to, the other class members to
bring his own action and, at the same time, assures that differences of
opinion within the class will not necessitate a dismissal of the action it-
self.392
387. Id. § 4:11.
388. See id. § 4:1.
389. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 382, § 1786.
390. Id.
391. Id. (footnotes and citations omitted).
392. Id. § 1787. It has also been observed that "[b]y requiring the absentee to take af-
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In Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,39 3 the Supreme Court recognized
that opt-out procedures in a class action help satisfy due process con-
cerns. 394 In discussing procedural due process protections for absent
class members when a "forum State wishes to bind an absent plaintiff
concerning a claim for money damages or similar relief at law, ' 395 the
Supreme Court held "that due process requires at a minimum that an
absent plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to remove himself
from the class by executing and returning an 'opt out' or 'request for
exclusion' form to the court. '396 The Court held that an opt-out pro-
cedure can protect the interests of absent plaintiffs.391 In rejecting the
petitioner's argument that due process requires an opt-in procedure,
the Court recognized that "[a]ny plaintiff may consent to jurisdic-
tion,"398 and an opt-out procedure provides for a sufficient showing of
such consent to jurisdiction. 39
This function of an opt-out procedure regarding consent to juris-
diction in a traditional judicial class action is not perfectly analogous
to the function that an opt-out procedure may serve in a class arbitra-
tion context. In a class arbitration context, the parties have already
generally consented, in advance, to class arbitration by entering into
the arbitration agreement. However, an opt-out procedure in class ar-
bitration, should the parties agree to such a procedure, perhaps may
function to protect absent class members who are not satisfied with
the selection of a particular arbitrator or arbitration panel. Further-
more, an opt-out procedure in class arbitration perhaps may help pro-
tect a class member who feels that his or her interests are in conflict
with the interests of other class members.
As indicated above, an opt-out procedure was available in the
class arbitration in the Bazzle proceedings. Despite the possible func-
tions an opt-out procedure may serve in class arbitration, arbitration
agreements providing for class arbitration on an opt-out basis may be
firmative action to avoid being bound, the rule [providing for opt-out rights] attempts to
eliminate the common practice in 'spurious' class suits prior to 1966 of waiting to see if the
adjudication was favorable to the class before deciding whether to enter the action." Id.
393. 472 U.S. 797 (1985).
394. Id.
395. Id. at 811 & n.3 ("Our holding today is limited to those class actions which seek to
bind known plaintiffs concerning claims wholly or predominately for money judgments. We
intimate no view concerning other types of class actions, such as those seeking equitable re-
lief.").
396. Id. at 812.
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id. at 812-13.
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problematic and unenforceable Under the FAA. Imagine a customer
of BlueTree promising "I hereby agree to class arbitration, but by the
way, I may opt-out and sue in court simply because I choose to do so."
Such an agreement providing for class arbitration on an opt-out basis
and allowing an opt-out to proceed in court creates no obligation to
arbitrate and is simply an illusory promise. This unlimited right to
avoid arbitration by opting-out may seem antithetical to an agreement
to arbitrate.
The Third Circuit in Harrison v. Nissan Motor Corp.' addressed
whether a non-binding alternative dispute resolution procedure in Nis-
san warranties called the Better Business Bureau Auto Line was en-
forceable under the FAA.4° Nissan contracted with the Better Busi-
ness Bureau to administer this non-binding mechanism, described in
the warranty "as a remedy available to consumers who are dissatisfied
with their vehicles' performance" 2 and as consisting of both media-
tion and arbitration.4 °3 Under this procedure, "[i]f the complaint can-
not be mediated, the consumer can present the matter to an impartial
person or a three-person arbitration panel. The arbitrators' decision is
not binding unless the consumer accepts it as binding. 4°  The Third
Circuit reasoned that an enforceable agreement to arbitrate certain dis-
putes entails an "agree[ment] to arbitrate these disputes through to
completion, i.e. to an award made by a third-party arbitrator." 5 The
Third Circuit held that the consumer and Nissan had not entered into
an enforceable agreement to arbitrate within the meaning of the FAA
because the consumer would not have to pursue the procedure to com-
pletion.4'
Under the rationale of Harrison, an agreement providing for class
arbitration on an opt-out basis and permitting opt-outs to file in court
would not be considered an enforceable agreement to arbitrate cov-
ered by the FAA, and in this limited sense, such an agreement for
400. 111 F.3d 343 (3d Cir. 1997).
401. Id.
402. Id. at 346.
403. Id.
404. Id.
405. Id. at 350 (emphasis added).
406. Id. at 351. But see Wolsey, Ltd. v. Foodmaker, Inc., 144 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 1998)
(agreement to submit to non-binding arbitration is covered by the FAA). Whether non-
binding arbitration agreements are covered by the FAA is not settled. Fit Tech, Inc. v. Bally
Total Fitness Holding Corp., 374 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004) (acknowledging disagreement re-
garding the issue, but stating that some "circuits (defensibly, in our view) have declined to
treat an agreement for non-binding arbitration as 'arbitration' within the meaning of the [Fed-
eral Arbitration] Act").
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class arbitration would be at odds with the FAA.4°7 One possible solu-
tion to cure this problem regarding opt-outs and an illusory promise to
arbitrate might be to specify in the agreement that opt-outs from a
class arbitration would be bound to individual arbitration. Thus, for
example, a customer of Blue Tree would agree that "all disputes be-
tween you and me shall be resolved in binding arbitration, either on a
class action basis or in individual arbitration proceedings," and any
provision permitting opt-outs should make clear that opt-outs cannot
sue in court but must instead rely on individual arbitration. With such
language, the parties would be agreeing to arbitrate their dispute
through to completion, thereby satisfying the Third Circuit's rationale
in Harrison. The current version of the AAA Class Rules provides for
the possibility of opt-outs, but the opt-out language in the rules do not
appear to qualify that opt-outs must bring their claims in arbitration.4 8
An agreement that provides for class arbitration on an opt-out basis
and permits opt-outs to avoid arbitration and bring claims in court
may be problematic under the Third Circuit's rationale and not cov-
ered by the FAA. In order to create enforceable arbitration agree-
ments covered by the FAA, the arbitration agreements should clarify
that the exercise of an opt-out does not avoid an obligation to arbitrate
and permit the opt-out individual to bring claims in court.
D. Suggested Procedure for Handling Class Arbitration Under the
FAA's Enforcement Mechanism
Suppose that Blue Tree and each of its 1,000 customers enter into
arbitration agreements providing that all disputes between Blue Tree
and a customer shall be resolved in binding arbitration, either in an in-
407. Moreover, agreements between two parties where only one party is bound to arbitrate
and the other party has no such obligation have been held unenforceable. See, e.g., Iberia
Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Cingular Wireless LLC, No. 03-30613, 2004 WL 1622065 (5th Cir.
July 21, 2004) (one-sided arbitration clause imposing the duty to arbitrate on only one party is
unenforceable).
408. The language in the AAA Class Rules is patterned after the opt-out provision in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Compare Rule 6(b)(5) of the AAA Class Rules ("The No-
tice of Class Determination must concisely and clearly state in plain, easily understood lan-
guage: ... (5) that the arbitrator will exclude from the class any member who requests exclu-
sion, stating when and how members may elect to be excluded") with FED. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(2)(B) ('The notice must concisely and clearly state in plain, easily understood lan-
guage: ... that the court will exclude from the class any member who requests exclusion, stat-
ing when and how members may elect to be excluded"). There was no need in the Federal
Rules to specify that an opt-out must proceed in court, but in order to create an enforceable
class arbitration agreement under the rationale of Harrison, an opt-out right in class arbitra-
tion should not permit an individual to completely avoid arbitration and bring claims in court.
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dividual arbitration or in a class arbitration. For example, Customer
#1 agrees that when bringing claims in arbitration, the customer may
purport to represent a class or may simply proceed on an individual
basis. If the customer purports to represent a class, the arbitrator will
determine whether a class can be certified, as provided, for example,
in the AAA Class Rules patterned after Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Further-
more, the arbitration agreement provides that if another Blue Tree cus-
tomer brings claims in arbitration and purports to represent a class,
and if that class has been certified and Customer #1 falls within the
definition of the certified class, then a class judgment by the arbitrator
or a settlement approved by the arbitrator will have a binding effect on
Customer #1. Customers #2 through #1000 have the same agreement.
Suppose that Customer #401 brings a claim in federal court and
purports to represent a class of similarly situated individuals, and Blue
Tree immediately files a motion to compel arbitration. How should a
court handle the motion to compel arbitration?
1. The Named Class Representative
The FAA authorizes an order compelling arbitration when one
party is "aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of an-
other to arbitrate4°9 pursuant to an arbitration agreement. ° Section 4
provides for "an order directing the parties [i.e., the 'aggrieved' party
and the party 'in default,'] to proceed to arbitration in accordance with
the terms of the agreement. 4 1 In PaineWebber Inc. v. Faragalli,1 2
the Third Circuit explained that an order compelling arbitration is
available under the FAA "only to those persons 'aggrieved by the al-
leged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate.' 41 3 The Third
Circuit also explained the rationale underlying this limitation:
Clearly, unless [one party] has resisted arbitration, the [other party seeking
the order] has not been "aggrieved" by anything. The reason for this rule,
though little discussed, is evident: unless and until an adverse party has re-
fused to arbitrate a dispute putatively governed by a contractual arbitration
clause, no breach of contract has occurred, no dispute over whether to ar-
bitrate has arisen, and no harm has befallen the [party seeking the order]-
409. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2004).
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. 61 F.3d 1063 (3d Cir. 1995).
413. Id. at 1067 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 (emphasis added)).
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hence, the 1party seeking the order] cannot claim to be "aggrieved" under
the FAA.4 '
In the Blue Tree example, who is the party "in default" with re-
spect to an agreement to arbitrate? It appears that only Customer #401
is "in default" because Customer #401 initiated claims in court instead
of arbitration, and Blue Tree has been aggrieved by Customer #401's
failure to arbitrate in accordance with the terms of Customer #401's
agreement. Accordingly, under the FAA, the court may direct Cus-
tomer #401 and Blue Tree to arbitrate in accordance with Customer
#401's agreement. However, with respect to the 999 other customers,
a court cannot determine at this point whether one or more of the 999
other customers have breached their individual arbitration agreements
and are "in default," and it would be premature at this point for an or-
der directing every other customer to arbitrate. There is simply no
dispute at this time between Blue Tree and the 999 other customers
regarding a duty to arbitrate. For example, after Customer #401 prop-
erly commences arbitration pursuant to the court's order, the other
class members may comply with their obligations under their arbitra-
tion agreements. Indeed, the arbitration may remain an individual ar-
bitration because a class may never be certified, and prior to certifica-
tion, the 999 other customers may have little or no obligation under
their arbitration agreements and may never be called to task.4"5
414. Id.; see also E.E.O.C. v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 459-460 (6th
Cir. 1999) (recognizing that "[t]he FAA grants federal courts the authority to order into arbi-
tration one who has failed, neglected, or refused to arbitrate despite having agreed in writing
to do so," and rejecting lower court's application of the FAA because "Adams has never
really failed, neglected or refused to arbitrate and has thus not breached her agreement"); Tra-
falgar Shipping Co. v. Int'l Milling Co., 401 F.2d 568, 572 n.3 (2d Cir. 1968) ("The phrase
'failure, neglect, or refusal' was included in the first line of 9 U.S.C. § 4, . . primarily to as-
sure that the remedy which Congress was affording would not be available before there had
been a demand to arbitrate and a refusal."); Central Park Elecs., Inc. v. Hyundai Elecs. Am.,
No. 95 Civ. 4201, 1996 WL 537660, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 1996) ("In order to decide a
motion to compel arbitration, a district court must determine: (1) whether there is an agree-
ment to arbitrate; and (2) whether one party to the agreement has failed, neglected or refused
to arbitrate.").
415. Cf. Am. Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 552 (1974) (Prior to class certifi-
cation, "potential class members are mere passive beneficiaries of the action brought in their
behalf. Not until the existence and limits of the class have been established and notice of
membership has been sent does a class member have any duty to take note of the suit or to
exercise any responsibility with respect to it in order to profit from the eventual outcome of
the case."); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810 (1985) ("Unlike a defendant
in a normal civil suit, an absent class-action plaintiff is not required to do anything. He may
sit back and allow the litigation to run its course ... ").
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2. The Unnamed Class Members and the Contract Principle
As discussed above, a core principle of arbitration law is that arbi-
tration is a matter of contract, and before a court may compel arbitra-
tion, it is important to honor this principle by first making a determi-
nation regarding the threshold issue of whether a valid agreement to
arbitrate exists. By limiting its order to compel to Customer #401 and
Blue Tree, it is easier for a court to honor this contract principle. The
court may compel Customer #401 and Blue Tree to arbitrate after be-
ing satisfied that the making of the particular arbitration agreement be-
tween Customer #401 and Blue Tree is not in issue.
However, an arbitrator must also respect the core principle of ar-
bitration. An arbitrator's very power arises from the agreement to ar-
bitrate. Thus, for example, 1,000 valid class arbitration agreements
must exist if a class award covering the entire class of 1,000 Blue Tree
customers is to be justified. In a traditional non-class arbitration pur-
suant to a pre-dispute arbitration agreement, the claimant or initiating
party typically sends written notice to the other party of its intent to
arbitrate a dispute pursuant to their contract.416 The initiating party
usually files a copy of the demand and arbitration agreement with an
arbitration association, and the respondent may file a responsive
pleading. If there is no dispute as to the agreement to arbitrate, the
parties will continue the arbitration process in front of an arbitrator
bestowed with power arising from the parties' agreement. The parties
in such a situation are willingly appearing in and utilizing a private
tribunal created by their contract, and there is not likely to be any vio-
lation of the core principle that arbitration is a matter of contract. If,
however, a dispute exists regarding the existence of an agreement to
416. In addition to a pre-dispute arbitration agreement, there is generally another type of
agreement to arbitrate commonly known as a "submission." See 1 DoMKE ON COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION § 8:1 (2003) ("One type consists of a clause in a contract under which the par-
ties agree to make use of arbitration to decide disputes that may, in the future, arise out of the
particular contractual relationship. The other type is an independent agreement under which
the parties agree to submit an existing dispute to arbitration. This second type of arbitration
agreement is called a submission."); see also Rules 4 and 5 of AAA Rules for Commercial
Arbitration (providing for initiation under an arbitration clause in a contract and initiation
pursuant to a submission), at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15747&JSPsrc
=upload\LIVESITE\Rules-Procedures\National-Internationa\..\..\focusArea\commercial\AA
A235current.htm (last visited Nov. 15, 2004). Rule 5 of AAA Rules for Commercial Arbitra-
tion, "Initiation under a Submission," recognizes that "[p]arties to any existing dispute may
commence an arbitration under these rules by filing at any office of the AAA two copies of a
written submission to arbitrate under these rules, signed by the parties." The existence of an
agreement to arbitrate seems generally less likely to arise when an arbitration is commenced
via a submission as compared to an arbitration commenced by one party pursuant to a pre-
dispute arbitration agreement.
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arbitrate, how should the party believing there is no agreement pro-
ceed?
In Comprehensive Accounting Corp. v. Rudell,417 Comprehensive
Accounting Corporation ("Comprehensive") commenced an arbitra-
tion against Mr. & Mrs. Rudell, who refused to participate, and the ar-
bitration proceeded ex parte and resulted in an award against them. 418
Comprehensive subsequently moved to confirm the award in court,
and the Rudells objected to the confirmation on various grounds, in-
cluding an objection regarding whether a valid agreement existed.419
The court rejected this objection as untimely and confirmed the
award.42° On appeal, the Seventh Circuit similarly rejected the
Rudells' argument concerning their agreement to arbitrate.42' The
Seventh Circuit explained:
No one should be forced into arbitration without an opportunity to show
that he never agreed to arbitrate the dispute that is the subject of the arbi-
tration. The Rudells had that opportunity when they were notified of the
arbitration, and they let it pass by. It was then too late for them to sit back
and allow the arbitration to go forward, and only after it was all done, and
enforcement was sought, say: oh by the way, we never agreed to the arbi-
tration clause. That is a tactic that the law of arbitration, with its commit-
ment to speed, will not tolerate.
422
The Seventh Circuit then suggested some options for individuals
like the Rudells who were faced with an arbitration proceeding that
could proceed ex parte pursuant to an agreement they believe does not
exist:
They might have brought suit to enjoin the arbitration. At the very least,
they could have told the arbitrator that they did not recognize his authority
to proceed, because they had not agreed to arbitration. That would have
put the arbitrator and Comprehensive on notice that the arbitrator's juris-
diction was questioned. Comprehensive might then have moved under
section 4 of the Act for an order to arbitrate, and the Rudells would have
gotten their day in court to challenge the existence of an agreement to ar-
bitrate, before Comprehensive was put to the expense of the arbitration. If
Comprehensive had not moved under section 4, but had gone ahead with
the arbitration in the Rudell's absence, then the Rudells, having put Com-
prehensive on notice of their reservation, might be allowed in the confir-
mation proceeding to litigate the question whether there was a valid
agreement to arbitrate, though we need not decide in this case whether
417. 760 F.2d 138 (7th Cir. 1985).
418. Id. at 139.
419. Id.
420. Id.
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they should instead have sought to enjoin the arbitration. They did nei-
ther. They waited too long.423
Also, the parties may submit the question directly to the arbitrator.
In First Options, the Supreme Court addressed a situation involving
two respondents in an arbitration proceeding, Mr. & Mrs. Kaplan, who
filed written objections with the arbitration panel, claiming that their
dispute with claimant First Options was not arbitrable.424 The arbitra-
tion panel issued an award against the Kaplans, and the Kaplans filed
a petition in federal court to vacate the award, while the claimant First
Options cross-petitioned to confirm the award.425 The district court
confirmed the award, but the appellate court reversed, finding that the
dispute with the Kaplans was not arbitrable.426
The Supreme Court explained that if the parties had agreed "to
submit the arbitrability question itself to arbitration .... then the
court's standard for reviewing the arbitrator's decision about that mat-
ter should not differ from the standard courts apply when they review
any other matter that parties have agreed to arbitrate, '427 namely, by
giving "considerable leeway to the arbitrator .... ,"428 However, if
"the parties did not agree to submit the arbitrability question itself to
arbitration, then the court should decide that question just as it would
decide any other question that the parties did not submit to arbitration,
namely, independently. 429 With respect to whether the Kaplans had
agreed to submit the issue to the arbitrator, First Options pointed to a
written memorandum filed with the arbitration panel by the Kaplans
objecting to the arbitration panel's jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court
did not believe that First Options had clearly demonstrated the Kap-
lans had agreed to submit the issue of arbitrability to the arbitration
423. Id. at 140-4 1; see also J.A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Flakt, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 1061, 1065
n.4 (N.D. Ga. 1990) (citing Comprehensive Accounting Corp. v. Rudell, 760 F.2d 138, 140
(7th Cir. 1985) and explaining that "[i]f Flakt believed that it had no obligation to arbitrate
Brennan's claims, it should have refused to participate in the proceedings and forced Brennan
to bring an action to compel arbitration under Section 4."); Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook &
Weeden, Inc. v. Ellis, 849 F.2d 264, 269 (7th Cir. 1988) ("A claimant may not voluntarily
submit his claim to arbitration, await the outcome, and, if the decision is unfavorable, then
challenge the authority of the arbitrators to act.") (quoting Ficek v. Southern Pacific Co., 338
F.2d 655, 657 (9th Cir. 1964)).
424. First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 940-41 (1995).
425. Id. at 941.
426. Id.
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panel.43 The Court explained that "merely arguing the arbitrability
issue to an arbitrator does not indicate a clear willingness to arbitrate
that issue, i.e., a willingness to be effectively bound by the arbitrator's
decision on that point." '431 Thus, because there was no clear and un-
mistakable evidence that the Kaplans agreed to submit the question of
arbitrability to the arbitrator, the issue should be reviewed by a court
independently. The Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit's judg-
ment.43
2
In sum, when a respondent in a traditional, non-class arbitration
believes there is no valid arbitration agreement and the arbitrator
therefore has no authority, there are several options with different im-
plications. For example, clearly agreeing to submit to the arbitrator
the issue of whether a valid arbitration agreement will result in a def-
erential review in court regarding this issue as opposed to an inde-
pendent review. Also, it has been recognized that there may be a risk
that a court may treat a respondent's objections before an arbitrator as
amounting to a waiver and submission of the issue for the arbitrator to
decide, resulting in a deferential review before a court.433 And doing
absolutely nothing and not raising the issue of the making of the
agreement may result in a finding of waiver as the Seventh Circuit
found in Rudell.4 3
In a traditional, non-class two-party arbitration, it should become
readily apparent if one of the parties believes it is not subject to a valid
arbitration agreement because a party is likely to raise an objection to
the arbitration proceeding if it believes there is no obligation to arbi-
trate. However, in a class-arbitration setting where for the most part
class members are absent and not actively participating in the prosecu-
tion of the class arbitration, it will probably not be readily apparent
whether every class member is bound by an arbitration agreement.
Thus, in a class arbitration context (whether, for example, commenced
through a court order compelling Customer #401 to arbitrate, or com-
menced voluntarily by Customer #401 without any court order), some
430. Id. at 946.
431. Id.
432. Id. at 949.
433. Alan Scott Rau, The Arbitrability Question Itself, 10 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 287, 296-
302 (1999) (discussing the options available to a respondent and recognizing that if a respon-
dent contests before the arbitrator the existence of an agreement and fails to convince the arbi-
trator that there is no agreement, "there has always been a serious risk that his arguing the
point will be seen as amounting to a grant to the arbitrator of the jurisdiction to decide the ar-
bitrability question.") (internal quotations and citations omitted).
434. Comprehensive Accounting Corp. v. Rudell, 760 F.2d 138, 140 (7th Cir. 1985).
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means should be devised in order to legitimize the authority of the ar-
bitrator or arbitrators and guarantee that the core contract principle is
respected.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that "[f]ederal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction. They possess only that power author-
ized by Constitution and statute, which is not to be expanded by judi-
cial decree." '435 In accord with this principle, a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction in judicial proceedings can generally be raised at any time,
even on appeal, despite the waste of resources that could have oc-
curred, and consent of the parties cannot confer subject matter juris-
diction because courts are of limited jurisdiction. However, the juris-
diction of an arbitrator is not similarly constrained by the Constitution.
An arbitrator's jurisdiction is given its scope by the consent of the par-
ties, and courts have found that parties have waived challenges to an
arbitrator's jurisdiction: "[a] claimant may not voluntarily submit his
claim to arbitration, await the outcome, and, if the decision is unfavor-
able, then challenge the authority of the arbitrators to act. 436
Should these rules regarding waiver of challenges to arbitral au-
thority apply in the class arbitration context? Rules for traditional ju-
dicial class actions do not necessarily require individual notice to in-
dividuals before an award is rendered. Although individual notice for
a Rule 23(b)(3) class is mandatory, for the two other types of classes,
a Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2) class, notice to the class is merely discretion-
ary even though a final judgment would be binding on such mem-
bers.437 To the extent that notice is not provided in a class arbitration,
435. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2701 (2004) (internal quotations and citations omit-
ted); see also California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 112 n.3 (1972) ("Since parties may not con-
fer jurisdiction either upon this Court or the District Court by stipulation, the request of both
parties in this case that the court below adjudicate the merits of the constitutional claim does
not foreclose our inquiry into the existence of an 'actual controversy' within the meaning
of... Art. 1II, s 2, cl. 1, of the Constitution."), overruled by 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Is-
land, 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
436. Ficek v. S. Pac. Co., 338 F.2d 655, 657 (9th Cir. 1964). Cf Marino v. Writers Guild
of Am., E., Inc., 992 F.2d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[I]t is well settled that a party may not
sit idle through an arbitration procedure and then collaterally attack that procedure on grounds
not raised before the arbitrators when the result turns out to be adverse."); Butler Mfg. Co. v.
United Steelworkers of Am., AFL-CIO-CLC, 336 F.3d 629, 635 (7th Cir. 2003) ("Principles
of estoppel prevent a party to arbitration from taking a position before the arbitrator that in-
vites consideration of external law, losing in arbitration, and then seeking relief from the un-
favorable arbitral award in federal court by arguing that the arbitrator lacked authority to con-
sider the law in the first instance."); Nghiem v. NEC Elec., Inc., 25 F.3d 1437, 1440 (9th Cir.
1994) ("Once a claimant submits to the authority of the arbitrator and pursues arbitration, he
cannot suddenly change his mind and assert lack of authority.").
437. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(A) ("For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (2),
the court may direct appropriate notice to the class.") (emphasis added); 2 CoNTE &
NEWBERG, supra note 14, § 4:11 n.20 ("(T]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not provide
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there would be little or no opportunity for an absent class member to
raise an objection regarding the existence of his or her agreement to
arbitrate prior to a class award as there would normally be in a tradi-
tional, non-class arbitration.'
The procedure for compelling arbitration that has developed with
respect to non-class arbitrations fully honors the core contract princi-
ple underlying arbitration because the existence of an arbitration
agreement is a critical threshold issue in such a proceeding. In a tradi-
tional, non-class arbitration involving only one claimant and one re-
spondent, it should become readily apparent if one of the parties be-
lieves there is no valid arbitration agreement giving rise to the
authority of the arbitrator and an obligation to arbitrate. Although a
dispute regarding the contract principle should be rather easy to iden-
tify in such a non-class arbitration proceeding, there is no uniform
procedure for resolving the dispute. Different options are available
for resolving the issue, but each may have its own potential draw-
backs. For example, if there is no consent to have the arbitrator re-
solve the issue of whether an arbitration agreement exists, the arbitra-
tion may continue subject to the objections of one of the parties
despite the lack of authority of the arbitrator, and the issue regarding
the core contract principle may not be resolved until the arbitration is
over and the arbitration award resulting from the questionable author-
ity of the arbitrator comes before a court upon a motion to vacate or
confirm the award. The individual who is not bound by an arbitration
agreement may have been forced to suffer through the illegitimate
proceedings. Of course, there are other options available, such as the
party who believes there is an obligation to arbitrate may temporarily
halt the arbitration and seek an order compelling arbitration. Such a
procedure would help honor the core principle that arbitration is a
matter of contract.
What options would be available in connection with a class arbi-
tration procedure to ensure respect for the core contract principle?
Suppose Customer #401 commences a class arbitration (either by
court order, or Customer #401 commences the class arbitration inde-
pendently), and further suppose that 30 customers who signed an arbi-
tration agreement, Customers #1 through #30, are not actually bound
comparable guarantees of those rights [regarding notice and opportunity to opt-out] for a class
certified under subsections (b)(l) or (b)(2)."); Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 508 F.2d 239,
249 (3d Cir. 1975) (any unfairness resulting to a mandatory, non-opt-out class was "thought
to be outweighed by the purposes behind class actions: eliminating the possibility of repeti-
tious litigation and providing small claimants with a means of obtaining redress for claims too
small to justify individual litigation.").
[Vol. 41
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by the agreement. The option suggested in Rudell whereby the party
who believes there is a duty to arbitrate stops the arbitration proceed-
ing and seeks a court order compelling arbitration is one possibility
for honoring the contract principle.4 38 However, this option would ne-
cessitate notice to all class members about the pending class arbitra-
tion. 439 For example, assuming Customers #1 through #30 object after
receiving the notice of the class arbitration, Blue Tree may then seek
orders compelling arbitration with respect to these individuals and any
other individuals who may object, and these individuals would be
given a fair opportunity to dispute the existence of an agreement, even
to the point of a trial on the issue, thereby respecting the core contract
principle and the procedures established by the FAA.
Another option instead of filing a motion to compel arbitration is
that Customers #1 through #30 may object after receiving notice, and
the arbitration proceedings may continue subject to the objection of
these class members. If Blue Tree chooses not to compel arbitration
and instead continue with the arbitration, Blue Tree assumes the risk
that its efforts may be in vain with respect to these thirty Customers
who may not be bound by an arbitration clause, although such efforts
with respect to the thirty customers are likely to be minimal because
Blue Tree is essentially defending the claims of the named representa-
tive who is serving in a representative capacity. Blue Tree is not
likely to conduct its defense differently. Also, Blue Tree assumes the
risk that these individuals may drop their objections if the award is fa-
vorable to the individuals. If Blue Tree continues without compelling
arbitration, the objections of these thirty customers may be subse-
quently heard by a court upon a motion to confirm or vacate an award,
unless the thirty customers feel strongly enough to immediately file
suit in court. They may bring suit on the underlying claim, or file a
declaratory judgment action regarding the duty to arbitrate, or both,
438. Rudell, 760 F.2d at 140.
439. With respect to the contents of such a notice, perhaps the notice may simply inform
the class members of the pending arbitration, without specifically stating that the recipient
may object if the recipient believes no arbitration agreement exists or without providing a
specific procedure for the recipient to register an objection. In traditional non-class arbitra-
tions involving two parties, there is no general duty for one party to notify the other party of
any particular mechanism for objecting to the existence of an arbitration agreement. Any ob-
jection would likely be raised sua sponte by one of the parties in a non-class arbitration, and
in fact, arbitration rules may provide that any objection not raised at the commencement of
the proceedings is waived. However, in a class arbitration setting, a notice that informs class
members of a specific procedure for registering an objection regarding the existence of an ar-
bitration agreement would probably be helpful in facilitating the identification of parties
without a valid arbitration agreement, which in turn would help legitimize the class arbitra-
tion.
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any of which may trigger a motion to compel arbitration by Blue Tree.
In this manner, the contract principle will be respected.
Also, if there is consent to submit the issue of arbitrability to the
arbitrator, the arbitrator may resolve the issue, as recognized by First
Options. All of these options, whether Blue Tree moves to compel ar-
bitration, whether the arbitration continues subject to the objection of
the thirty Customers, or whether the issue is to be resolved by the arbi-
trator, would necessitate the giving of some type of notice to the class.
If no notice is given to the class, and class members only find out
about the arbitration proceedings after an award has been rendered,
then the thirty Customers should be allowed to contest the binding ef-
fect of the class after the class award has been issued in order to honor
the core contract principle. This option would provide an opportunity
for individuals to wait and see whether a class award is favorable or
not before raising objections regarding the existence of a valid arbitra-
tion agreement. An unfavorable class award may invite a significant
number of such objections and threaten to unravel the class and its ef-
fectiveness as a tool for collective resolution of claims. By providing
notice shortly after class certification and providing an opportunity to
resolve the existence of disputed arbitration agreements prior to a
class award, it would help legitimize the arbitral proceedings. In class
arbitrations, there should be a concern regarding the contract principle
because the very authority of the arbitrator arises from contracts of the
class members, and some means should be devised to give effect to
the contract principle in class arbitration.
E. Whether a Court or Arbitrator Should Determine Whether the
Arbitration Agreement Provides For Class Arbitration
The above discussion sets forth suggested procedures for respect-
ing the core contract principle in connection with class arbitration, and
these suggested procedures assumed the arbitration agreements at is-
sue provided for arbitration on a class-wide basis. However, what
happens if the parties dispute whether a particular arbitration clause
provides for class arbitration? Bazzle left this issue unresolved." 0
The Bazzle plurality concluded that this dispute is presumptively for
an arbitrator to resolve," and Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting
opinion concluded class arbitration was improper because the selec-
tion of arbitrator, an issue presumptively for judicial determination,
440. See supra Part I.C.3.
441. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444,451-52 (2003).
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was inconsistent with class arbitration." 2 Furthermore, as indicated
above, the Supreme Court may have signaled lower courts to begin
independently addressing this unresolved issue. "
Regardless of whether the appropriate decision-maker with re-
spect to this issue is a court or arbitrator, the decision-maker should
closely examine whether the terms of the arbitration clause provide for
class arbitration. In traditional non-class arbitration, it is recognized
that parties may arbitrate a particular claim even if the arbitration of
this claim is not permitted under an existing arbitration clause. For
example, if an arbitration clause provides a time limit for certain
claims and such time limit has expired, or if the scope of an arbitration
clause does not cover the particular dispute at issue, a claimant and re-
spondent in a traditional non-class arbitration may consent to arbitrate
the underlying claim despite the patent non-arbitrability of the claim
under their prior agreement.4' Such consensual submission of a dis-
pute to arbitration, even though the dispute is non-arbitrable under an
arbitration clause, is a perfect example of how arbitration is a matter
of consent.
However, suppose a claimant purports to represent a class in arbi-
tration, and further suppose that the arbitration clause in the agree-
ments of the claimant and putative class members clearly does not
provide for class arbitration. It would be inappropriate for the claim-
ant and respondent simply to consent that class arbitration is permissi-
ble and for such consent to apply to all the putative class members.
These absent class members have simply not agreed to class arbitra-
tion. It is important for the decision-maker when assessing class arbi-
tration to carefully and independently ensure that the arbitration provi-
sions at issue actually provide for class arbitration. 5
442. Id. at 456.
443. See Part I.C.4.
444. See generally DOMKE supra note 416, § 8:19 ("[T]he parties may agree to submit a
dispute to arbitration which they were not otherwise bound to submit under the contract.")
(citing Executone Info. Sys., Inc. v. Davis, 26 F.3d 1314 (5th Cir. 1994)); see also Kamakazi
Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 684 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1982) ("Even if the arbitra-
tion clause did not encompass Kamakazi's claims, it is hornbook law that parties by their
conduct may agree to send issues outside an arbitration clause to arbitration.") (citations omit-
ted).
445. Cf. Hervey v. City of Little Rock, 787 F.2d 1223, 1227 (8th Cir. 1986) ("While class
stipulations by the parties may be helpful, they are not complete substitutes for 'rigorous
analysis' [under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23]. The purpose of this analysis is to protect unknown or
unnamed potential class members, and by definition those people do not and cannot partici-
pate in any stipulations concocted by the named parties."); but see 3 CONTE & NEWBERG, su-
pra note 14, § 7:10 (discussing that stipulations may be appropriate in class actions).
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With respect to the conflicting views of Justice Breyer's plurality
opinion and Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion regarding
the issue of who is the appropriate decision-maker, neither view is free
from problems.
The plurality determined that the issue of whether contracts pro-
vide for class arbitration do not fall within the class of issues that are
presumptively for a court to resolve as set forth in Howsam v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc."6 In Howsam, the Supreme Court addressed the
division of authority between courts and arbitrators under the FAA.
The underlying dispute involved misrepresentations that Dean Witter
Reynolds, Inc. ("Dean Witter") allegedly made to its client, Karen
Howsam, in connection with investment advice to purchase interests
in certain limited partnerships." 7 The parties were bound by an arbi-
tration agreement, and arbitration of Howsam's dispute was to be held
before the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD"). 48
The NASD Code of Arbitration Procedure provided that no dispute
"shall be eligible for submission... where six (6) years have elapsed
from the occurrence or event giving rise to the... dispute."" 9 An is-
sue arose whether the underlying controversy was ineligible for arbi-
tration before the NASD because of the six-year rule, and the federal
courts of appeal was split regarding whether a court or an arbitrator
was to apply the six-year rule.450
In discussing who was the appropriate decision-maker regarding
this six-year rule, the Howsam Court first recognized the core princi-
ple that arbitration is a matter of contract, and the Court acknowledged
that it had long "enforced a 'liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements."' 451 But the Howsam Court explained that a general in-
terpretative rule existed that was an exception to this liberal policy fa-
voring the enforcement of arbitration agreements: "The question
whether the parties have submitted a particular dispute to arbitration,
i.e., the 'question of arbitrability,' is 'an issue for judicial determina-
tion [u]nless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide other-
wise. "'452 As a general interpretative rule, it is presumed that courts,
and not arbitrators, are the appropriate decision-maker to resolve the
446. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79 (2002).
447. Id. at 81.
448. Id. at 81-82.
449. Id. at 82 (quoting NASD Code § 10304).
450. Id.
451. Id. at 83 (citations omitted).
452. Id. (citations omitted).
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question regarding whether the parties had submitted a particular dis-
pute to arbitration.
The Howsam Court recognized that there may be several gateway
issues dispositive of whether arbitration will proceed, but the Howsam
Court emphasized that not every "potentially dispositive gateway
question" was a "question of arbitrability" to be resolved by a court.453
Rather, a court's involvement in FAA enforcement proceedings is nar-
rowly confined, and the Howsam Court, relying on some of its prior
decisions, declared that the category of arbitral questions generally re-
served for court determination was limited:
The Court has found the phrase ["question of arbitrability"] applicable in
the kind of narrow circumstance where contracting parties would likely
have expected a court to have decided the gateway matter, where they are
not likely to have thought that they had agreed that an arbitrator would do
so, and, consequently, where reference of the gateway dispute to the court
avoids the risk of forcing parties to arbitrate a matter that they may well
not have agreed to arbitrate.45
The Howsam Court then explained that in connection with the en-
forcement of private arbitration agreements under the FAA, a dichot-
omy exists between arbitration-related disputes generally reserved for
a court to resolve and arbitration-related disputes generally reserved
for an arbitrator to resolve.455
The Howsam Court cited a few of its earlier cases as involving is-
sues that fall within the limited category of disputes generally reserved
for court determination, and Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting
opinion in Bazzle would classify the dispute over class arbitration as
456falling within this category. The Howsam Court recognized that a
''gateway [disagreement] about whether [certain] parties' ''who did
not sign [an arbitration] agreement" are nevertheless bound to arbi-
trate was generally a matter for judicial determination.457 As another
example of a dispute generally reserved for court determination, the
Howsam Court explained that courts are the appropriate decision-
makers to resolve the issue of whether an arbitration agreement sur-
vived a corporate merger and bound the resulting corporation.458 Also,
453. Id.
454. Id. at 83-84.
455. Id. at 84.
456. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 455-60 (2003).
457. Howsam v. Dean Witter Ryenolds, 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2003) (citing First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 947 (1995)).
458. Id. (citing John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 546-47 (1964)).
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the Howsam Court recognized that a court should generally resolve a
dispute about whether a particular type of controversy or claim is cov-
ered by an arbitration clause.45 9 These issues presumptively for a
court to determine generally deal with the existence of an arbitration
agreement and the scope of an arbitration agreement.
The Howsam Court then recognized a broader category of dis-
putes "where parties would likely expect that an arbitrator would de-
cide the gateway matter," 46 and the Bazzle plurality treated the issue
regarding class arbitration as falling within this broader category. 46'
The Howsam Court recognized that "'procedural' questions which
grow out of the dispute and bear on its final disposition ' ' 462 are gener-
ally for arbitrators to determine. 463 For example, arbitrators should re-
solve whether the first two steps of a grievance procedure, prerequi-
sites to arbitration, are satisfied.46 Also, the Howsam Court explained
that an arbitrator should generally resolve "allegation[s] of waiver, de-
lay, or a like defense to arbitrability." 465
Against this backdrop of a dichotomy between substantive and
procedural arbitrability, the Howsam Court held that the NASD time
limit rule was a question of procedural arbitrability, and an arbitrator
should therefore apply the NASD time limit rule. 66 The Court rea-
soned that "[t]he time limit rule closely resembles the gateway ques-
tions.. .. that are presumptively for an arbitrator, such as disputes
regarding "waiver, delay, or a like defense." 468 Additionally, the insti-
tutional competence of the NASD arbitrators to interpret and apply
their own rules informed the Howsam Court's decision that the appli-
cability of the NASD time limit rule is presumptively for an arbitrator.
The Howsam Court believed that NASD arbitrators were "compara-
459. Id. (citing AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643,
651 (1986); Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U.S. 238, 241 (1962)).
460. Id.
461. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 451.
462. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84.
463. Id. (citing John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. at 557).
464. Id.
465. Id. (citing Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25
(1983)). After setting forth this general framework dividing decision-making authority be-
tween courts and arbitrators in connection with FAA proceedings, the Howsam Court then
referred to some commentary of the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000, and this com-
mentary designated issues for court determination as "issues of substantive arbitrability," and
issues for arbitral determination as "issues of procedural arbitrability." Id. at 85.
466. Id. at 85.
467. Id.
468. Id. (citing Moses H. Cone Mem 'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25).
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tively more expert about the meaning of their own rule, [and] are
comparatively better able to interpret and to apply it."'469
The Bazzle plurality relied on Howsam and concluded that the is-
sue of whether a contract provides for class arbitration is an issue of
procedural arbitrability, 4 ° which Howsam identified as involving
"procedural questions ... growling] out of... and bear[ing] on ... [a
dispute] '47' and issues such as "waiver, delay, or a like defense to ar-
bitrability. ' '472 In identifying procedural arbitrability issues as issues
such as "waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability, ' 473 the Court
was citing its earlier decisions in Moses H. Cone.474 However, Moses
H. Cone does not hold that an arbitrator should decide these issues,
and Moses H. Cone appears to support the opposite conclusion.
In Moses H. Cone, Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital (the "Hos-
pital") entered into a contract with Mercury Construction Corp.
("Mercury") "for the construction of additions to the Hospital build-
ing", and the contract "included provisions for resolving disputes aris-
ing out of the contract or its breach. ' 475 "All disputes involving inter-
pretation of the contract or performance of the construction work were
to be referred in the first instance to ... an independent [archi-
tect]. .. , and [w]ith certain stated exceptions, . . . dispute[s] decided
by the Architect could be submitted by either party to binding arbitra-
tion." '476 Mercury incurred certain additional costs for "extended
overhead or... construction.., due to delay or inaction by the Hospi-
tal,1477 and "Mercury submitted to the Architect its claims" for such
costs. 478 After some discussions about these costs, the Hospital indi-
cated it would not pay Mercury's claims, and the Hospital filed a de-
claratory judgment action in state court, asking the court to declare,
469. Id. at 85. The Bazzle plurality also recognized the institutional competence of an ar-
bitrator. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 453 (2003) ("Arbitrators are well
situated to answer that question."). However, the Bazzle plurality's recognition of institu-
tional competence goes beyond the recognition in Howsam v. Dean Witter. The Howsam
Court recognized the institutional competence of NASD arbitrators to interpret the specific
rules developed by NASD itself. However, the recognition of the Bazzle plurality goes be-
yond Howsam by recognizing the institutional competence of arbitrators generally to resolve
arbitral procedural issues.
470. Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 453.
471. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84.
472. Id. (citations omitted).
473. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 25.
474. Id.
475. Id. at 4.
476. Id. at 4-5.
477. Id. at 6.
478. Id.
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among other things, that Mercury "had lost any right to arbitra-
tion.., due to waiver, laches, estoppel, and [the] failure to make a
timely demand for arbitration. 479
Mercury filed an action in federal court seeking an order compel-
ling arbitration under the FAA, but the federal court stayed the action
pending resolution of the Hospital's declaratory judgment action in
state court.480 The Fourth Circuit "reversed the.., stay order and re-
manded the case to the ... [lower federal court] with instructions for
entry of an order to arbitrate."48 '
The Supreme Court determined that the stay order, in "deference
to the parallel litigation brought in state court, '482 was appealable and
improper.483 In discussing the impropriety of the federal court's ab-
stention, the Court recognized that federal law was involved, which is
a consideration which may weigh against surrendering jurisdiction.4"4
The Court, recognizing a "federal policy favoring arbitration, "485 ex-
plained that under the FAA "any doubts concerning the scope of arbi-
trable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, whether the
problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or
an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability,
' 486
which is the language cited by Howsam in discussing matters of pro-
cedural arbitrability for an arbitrator to decide. 487 However, in Moses
H. Cone, the Supreme Court did not hold "an allegation of waiver, de-
lay, or a like defense to arbitrability 48 8 was an issue for an arbitrator
to decide. Instead, the Moses H. Cone Court explained that the deci-
sion-maker should apply a presumption in favor of arbitration if there
was a doubt regarding "an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like de-
fense to arbitrability. ' '489 In other words, in resolving an allegation of
waiver, delay, or like defense, a canon of construction exists whereby
doubts should be resolved in favor of arbitration. In support of this
rule of construction that doubts are to be resolved in favor of arbitra-
479. Id. at 7.
480. Id.
481. Id. at 8.
482. Id. at 13.
483. Id. at 19.
484. Id. at 25-26.
485. Id. at 24.
486. Id. at 24-25.
487. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) (citing Moses H. Cone
Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24-25).
488. Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 25.
489. Id. at 24-25.
[Vol. 41
84
California Western Law Review, Vol. 41 [2004], No. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol41/iss1/2
2004] THE NEW ADR: AGGREGATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 85
tion when ruling on an allegation of waiver or delay, the Moses H.
Cone Court cited two cases in a footnote involving courts, not arbitra-
tors, applying this presumption in favor of arbitration when dealing
with an allegation of waiver or delay."9
Also, the Howsam Court cited John Wiley in explaining that
"'procedural' questions grow[ing] out of. . . and bear[ing] on [a dis-
pute]" are generally for an arbitrator to decide. 49' In John Wiley, a un-
ion had previously entered into a collective bargaining agreement with
a publishing company named Interscience, which ceased to exist after
it merged with John Wiley.492 The collective bargaining agreement
contained an arbitration clause, and the union and Interscience could
not agree on what the effect of the merger would be upon the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. 493 The union took the position that it con-
tinued to represent several of the Interscience employees who became
John Wiley's employees, and the union believed John Wiley was ob-
ligated to recognize certain rights of such employees pursuant to the
collective bargaining agreement.494 John Wiley, however, took the
position that the merger had terminated the collective bargaining
agreement and refused to recognize the union as a bargaining agent.495
490. Id. at 25 n.31 (citing Hart v. Orion Ins. Co., 453 F.2d 1358, 1360-61 (10th Cir. 1971)
("In view of the overriding federal policy favoring arbitration, waiver is not lightly in-
ferred.... The court found ... that there was no waiver of arbitration. The finding is not
clearly erroneous and is sustained by the record.") (emphasis added); Germany v. River Ter-
minal Ry. Co., 477 F.2d 546, 547 (6th Cir. 1973) (An agreement to arbitrate may be waived
by the actions of a party which are completely inconsistent with any reliance thereon. How-
ever, waiver may not be inferred from the fact that a party does not rely exclusively on the
arbitration provisions of a contract .... Our review of the record convinces us there was no
waiver by RTR in the district court proceedings.). The other six cases cited in footnote 31 of
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. in support of the general
rule that doubts are to be resolved in favor of arbitration involve this general rule in connec-
tion with interpretation of the scope of arbitrable issues, not allegations of waiver or delay.
See Dickinson v. Heinold Sec., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 1981); Wick v. At. Marine,
Inc., 605 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1979); Becker Autoradio U.S.A., Inc. v. Becker Autora-
diowerk GmbH, 585 F.2d 39, 44 (3d Cir. 1978) ("[D]oubts as to whether an arbitration clause
may be interpreted to cover the asserted dispute should be resolved in favor of arbitration
unless a court can state with 'positive assurance' that this dispute was not meant to be arbi-
trated."); Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Acevedo Maldonado v.
PPG Indus., Inc., 514 F.2d 614, 616-617 (1st Cir. 1975); Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co.,
453 F.2d 1209, 1211-12 (2d Cir. 1972).
491. Howsam, 537 U.S. at 84 (citing John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543,
557 (1964)).
492. John Wiley & Sons, 376 U.S. at 544-45.
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The union subsequently brought an action to compel arbitration pur-
suant to the collective bargaining agreement.496
The collective bargaining agreement provided that arbitration was
to be the third and final stage of certain grievance procedures, and
John Wiley argued it had no obligation to arbitrate because the first
two steps of the grievance procedure, which were prerequisites to ar-
bitration, had not been followed.4 97 The union argued that following
the grievance procedures would be futile because John Wiley refused
to recognize the union as a result of the merger.498 An issue arose
whether a court or an arbitrator should resolve "whether [the] 'proce-
dural' conditions to arbitration ha[d] been met." '499 In discussing
whether a court or arbitrator should resolve this issue, the John Wiley
Court recognized that it may sometimes be difficult to separate the
procedural and substantive aspects of a dispute.5" The John Wiley
Court believed that whether the grievance procedures were followed
was an issue that would "ordinarily" be intertwined with the merits of
the underlying dispute:
Doubt whether grievance procedures or some part of them apply to a par-
ticular dispute, whether such procedures have been followed or excused,
or whether the unexcused failure to follow them avoids the duty to arbi-
trate cannot ordinarily be answered without consideration of the merits of
the dispute which is presented for arbitration. 50
1
The John Wiley Court had already determined that an arbitrator
had the authority to resolve, and the parties were required to arbitrate,
the merits of the underlying dispute.0 Then in discussing the griev-
ance procedures, the John Wiley Court reasoned that whether the
grievance procedures, prerequisites to arbitration, were satisfied
would implicate the merits of the underlying dispute.5 3 The John
Wiley Court thought that an analysis of the arguments regarding the
following of the grievance procedures "depends to a large extent on
how one answers questions bearing on the basic issue, the effect of
the merger."" ° The John Wiley Court reasoned that it was illogical for
496. Id. at 546.
497. Id. at 555-56.
498. Id. at 557.
499. Id. at 556.
500. Id.
501. Id. at 557.
502. Id.
503. Id.
504. Id. (emphasis added).
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such "intertwined issues... raising the same questions on the same
facts... to be carved up between two different forums."505  Conse-
quently, the court held "[o]nce it is determined, [by the court], that the
parties are obligated to submit the subject matter of a dispute to arbi-
tration,"5°6 then such "'procedural' questions which grow out of the
dispute and bear on its final disposition should be left to the arbitra-
tor." 07
In John Wiley, the Court determined that the procedural issue
should be decided by an arbitrator because the issue was intertwined
with the merits which the arbitrator had authority to resolve. 8 Con-
sidered properly in the context of the John Wiley opinion, the phrase
"'procedural' questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its
final disposition should be left to the arbitrator ' '51 refers to procedural
questions, the consideration of which implicates the merits of the un-
derlying dispute. In Howsam, the Court quoted this phrase from John
Wiley in identifying procedural arbitrability issues."' Although the
Howsam Court did not focus on whether consideration of the six-year
time limit may involve consideration of the merits of the underlying
dispute, courts have recognized that statute of limitations issues may
involve consideration of issues bearing on the merits of the underlying
dispute.5 '
It seems that it would not be necessary to consider the merits of an
underlying claim in determining whether an arbitration agreement
provides for class arbitration. For example, whether or not Green
Tree violated a state statute requiring disclosures would not implicate
whether the arbitration clause in Green Tree's contracts provide for
class arbitration. Determining whether an agreement provides for






510. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79, 84 (2002) (citing John Wiley & Sons,
376 U.S. at 557).
511. Fechter v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 800 F. Supp. 178, 180 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (finding
"statute of limitations defense... inextricably intertwined with the fiduciary duty issue"); see
also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Gregg, No. 93-177-CIV-OC-16, 1993 WL
616691, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 1993) ("This Court determines, therefore, that the arbitration
panel is better equipped to address Merrill Lynch's statute of limitations concerns because the
issues surrounding the statute of limitations questions are inextricably intertwined with the
Greggs' substantive claims."); Corbo v. Les Chateau Assoc., 127 A.D.2d 657, 658 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1987) (statute of limitations issues which were "intertwined with the ultimate substantive
issues" should be determined by arbitrator).
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claim is barred under a rule providing for a time limitation, which
might necessitate consideration of facts that may be relevant to resolv-
ing the merits of the underlying claim. In Del E. Webb Construction
v. Richardson Hospital Authority,"2 the Fifth Circuit held that a court,
and not an arbitrator, should determine whether a written agreement
provides for consolidated arbitration proceedings. 53 In reaching this
holding, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that, unlike the situation in John
Wiley where resolving whether a claim is time barred may be inter-
twined with the merits, determining whether an arbitration agreement
provides for consolidation would not necessitate consideration of the
merits of the underlying dispute:
The question in [John Wiley], whether contractual prerequisites to arbitra-
tion have been satisfied, is for the arbitrator because invariably that ques-
tion is intertwined with the underlying facts. The arbitrator, with the full
case before it, can better determine whether there has been contractual
compliance. Indeed, as Justice Harlan explained in [John Wiley]: "Ques-
tions concerning the procedural prerequisites to arbitration do not arise in
a vacuum; they develop in the context of an actual dispute about the rights
of the parties to the contract or those covered by it .... Doubt whether
grievance procedures or some part of them apply to a particular dispute,
whether such procedures have been followed or excused, or whether the
unexcused failure to follow them avoids the duty to arbitrate cannot ordi-
narily be answered without consideration of the merits of the dispute
which is presented for arbitration." The question of consolidation, how-
ever, is tor the district court because the court must determine only
whether the contract provides for consolidated arbitration, a question free
of the underlying facts.514
Although the Fifth Circuit in Pedcor treated Del E. Webb as over-
ruled by Bazzle because Bazzle purportedly "held" that whether a con-
tract provides for class arbitration is for an arbitrator to decide,515 the
Fifth Circuit's Del E. Webb decision has not been overruled by Bazzle
because as explained above, Bazzle did not result in such a holding. 16
Under the rationale of Del E. Webb, courts may properly address
whether a contract provides for class arbitration.
Turning to Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent in Bazzle, although
the opening paragraph of his dissent states that courts should make the
determination whether a contract provides for class arbitration, the
reasoning in the rest of his dissent appears to focus on who should
512. 823 F.2d 145 (5th Cir. 1987).
513. Del E. Webb Constr., 823 F.2d at 150.
514. Id. at 149-50 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
515. Pedcor Mgmt. Co. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Nations Pers. of Texas, Inc., 343 F.3d
335, 363 (5th Cir. 2003).
516. See supra Part I.C.3.
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make the determination of a slightly different, although arguably re-
lated, issue: who is the appropriate decision-maker regarding how an
arbitrator should be selected." 7 After arguing that courts are the ap-
propriate decision-maker regarding the arbitrator selection process and
after determining the proper arbitrator selection procedure set forth in
the contracts at issue, Chief Justice Rehnquist reasoned class arbitra-
tion would contravene the particular arbitrator selection procedure
agreed to by the parties.5"8
In concluding that there is a presumption that courts, not arbitra-
tors, should resolve disputes regarding the selection of an arbitrator
and the selection process set forth in the arbitration agreements at is-
sue was inconsistent with class arbitration, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in
Bazzle, relied on the Supreme Court's earlier decision in First Op-
tions.5" 9 In Bazzle, Chief Justice Rehnquist cited a passage from First
Options explaining that courts, not arbitrators, should determine
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a matter:
[G]iven the principle that a party can be forced to arbitrate only those is-
sues it specifically has agreed to submit to arbitration, one can understand
why courts might hesitate to interpret silence or ambiguity on the 'who
should decide arbitrability' point as giving the arbitrators that power, for
doing so might too often force unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they
reasonably would have thought a judge, not an arbitrator would decide.
52 0
Chief Justice Rehnquist then explained that "[j]ust as fundamental
to the agreement of the parties as what is submitted to the arbitrator is
to whom it is submitted. Those are the two provisions in the sentence
quoted above [from First Options], and it is difficult to say that one is
more important than the other. I have no hesitation in saying that the
choice of arbitrator is as important a component of the agreement to
arbitrate as is the choice of what is to be submitted to him."'521 The
concern in this passage from First Options involves forcing an unwill-
ing party to arbitrate an issue that the party reasonably expected a
judge to decide, and Chief Justice Rehnquist appears to be saying that
there should be equal concern for forcing an unwilling party to arbi-
trate before Arbitrator A when the party reasonably expected Arbitra-
tor B, selected by a different process, to administer the arbitration.
Chief Justice Rehnquist then concluded that "the parties' agreement as
517. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 455-59 (2003).
518. Id. at 459.
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to how the arbitrator should be selected is much more akin to the
agreement as to what shall be arbitrated, a question for the courts un-
der First Options,"'522 than issues of procedural arbitrability presump-
tively for an arbitrator under Howsam.523 Although the opening para-
graph of his dissent states that courts, not arbitrators, should make the
determination whether a contract provides for class arbitration, his
dissent really focuses on who is the appropriate decision-maker for the
selection process of an arbitrator. 24
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the procedure for selecting
an arbitrator is a component of the agreement equally important to ar-
bitrate as the scope of issues to be submitted to arbitration, and thus
there should be a presumption that a court resolve debates about the
procedure. There appears to be a concern for forcing an unwilling
party to arbitrate before Arbitrator A when the party reasonably ex-
pected Arbitrator B, selected by a different procedure, to administer
the arbitration. This concern appears to lead down a slippery slope,
and a similar concern arguably exists in connection with other arbitra-
tion procedures. For example, what if the parties disagree over the
procedure for discovery in arbitration, and each party contends that
they had an agreement regarding a different procedure for discovery?
Shouldn't there be a similar concern for forcing an unwilling party to
arbitrate under one set of discovery rules when the parties purportedly
agreed to an entirely different set of discovery rules because arbitra-
tion is a matter of agreement, and under Chief Justice Rehnquist's ra-
tionale, wouldn't this concern suggest that a court should resolve is-
sues regarding arbitral discovery procedures?5 25
Nevertheless, there is some support for treating the selection pro-
cedure for an arbitrator differently than other arbitral procedures, and
thus the slope may not be too slippery. Chief Justice Rehnquist's
view that the selection of an arbitrator is an issue presumptively for
the courts is consistent with 9 U.S.C. § 5, which provides for judicial
intervention regarding the selection of an arbitrator. Section 5, which
was not cited by any of the Justices in Bazzle, states that "[ilf in the
agreement provision be made for a method of naming or appointing an
522. Id. at 457.
523. Id.
524. Id. at 455.
525. Issues regarding discovery procedures have been treated as procedural arbitrability
issues for an arbitrator to resolve. See, e.g., Titan/Value Equities Group, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 4 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
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arbitrator or arbitrators or an umpire, such method shall be followed."
However:
[I]f no method be provided [in the arbitration agreement], or if a method
be provided and any party thereto shall fail to avail himself of such
method, or if for any other reason there shall be a lapse in the naming of
an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, or in filling a vacancy, then upon the
application of either party to the controversy the court shall designate and
appoint an arbitrator or arbitrators or umpire, as the case may require, who
shall act under the said agreement with the same force and effect as if he
or they had been specifically named therein; and unless otherwise pro-
vided in the agreement the arbitration shall be by a single arbitrator.
5 2 6
Thus, the FAA empowers courts to play a central role in the selec-
tion process of arbitrators, including designating and appointing an ar-
bitrator to administer an arbitration if a party fails to follow a method
for selection of an arbitrator. Moreover, even if there is no method
provided in the arbitration agreement for selection of an arbitrator, the
court still may designate and appoint an arbitrator upon application of
one of the parties.
Courts have construed the language of arbitrator selection clauses
in discussing the appointment of arbitrators. For example, in Harris v.
Green Tree Financial Corp.,527 the Third Circuit addressed an arbitra-
tion clause with the exact same language regarding selection of an ar-
bitrator as the arbitration clause at issue in Bazzle: "selected by us
[Green Tree] with the consent of you. '528 After finding that the con-
sumer's interpretation of this arbitrator selection clause was flawed
and explaining how the clause should be properly construed, the Third
Circuit stated that if a failure would occur in following this proper ar-
bitrator selection process, either party may petition a court under 9
U.S.C. § 5 to appoint an arbitrator.529
526. 9 U.S.C. § 5 (2004) (emphasis added).
527. 183 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1999).
528. Harris, 183 F.3d at 177.
529. Id. at 183 ("We note, however, that the language of the arbitration clause does not
comport with the Harrises' interpretation of their rights regarding the choice of arbitrator.
Rather, the clause provides that the arbitrator will be 'selected by us [Green Tree] with the
consent of you [the Harrises].' In the event that Green Tree and the Harrises do not agree on
Green Tree's choice of arbitrator, section five of the FAA provides that either party may peti-
tion the court to appoint an arbitrator."); see also Lloyd v. Hovensa, LLC, 369 F.3d 263, 270
(3d Cir. 2004) (noting 9 U.S.C. § 5 provides for judicial resolution of disputes regarding the
selection of an arbitrator); Continental Cas. Co. v. QBE Ins., No. 03 C 2222, 2003 WL
22295377 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 7, 2003) (appointing third member of tri-partite arbitration panel
pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 5); Neptune Maritime, Ltd. v. H & J Isbrandtsen, Ltd., 559 F. Supp.
531 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (recognizing that 9 U.S.C. § 5 empowers courts to appoint arbitrators
and appointing arbitrator where party failed to comply with arbitration agreement). See gen-
erally 3 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND
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In discussing the division of authority between arbitrators and
courts under the FAA, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the ex-
pectation of the parties. For example, in First Options, the Supreme
Court explained that a court is generally the correct decision-maker to
determine whether parties agreed to arbitrate a matter because to hold
otherwise would "force unwilling parties to arbitrate a matter they rea-
sonably would have thought a judge, not an arbitrator would de-
cide."53 Similarly, in Howsam, the Court explained that a substantive
arbitrability issue generally involves a "circumstance where contract-
ing parties would likely have expected a court to have decided the
gateway matter, where they are not likely to have thought that they
had agreed that an arbitrator would do so, and, consequently, where
reference of the gateway dispute to the court avoids the risk of forcing
parties to arbitrate a matter that they may well not have agreed to arbi-
trate." '531 Procedural arbitrability, on the other hand, involves situa-
tions "where parties would likely expect that an arbitrator would de-
cide the gateway matter. 532
It seems that parties may reasonably expect that a court would de-
cide issues regarding the selection of an arbitrator. It has been recog-
nized by the leading treatise on federal arbitration law that selection of
an arbitrator "is the most important decision arbitrating parties can
make. 5 33 Because of the importance of this decision, it seems that
parties may generally expect that a court, with the greater protections
provided through the judicial processes, would presumptively resolve
issues regarding the selection of an arbitrator. If the parties dispute
the selection process of an arbitrator such that a complete impasse oc-
curs in the selection process, it would be practically impossible for an
arbitrator properly selected by the parties to resolve the dispute, and it
seems that parties would expect a court, rather than an arbitrator, to
resolve this issue. Moreover, suppose that Party X would consent to
Arbitrator A to administer non-class arbitration, but would prefer Ar-
bitrator B to administer class arbitration. It may be problematic to
force Party X to choose an arbitrator and to submit to that arbitrator
the question of whether class arbitration is permitted when the answer
to that question would significantly impact the initial choice of an ar-
REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 29 (Supp. 1999).
530. First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995).
531. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, 537 U.S. 79, 83-84 (2002).
532. Id. at 84.
533. MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 529, § 27.1 (emphasis added).
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bitrator, which has been recognized as the most important decision
that can be made regarding arbitration.
Turning back to the hypothetical example set forth above in Sec-
tion II.D., involving Customer #401 who brings a claim in federal
court against Blue Tree and purports to represent a class of similarly
situated individuals. If Blue Tree files a motion to compel arbitration
pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 4, the court may direct Customer #401 and
Blue Tree to arbitrate in accordance with Customer #401's agree-
ment. 4 If the court adopts Chief Justice Rehnquist's position in Baz-
zle, the court may resolve whether Customer #401's agreement pro-
vides for a class arbitration mechanism. Also, if class arbitration is
commenced and if thirty of the absent class members believe there is
no valid arbitration agreement to arbitrate on a class-wide basis, there
is no uniform procedure for resolving the contract principle as dis-
cussed above in Section II.D.2. Blue Tree perhaps may stop the pro-
ceedings and file a motion to compel arbitration with respect to these
thirty customers, and a court adopting Chief Justice Rehnquist's posi-
tion in Bazzle may determine whether a valid agreement to arbitrate
on a class-wide basis exists. Alternatively, the thirty customers may
object, and the arbitration proceedings may continue subject to the ob-
jection of these class members, and these objections may be subse-
quently heard by a court upon a: motion to confirm or vacate an award,
unless these thirty customers feel strongly enough to immediately file
suit in court. These customers may bring suit in court on the underly-
ing claim, or file a declaratory judgment action regarding the duty to
arbitrate, or both, any of which may trigger a motion to compel arbi-
tration by Blue Tree. A court adopting Chief Justice Rehnquist's posi-
tion may then address whether these thirty individuals have a valid
agreement to arbitrate on a class-wide basis.535 Similarly, if Customer
#401 commences a class arbitration against Blue Tree, and Blue Tree
refuses to participate believing there was no agreement for class arbi-
tration, there would be several options. For example, Customer #401
may stop the proceedings and bring a motion to compel arbitration, or
Blue Tree may decide to bring a declaratory judgment action in court,
534. See supra Part ll.D. 1.
535. These thirty Customers may attempt to show that there is no valid arbitration agree-
ment at all. If these thirty Customers wish to contest whether their valid arbitration agree-
ments provide for class arbitration or not, it may be an uphill battle to the extent that a court
has already addressed the contract. For example, if Customer #401 initially filed a class ac-
tion in court and the class arbitration was instituted pursuant to a court order compelling arbi-
tration, whether the contract provided for class arbitration or not may have already been ad-
dressed by the court.
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and if the court adopts Chief Justice Rehnquist's position, the court
may address whether the agreement provides for class arbitration.
To summarize, the existence of an arbitration agreement is a cru-
cial issue which legitimizes the entire arbitral process. The summary
judgment-like procedure established by the FAA to determine whether
a valid arbitration agreement exists before ordering a party to arbitrate
is problematic in connection with ordering potentially thousands of
individuals to arbitrate, but the procedure may nevertheless be worka-
ble in a class arbitration context if the court focuses on the aggrieved
party and the party in default as provided by the FAA. Moreover,
some type of procedure should be in place in the arbitration proceed-
ing to help ensure that all the class members are bound by valid arbi-
tration agreements. Finally, with respect to the issue whether a court
or arbitrator should determine if an arbitration agreement provides for
class arbitration, there is some support for Chief Justice Rehnquist's
position in dissent that a court is the correct decision-maker.
III. CONCERNS REGARDING APPELLATE REVIEW AND DUE PROCESS IN
CONNECTION WITH CLASS ARBITRATION
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended in
1998 to provide for a discretionary interlocutory appeal of an order
granting or denying class action certification.53 6 The Advisory Com-
mittee Notes regarding this amendment explained the concerns justify-
ing the expansion of opportunities for appeal of certification orders:
An order denying certification may confront the plaintiff with a situation
in which the only sure path to appellate review is by proceeding to final
judgment on the merits of an individual claim that, standing alone, is far
smaller than the costs of litigation. An order granting certification, on the
other hand, may force a defendant to settle rather than incur the costs of
defending a class action and run the risk of potentially ruinous liability.
537
Courts have recognized a "death-knell" effect that a class certifi-
cation order may have on litigation. With respect to plaintiffs, the de-
nial of a class certification may "defeat[] the case as a practical matter
because the stakes are too small and the litigation costs are too high
536. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(t) ("A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal from
an order of a district court granting or denying class action certification under this rule if ap-
plication is made to it within ten days after entry of the order. An appeal does not stay pro-
ceedings in the district court unless the districtjudge or the court of appeals so orders.").
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for the individual plaintiff to go forward." '538 With respect to defen-
dants, the grant of class certification can "propel the stakes of a case
into the stratosphere," placing "undue pressure" on a defendant to en-
ter into a "blackmail" settlement of potentially weak claims rather
than risk "bet-the-company" liability.539 The Advisory Committee
Notes regarding Rule 23(f) recognize that the amendments were
adopted to address these death-knell concerns, which "can be met at
low cost by establishing in the court of appeals a discretionary power
to grant interlocutory review .... -140
Similarly, in class arbitration, the denial of certification may end
the arbitration as a practical matter because costs may be too expen-
sive for a claimant to continue, and the grant of class certification may
place undue pressure on respondents to settle weak claims. In judicial
class actions, the death-knell may now be silenced by means of Rule
23(f), which allows courts of appeals "unfettered discretion" to permit
an interlocutory appeal based upon "any consideration that the court
of appeals finds persuasive."54' However, the death-knell in class ar-
538. In re Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 953, 957 (6th Cir. 2002).
539. Blair v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 181 F.3d 832, 834 (7th Cir. 1999) ("Many corpo-
rate executives are unwilling to bet their company that they are in the right in big-stakes liti-
gation, and a grant of class status can propel the stakes of a case into the stratosphere. In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995), observes not only that class actions
can have this effect on risk-averse corporate executives (and corporate counsel) but also that
some plaintiffs or even some district judges may be tempted to use the class device to wring
settlements from defendants whose legal positions are justified but unpopular. Empirical
studies of securities class actions imply that this is common."); Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d at
957; see also Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001) (recogniz-
ing that class certification orders may impose upon defendants a "bet-your-company deci-
sion" and may "induce a substantial settlement even if the customers' position is weak"); Rut-
stein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., 211 F.3d 1228, 1241 n.21 (11th Cir. 2000) (referring to "the
blackmail value of a class certification that can aid the plaintiffs in coercing the defendant
into a settlement").
540. See FRCP Note, supra note 537.
541. Hevesi v. Citigroup Inc., 366 F.3d 70, 76 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing FRCP Note, see supra
note 537). The Advisory Committee Note also recognizes that "courts of appeals will de-
velop standards for granting review that reflect the changing areas of uncertainty in class liti-
gation," and courts have adopted flexible standards regarding when leave to appeal should be
granted. FRCP Note, see supra note 537. See, e.g., Hevesi, 366 F.3d at 76 & n.4 (stating that
the standard for granting leave to appeal is whether the petitioner demonstrates "either (1) that
the certification order will effectively terminate the litigation and there has been a substantial
showing that the district court's decision is questionable, or (2) that the certification order im-
plicates a legal question about which there is a compelling need for immediate resolution,"
but recognizing that the standard "is a flexible one that should not be reduced to any bright-
line rules") (citing In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 262 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2001)); Delta Air
Lines, 310 F.3d at 959 (recognizing Rule 23(f) standards adopted by other circuits and con-
cluding that "[l]ike the courts that have spoken on the issue, we eschew any hard-and-fast test
in favor of a broad discretion to evaluate relevant factors that weigh in favor of or against an
interlocutory appeal").
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bitration may be more likely to continue somberly tolling as a result of
the limited review of arbitral decisions recognized by courts, which
has been described as among the "narrowest known to the law." '542
Section 10 of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10, provides certain grounds
for vacating arbitral awards upon application to a court by any party to
the arbitration,543 and it is well-recognized that judicial review of arbi-
542. Pfeifle v. Chemoil Corp., No. 03-20047, 2003 WL 21999540, at *3 (5th Cir. Aug. 22,
2003) ("Courts consistently emphasize the narrowness of judicial review of arbitration
awards, describing it as 'among the narrowest known to the law"') (citation omitted); Brown
v. Coleman Co., Inc., 220 F.3d 1180, 1182 (10th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that "[m]aximum
deference is owed to the arbitrator's decision" and the standard of review "is among the nar-
rowest known to law"); Widell v. Wolf, 43 F.3d 1150, 1151 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Over and over
we have held that arbitrators' errors-even clear or gross errors--do not authorize courts to
annul awards.") (internal citation omitted).
543. 9 U.S.C. § 10 provides the following grounds for vacating an arbitral award:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hear-
ing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and mate-
rial to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party
have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that
a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
Some courts have held that these grounds are the exclusive grounds for vacating an arbitral
award. See, e.g., e.spire Communications, Inc. v. CNS Communications, No. 02-1089, 2002
WL 1492560, at *6 (4th Cir. July 15, 2002) (finding FAA provides exclusive grounds for va-
catur of an arbitration award); Decker v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 205
F.3d 906, 909 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding FAA provides exclusive remedy for challenging arbi-
tration award); Eljer Mfg., Inc. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1994)
("Arbitration does not provide a system of 'junior varsity trial courts' offering the losing party
complete and rigorous de novo review .... A restrictive standard of review is necessary to
prevent arbitration from becoming a 'preliminarv step to judicial resolution."') (citations
omitted); Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., v. Ellis, 849 F.2d 264, 267 (7th
Cir. 1988) (explaining that 9 U.S.C. § 10 provides the exclusive grounds for vacating an arbi-
tral award and recognizing that "[a]rbitration is an alternative to the judicial resolution of dis-
putes, and an extremely low standard of review is necessary to prevent arbitration from be-
coming merely an added preliminary step to judicial resolution rather than a true alternative")
(citation omitted). However, courts have recognized grounds for vacating arbitral awards
such as "manifest disregard of the law" that do not track the exact language of the statute, and
there has been some uncertainty regarding whether these labels are accepted non-statutory
grounds or whether they simply are paraphrases of some of the grounds set forth in 9 U.S.C. §
10 such as the provisions regarding arbitrators who "exceeded their powers." See, e.g., Mose-
ley, 849 F.2d at 268 n.7 (recognizing that some courts "have suggested that an award may be
set aside if it is in 'manifest disregard of the law,"' but refusing to adopt this non-statutory
grounds for vacating an arbitral award) (citations omitted). However, some language in First
Options indicates that the Supreme Court approves of the manifest disregard of the law stan-
dard. See Williams v. Cigna Fin. Advisors Inc., 197 F.3d 752, 759 (5th Cir. 1999) (recogniz-
ing that "clear approval of the 'manifest disregard' of the law standard in the review of arbi-
tration awards under the FAA was signaled by the Supreme Court's statement in First
Options that 'parties [are] bound by [an] arbitrator's decision not in manifest disregard of the
law."') (citation omitted); see also 4 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW:
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tral decisions is extremely limited. The Fourth Circuit has discussed
this policy behind the well-established limited review of arbitral deci-
sions as follows:
We must underscore at the outset the limited scope of review that courts
are permitted to exercise over arbitral decisions. Limited judicial review
is necessary to encourage the use of arbitration as an alternative to formal
litigation. This policy is widely recognized, and the Supreme Court has
often found occasion to approve it. A policy favoring arbitration would
mean little, of course, if arbitration were merely the prologue to prolonged
litigation .... Opening up arbitral awards to myriad legal challenges
would eventually reduce arbitral proceedings to the status of preliminary
hearings. Parties would cease to utilize a process that no longer had final-
ity. To avoid this result, courts have resisted temptations to redo arbitral
decisions. As the Seventh Circuit put it, "[a]rbitrators do not act as junior
varsity trial courts where subsequent appellate review is readily available
to the losing party." Thus, in reviewing arbitral awards, a district or appel-
late court is limited to determining "whether the arbitrators did the job
they were told to do-not whether they did it well, or correctly, or rea-
sonably, but simply whether they did it."544
AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 40.7.1
(Supp. 1999) (explaining that First Options "gave reinforcement to the use of the extra-
statutory ground of manifest disregard of the law," but adoption of this rule "is by no means
inconsistent with the proposition that FAA § 10 sets out exclusive grounds for vacation" and
use of this manifest disregard rule "should seldom if ever affect actual outcomes of decisions"
because a "court proceeding under FAA § 10(a)(4) may use what is essentially a manifest-
disregard-of-the-law analysis to determine whether arbitrators exceeded their powers"); id. §§
40.5.1.2-1.3.
544. Remmey v. PaineWebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted);
see also National Boatland, Inc. v. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp., 230 F.3d 1359, 2000 WL
1434671, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 19, 2000) ("[I]t is well-established that judicial review of a
commercial arbitration award is extremely limited," and "[w]hen courts are called on to re-
view an arbitrator's decision, the review is very narrow, one of the narrowest standards of re-
view in all of American jurisprudence.") (citations and internal quotations omitted); Amicizia
Societa Navegazione v. Chilean Nitrate & Iodine Sales Corp., 274 F.2d 805, 808 (2d Cir.
1960) ("Were we empowered to view the matter de novo, we would find much to persuade in
the arguments advanced by the dissenting arbitrator. But as respondent recognizes, the
court's function in confirming or vacating an arbitration award is severely limited. If it were
otherwise, the ostensible purpose for resort to arbitration, i.e., avoidance of litigation, would
be frustrated.") (citation omitted); MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 543, at § 40.1.4 (recognizing
long history of judicial reluctance to vacate arbitration awards); Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu
Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 216 n. 10 (2d Cir. 2002) (refusing to vacate award despite "serious
reservations about the soundness of the arbitrator's reading of this contract" and explaining
the "standard of review constrains us to affirm an arbitrator's judgment 'even if a court is
convinced he committed serious error"') (citations and internal quotations omitted); B-S Steel
of Kansas, Inc. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 321 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1220-21 (D. Kan. 2004) ("Mere
error or misunderstanding of law is not enough." There must be a showing that "the arbitra-
tors knew the law and explicitly disregarded it." The court denied a motion to vacate an award
where movant failed to show a "willful inattentiveness to the governing law.") (citations omit-
ted).
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In describing this extremely limited review of arbitral awards,
courts have explained that "a motion to vacate filed in a federal court
is not an occasion for de novo review of an arbitral award," and a
"federal court cannot vacate an arbitral award merely because it is
convinced that the arbitration panel made the wrong call on the
law. '545  Moreover, the general rule is that courts do not allow inter-
locutory review of an arbitral decisions pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 10 dur-
ing an arbitration proceeding. 46
However, with respect to judicial class actions, discretionary in-
terlocutory appeals are explicitly recognized by Rule 23(f), and al-
though the standard of review with respect to judicial class certifica-
tion orders is generally an abuse of discretion standard, some issues
are reviewed de novo, in contrast to the extremely narrow review tra-
ditionally accorded to arbitral awards. For example, the First Circuit
has explained that "[n]ominally, review of decisions granting or deny-
ing class certification is for 'abuse of discretion,' but this chameleon
phrase is misleading. Express standards for certification are contained
in Rule 23, so an appeal can pose pure issues of law reviewed de
lOVO." ' 54  Class arbitrations, like judicial class actions, may have a
545. Wallace v. Buttar, No. 03-7158, 2004 WL 1753392, at *7 (2d Cir. Aug. 5, 2004); see
also Sun Ship, Inc. v. Matson Navigation Co., 785 F.2d 59, 62 (3d Cir. 1986) (pursuant to the
very limited scope of review permitted by 9 U.S.C. § 10, courts may not "consider whether
the arbitrators committed an error of law"); Abbott Labs. v. Orasure Techs., Inc., No. 04 C
1857, 2004 WL 887383, at *4 (N.D. 111. Apr. 23, 2004) ("[Ajrbitrators' errors-even clear or
gross errors--do not authorize courts to annul awards.") (citation omitted); Choice Hotels
lnt'l, Inc. v. Patel, No. Civ. A. DKC 2003-2318, 2004 WL 57658 (D. Md. Jan 13, 2004) (an
error of law does not suffice to overturn an arbitral award); Cunningham v. Pfizer Inc., 294 F.
Supp. 2d 1329, 1331 (M.D. Fla. 2003) ("The party seeking vacatur has the burden to over-
come the strong presumption under the Federal Arbitration Act that the arbitration award
should stand. A court reviewing an arbitration decision does not review the issues submitted
to arbitrators de novo,") (citation omitted); Companhia De Navegacao Maritima Netumar v.
Armada Parcel Serv., Ltd., No. 96 Civ. 6441, 1997 WL 16663, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 1997)
("[E]rrors of fact or of law do not constitute reasons to vacate or modify an arbitration.") (ci-
tations omitted); Nitram, Inc. v. Industrial Risk Insurers, 848 F. Supp. 162, 165 (M.D. Fla.
1994) ("Respondents are in effect, asking this Court to review the Arbitrator's Award de
novo. The level of scrutiny given to an Arbitrator's award is not that intrusive and moreover,
because such awards are given greater deference, this Court shall not make such a review.").
546. See, e.g., Michaels v. Mariforum Shipping, S.A., 624 F.2d 411, 414 (2d Cir. 1980)
("[A] district court does not have the power to review an interlocutory ruling by an arbitration
panel" under the FAA.) (citations omitted); Hart Surgical, Inc. v. Ultracision, Inc., 244 F.3d
231, 233-34 (1 st Cir. 2001) (In applying 9 U.S.C. § 10, "[ilt is essential for the district court's
jurisdiction that the arbitrator's decision was final, not interlocutory." "The prerequisite of
finality promotes the role of arbitration as an expeditious alternative to traditional litigation,"
but there are some exceptions to this general rule.) (citations omitted).
547. Tardiff v. Knox County, 365 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); see also
London v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 340 F.3d 1246, 1251 (1 1th Cir. 2003) ("[W]hether the dis-
trict court applied the correct legal standard in reaching its decision on class certifica-
tion ... is a legal question that we review de novo.") (citation omitted); Sikes v. Teleline, Inc.,
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death-knell effect for plaintiffs and defendants, which may justify a
relaxing of the traditionally narrow standard of review for arbitral de-
cisions and the permitting of interlocutory appeals.
It should also be remembered that as arbitrations are a matter of
private agreement, the procedures in a class arbitration are subject to
the agreement of the parties. Although the AAA Class Rules are pat-
terned after Rule 23, "[t]here is no federal policy favoring arbitration
under a certain set of procedural rules; the federal policy is simply to
ensure the enforceability, according to their terms, of private agree-
ments to arbitrate." '548 As colorfully stated by Judge Posner, "[ijndeed,
short of authorizing trial by battle or ordeal or, more doubtfully, by a
panel of three monkeys, parties can stipulate to whatever procedures
they want to govern the arbitration of their disputes." '549 It has long
been recognized that constitutional due process concerns are signifi-
cant in judicial class actions, 5° and there may be similar concerns re-
garding whether the procedures for a class arbitration created by pri-
vate agreement comport with constitutional due process. However,
some courts have held that private arbitration does not involve state
action, and thus, constitutional due process concerns are inapplica-
ble. 551
281 F.3d 1350, 1359 (11 th Cir. 2002) ("if the court's certification was 'erroneous as a matter
of law,"' then the class should be decertified.) (citation omitted).
548. Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 476
(1989) ("[Pjarties are generally free to structure their arbitration agreements as they see fit, so
too may they specify by contract the rules under which that arbitration will be conducted.").
Id. at 479.
549. Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, 28 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994).
550. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985) ("[Djue process
requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to remove
himself from the class by executing and returning an 'opt out' or 'request for exclusion' form
to the court."); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846 (1999) (recognizing that manda-
tory class actions "implicate the due process 'principle of general application in Anglo-
American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in
which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of
process"') (citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40(1940)).
551. In Davis v. Prudential Sec., Inc., the Eleventh Circuit firmly held:
[W]e agree with the numerous courts that have held that the state action element of
a due process claim is absent in private arbitration cases. See, e.g., Federal De-
posit Ins. Corp. v. Air Florida Sys., Inc., 822 F.2d 833, 842 n.9 (9th Cir. 1987)
("The arbitration involved here was private, not state, action; it was conducted
pursuant to contract by a private arbitrator. Although Congress, in the exercise of
its commerce power, has provided for some governmental regulation of private ar-
bitration agreements, we do not find in private arbitration proceedings the state ac-
tion requisite for a constitutional due process claim."), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 987
(1988); Elmore v. Chicago & Illinois Midland Ry. Co., 782 F.2d 94, 96 (7th Cir.
1986) ("[T]he fact that a private arbitrator denies the procedural safeguards that
are encompassed by the term 'due process of law' cannot give rise to a constitu-
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Although the holding that private arbitration does not involve
state action is not without its critics, 52 to the extent that due process
challenges to arbitration are foreclosed by the acceptance of this "no
state action" holding by courts, individuals would have to rely on
other avenues to address a class arbitration that they believe goes
awry. Although 9 U.S.C. § 10 indirectly regulates arbitral procedures
by providing parties with a mechanism to request the vacating of an
arbitral decision,5 3 the standard of review with respect to arbitral de-
cisions, as recognized above, has traditionally been extremely narrow,
and more relaxed standards of review may help ensure the fairness of
class arbitration.554
tional complaint."); Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers
Local Union 42 v. Absolute Envtl. Servs., Inc., 814 F. Supp. 392, 402-03 (D. Del.
1993) (no state action in arbitration proceedings pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement between private parties); Austern v. Chicago Bd. Options Exch., Inc.,
716 F. Supp. 121, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that the conduct of an arbitration
panel "did not in any way constitute state action"), aff'd, 898 F.2d 882 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 850 (1990). In the present case, the arbitration was a private
proceeding arranged by a voluntary contractual agreement of the parties. Accord-
ingly, the arbitration proceeding itself did not constitute state action.
59 F.3d 1186, 1191 (11th Cir. 1995).
552. See, e.g., Richard C. Reuben, Public Justice: Toward A State Action Theory Of Alter-
native Dispute Resolution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 577, 629 (1997) ("In short, the mandatory statu-
tory schemes that allocate the roles of the private ADR providers and the public courts toward
the single end of state-enforced dispute resolution can establish an inseverable and indispen-
sable nexus between the seemingly private actors and their governmental partners. This rela-
tionship represents an extremely high level of government assistance and benefits for other-
wise seemingly private conduct. As such, the 'private use of the [procedure] with the help of
state officials constitutes state action."') (citation omitted).
553. See generally 4 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS,
AwARDs, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT § 40.1.1 (Supp. 1999) (rec-
ognizing that the provisions of 9 U.S.C. § 10 that allow vacation of arbitral decisions "can be
brought to bear respecting the conduct of arbitration proceedings").
554. Compare Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 951 (9th Cir. 2003) (whether notice of a
proposed settlement in a judicial class action satisfies due process is a question of law re-
viewed de novo) with Nitram, Inc. v. Indus. Risk Insurers, 848 F. Supp. 162, 165 (M.D. Fla.
1994) ("Respondents are in effect, asking this Court to review the Arbitrator's Award de
novo. The level of scrutiny given to an Arbitrator's award is not that intrusive and moreover,
because such awards are given greater deference, this Court shall not make such a review.").
Compare Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 811-812 (1985) (recognizing that in
order for absent class members in a judicial class action to be bound, minimal due process
protections require, inter alia, that the class members receive notice) with Gingiss Int'l, Inc. v.
Bormet, 58 F.3d 328, 332 (7th Cir. 1995) ("The Bormets contend that the arbitration award
should be vacated because they did not receive proper notice of the arbitration proceedings.
We have repeatedly held that 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) provides the exclusive grounds for setting aside
an arbitration award under the FAA. ... Inadequate notice is not one of these grounds, and
the Bormets' claim therefore fails.").
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CONCLUSION
In Mitsubishi, Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Marshall in dissent,
raised some concerns whether arbitration agreements with respect to
particular claims should be enforceable in light of the narrow standard
of review for arbitral decisions and the "rudimentary procedures" that
may exist in arbitration, such as procedures that do not "provide any
right to evidentiary discovery or a written decision" or procedures that
may require that "all proceedings be closed to the public." '555 These
Justices explained that:
Arbitration awards are only reviewable for manifest disregard of the law, 9
U.S.C. §§ 10 .... and the rudimentary procedures which make arbitration
so desirable in the context of a private dispute often mean that the record
is so inadequate that the arbitrator's decision is virtually unreviewable.
Despotic decisionmaking of this kind is fine for parties who are willing to
agree in advance to settle for a best approximation of the correct result in
order to resolve quickly and inexpensively any contractual dispute that
may arise in an ongoing commercial relationship. Such informality, how-
ever, is simply unacceptable when every error may have devastating con-
sequences for important businesses in our national economy and may un-
dermine their ability to compete in world markets. Instead of muffling a
grievance in the cloakroom of arbitration, the public interest in free com-
petitive markets would be better served by having the issues resolved in
the light of impartial public court adjudication. 556
Although these concerns were addressed in the context of the arbi-
trability of antitrust claims, similar concerns may exist in arbitral class
actions. An error by a single arbitrator in a class arbitration with na-
tionwide ramifications may negatively impact thousands of individu-
als and yet remain insulated from review, and informal procedures
may not adequately protect the interests of all involved. Although in-
creased formality in class arbitration and increased judicial interven-
tion to review class arbitral awards may help alleviate concerns about
the propriety of class arbitrations as a means of providing collective
justice, imposing more court-like procedures and providing increased
opportunity for judicial review would help bring class arbitration full-
circle and closer to a traditional model of a judicial class action, forc-
ing an inquiry into the value of having class arbitration as a form of
aggregate dispute resolution in the first place.
It has been observed that more people are using arbitration as a
means of dispute resolution than ever before, and "[a]rbitration pro-
555. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 656, 657
n.31 (1985) (citation omitted).
556. Id. at 656-57 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
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vides a valuable alternative to the time and complexity of lawsuits for
consumers and companies, and for employees and employers,
alike." '557 With the trend toward class arbitration in the wake of Bazzle
and potentially more claims being resolving in arbitration, it is impor-
tant for courts to recognize that Bazzle did not set forth binding prece-
dent, and courts should develop their own reasoned opinions regarding
class arbitration issues and treat Bazzle "as a point of reference for fur-
ther discussion. ' ' 58 Also, Congress may want to consider amending
the FAA to specifically address certain issues that may arise in class
arbitration, such as the availability of interlocutory review and the ap-
propriate standard of review of class arbitration decisions. Further-
more, specific procedures should be considered in the context of class
arbitration to help respect the core principle that arbitration is a matter
of agreement. As the use of class arbitration increases, there will be
more opportunities to consider the intersection of class procedure and
arbitration and to evaluate whether class arbitration is an appropriate
method for aggregate dispute resolution.
557. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, FAIR PLAY: PERSPECTIVES FROM AMERICAN
ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION ON CONSUMER AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION 7, 37 (2003); see
also id. at 7 n.2 ("There were some 1,170,000 cases filed for administration with the Ameri-
can Arbitration Association from 1990 through 2001," which was "more than the number of
cases filed with AAA in the previous 65 years since its inception.").
558. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 737 (1983) ("Wihile the lower courts generally have
applied the Coolidge plurality's discussion of 'plain view,' it has never been expressly
adopted by a majority of this Court." Such a plurality view fails to establish "binding prece-
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